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ABSTRACT

THE NATION AS A COMMUNICATIVE CONSTRUCT:
TOWARD OF THEORY OF DIALOGIC NATIONALISM

By
Joseph T. DeCrosta
May 2014

Dissertation supervised by Janie Harden Fritz, Ph.D.
This project seeks to explore the subject of nation and nationalism in the context of
rhetoric and the philosophy of communication. By exploring ancient tropes of nation through
rhetorical figures such as Isocrates in Ancient Greece and Cicero in the Roman Republic;
through Kant, the Enlightenment and modernity; and, through postmodern interpretations, I
attempt to reconceptualize the nation as a communicative construct while pointing to what may
lie ahead for the future. By applying Anderson’s (2006) concept of “imagined communities” as
an interpretative framework, the nation appears to be a more fluid, contingent space for
communication that is grounded in ancient and Enlightenment ideals, but is perhaps
reconfiguring in the face of postmodern complexity as advanced by scholars such as Appadurai
(1996) and Smith (1979, 1983, 1995, 1998, 2008, 2010). The transition from antiquity and
modernity to postmodernity is characterized by what I call a theory of “dialogic nationalism,”
which has roots in Martin Buber’s understanding of dialogue (1988, 1996, 2002) and his writings
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on nationalism (2005). Dialogic nationalism may serve as an alternative hermeneutic for the
nation within the postmodern moment. The experience of international students in the United
States and the complex issue of immigration around the world are also explored as practical
applications for dialogic nationalism.
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Chapter 1
The Nation as a Communicative Construct:
Grounding the Nation in Communication and Rhetorical Theory
Throughout history the concept of the nation has textured our notions of
communication and community. Disagreement abounds about how and when the nation
occupied our social consciousness and constructed the ways in which we have organized
our lives in personal, social, political, economic and communicative realms (Anderson,
2006; Gellner, 1983; Kedourie, 1993; Smith, 1983, 1995). The structural components of
the nation seem to serve as a panacea for political, social, religious, and communicative
problems, while others have seen the nation and nationalism as a significant cause for
many political, social, and communicative problems (one must only refer to American
Exceptionalism (Bell, 1989; Huntington, 2004; Tyrrell, 1991), Nazism in Germany
(Bendersky, 2013), Fascism in Italy (Gregor, 1979), and Afrikaner and African national
movements in South Africa (Mandela, 1995), to name a few). Although often viewed as a
social and political construct that we often take for granted (see Billig’s concept of “banal
nationalism,” 1995), the nation seems to shape the ways in which we view our
situatedness within it and communicate across its physical and existentialphenomenological borders to address the complexities and ambiguity of everyday life.
This project assumes that the nation plays a significant role in our everyday identities and
the ways we choose to communicate and structure our realities.
Although the nation has been analyzed mainly as a historical, political and
economic construct, this project considers the nation specifically through a
rhetorical/communicative lens that shapes the ways in which we consider our place in the
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world as individuals and social beings. We can see the rhetorical qualities of the nation
as they have been characterized more recently through tropes such as “imagined”
(Anderson, 2006) and “discursive” (Calhoun, 1997) that offer alternative renderings of
what has traditionally been framed as the nation. The foundation for this thinking seems
to be grounded in rhetorical principles—or, what I view as the formal and informal
construction of communication that helps us attain truths by engaging communication to
negotiate our realities through social cooperation and communal action. Bitzer’s (1968)
and Hauser’s (1999) characterizations of rhetoric resonate with such an understanding.
While defining what he terms “the rhetorical situation,” Bitzer (1968) suggests that,
“…rhetoric is a mode of altering reality, not by the direct application of energy to objects,
but by the creation of discourse which changes reality through the mediation of thought
and action,” while Hauser (1999) sees rhetoric not merely as persuasive language, but
“the symbolic inducement of social cooperation” (p. 14).
At the moment it seems that the traditional understanding of the nation currently
seems to be under scrutiny, as the postmodern moment appears to present a number of
challenges. As a historical and academic concept, the postmodern moment is wrought
with qualities that express deep rhetorical contingency and fluidity, multiple and varied
points of reference, and frequent narrative disagreement about historical, social, political,
economic and communicative issues in our world. I will discuss understandings of the
postmodern moment through voices such as Lyotard (1984) and Giddens (1990) in more
detail later, but this conception of postmodernity underlies the overall purpose and theme
of this project since the characteristics of postmodernity create a tension that does not
seem to allow ideas of the nation to persist as they have in the past. Rather, the concept
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introduces a cacophony of voices that question the traditional understanding of the nation
and its legitimacy and utility in our current historical moment (Appadurai, 1996;
Habermas, 2001; Smith, 1998). As the postmodern moment and a modern concept of the
nation seem to run concurrently, we may be able to find new ways of negotiating national
and cultural identities that respond to the nuances of human interaction in the postmodern
moment. Questions of the nation and nationalism are foregrounded on a daily basis as we
witness and experience the effects of war, terrorism, social, cultural and economic
globalization, migrations (forced and voluntary), cultural conflict, and transformed
cultural identity. Nations and nationalism provide such unreflective structures in which
we function as political and cultural beings that we fail to consider any other system that
could manage our political, economic and cultural challenges. This unreflective
assumption seems to be a result of modernity.
The nation as a modern construct, emerging and developing with the dawn of
modernity in the Enlightenment is a common theme (Anderson, 2006; Gellner, 1983;
Habermas, 2001; Kedourie, 1993). Anthologies on the nation and nationalism often
begin with Enlightenment thinkers (Dahbour & Ishay, 1995); however, as we will see, the
overall concept of the nation has been communicated in cultures and societies as early as
the Greeks and Romans. Post-Enlightenment, contemporary renderings of the nation
have consistently resulted in a concept that has been appropriated by various intellectual,
political, cultural and economic perspectives that tend to place the concept at odds with
itself.
Anderson (2006) insists that the concept of the nation is a paradox – although
nations carry the political weight to exert powerful influence on people and frame
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cultures, theories of nation lack the substantive philosophical ground that permits us to
invest a great deal of faith in this social structure that organizes and frequently interprets
our lives. “In other words, unlike most ‘isms,’ nationalism has never produced its own
grand thinker: no Hobbeses, Tocquevilles, Marxes, Webers. This ‘emptiness’ easily
gives rise, among cosmopolitan and polylingual intellectuals, to certain condescension.
Like Gertrude Stein in the face of Oakland, one can rather quickly conclude that there is
‘no there there’” (Anderson, 2006, p. 5). For Anderson, the nation is nothing more than
an empty concept; he highlights Hobsbawm’s statement that nationalism is “Marxism’s
great historical failure” (p. 3). Ernest Gellner (1983) contends that we are better served
by studying those scholars who contributed to the understanding of the nation more
indirectly such as the philosophers and the rhetoricians, than by those scholars who chose
to study the concept of nation itself.
[Nationalism] preaches and defends continuity, but owes everything to a decisive
and unutterably profound break in human history. It preaches and defends
cultural diversity, when in fact it imposes homogeneity both inside and, to a lesser
degree, between political units. Its self-image and its true nature are inversely
related, with an ironic neatness seldom equaled even by other successful
ideologies. Hence it seems to me that, generally speaking, we shall not learn too
much about nationalism from the study of its own prophets.” (Gellner, 1983, p.
125, emphasis added)
The internal structure and actual reality of the concepts frequently seem to contradict
themselves, and for this reason scholarship and even popular debates on nationalism are
widely varied, polarizing and often controversial.
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A common feature of the nation and the field of communication is their
unreflective, interdisciplinary nature and how they are often embedded into quotidian life
without question or contest (Billig, 1995). Thus, a communicative approach is not only
unique but also productive when exploring the nation’s and nationalism’s roots in
premodern, modern and postmodern orientations. Anderson’s analysis that the idea of
nationalism has never produced a “grand thinker” may be pre-emptive or even inaccurate,
while Gellner provides an alternative constructive approach for exploring the nation
through multiple scholarly viewpoints that may have in fact granted the concept various
“grand thinkers” who would have understood this particular concept emerging from
questions arising in given historical moments (Arnett & Arneson, 1999). The question
rests with whether we would consider ancient thinkers like Isocrates and Cicero as
“prophets” of the nation or rather thinkers who discussed such ideas more as products of
their overall philosophies. Contemporary scholars rarely refer to these ancient
predecessors as thinkers who engaged ideas about the nation, but by taking a more
deliberate rhetorical stance, we see that the seeds had been planted and nurtured even
within antiquity. More recent scholarship (Cohen, 2000; Smith 1979, 1983, 1995, 1998,
2008, 2010) understands the value of classical political philosophy and the ground from
which much scholarship on the nation must begin. This project recognizes the value of
ancient rhetoricians in particular, as Isocrates and Cicero provide substantive glimpses
into the beginnings of nationalistic thinking and how the nation emerges, not only as a
political entity, but also as a rhetorical and phenomenological entity. Scholarship in
modernity enlarges the ideas of these ancient scholars, and transforms ideas of the nation
and nationalism, as we tend to understand them today. It is important to recognize the
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communicative continuity involved in understanding the nation and nationalism and how
such continuity in rhetorical representation has shaped the ways in which we have
engaged the nation’s power, not only through political, economic and juridical
metanarratives, but also in individual, interpersonal and dialogic micronarratives.
Marx’s project is perhaps the most intense modern account of the nation, but
clearly it is based on economic principles; the economic construct acts as a hermeneutic
entrance through which we can begin to comprehend the complex relationship of
individuals, society and the economy under the rubric of nation. For Marx, bourgeois
actions and behaviors based in feudalistic economic structures had to be burst asunder
and a new organizing entity generated through economic forces and framed by
nationalistic, even isolationist tendencies, had to rise up to protect the workers of the
world (Findlay, 2004). For Anderson (2006), this Marxist form of the nation never truly
takes shape as it focuses purely on economic origins and lacks a substance that addresses
real social and human dimensions. Rather, for Anderson, the nation is most significantly
a rhetorical phenomenon—“’an imagined political community,’ imagined as both
inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the
smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear
of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson, 2006,
p. 6). Although nations are, at first glance, territorialized within particular physical
spaces, this “imagined” character is phenomenological; nations not only exist on land,
they live in the minds, hearts and souls of people. Anderson also points out that national
identity often supersedes forms of inequality and discrimination that tend to emerge in
social contexts within the nation’s imagined borders. For Anderson, in other words,
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regardless of conflicts of race, culture or class, individuals and groups alike often are
prepared to identify themselves through national citizenship without question. “It is an
imagined community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that
may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship”
(Anderson, 2006, p. 7).
The validity of Anderson’s claim that the idea of the nation is not substantially
philosophically grounded is questionable, however. We can see early versions of the
nation even in the ancient world. Aristotle advanced the idea that humans are essentially
at their core political creatures: individual beings that are naturally organized into
communal structures for the good of the polis. The first lines of Aristotle’s Politics bring
the communal life of the polis into focus:
Observation tells us that every state is an association, and that every association is
formed with a view to some good purpose. I say “good,” because in all their
actions all men do in fact aim at some good, that association which is the most
sovereign among them all and embraces all others will aim highest, i.e. at the
most sovereign of all goods. This is the association which we call the state, the
association which is “political.” (Aristotle, 1981, Politics, p. 54)
To understand this Aristotelian principle, one could argue that modern (and postmodern
citizens, for our purposes of this study) are teleologically pulled toward community life
realized in the structure of the nation. For Aristotle (1999), the polis provided the
structure in which its members were free to engage in debate and deliberation under
which the minimal good could be attained and agreed upon (Ethics, p. 2). Plato, Aristotle,
Isocrates, and Cicero all recognized that the polis or civitas provided the existential-
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phenomenological space in which individuals and groups could strive for justice and
rational thought. Just as the family (oikos) provided a similar, but more interpersonal,
structure under which individuals could function, the polis provided a larger, public
structure under which individuals could work, worship, and interact productively on a
larger scale. Although Aristotle saw the polis as a much smaller version of the modern
nation-state, he still saw its function as a sovereign political unit (Irwin, 1999, p. 320).
Anderson (2006), perhaps, fails to see the power of Ancient Greek thought as a
precursor to the nation, or perhaps considers the polis to be a diluted form of the modern
nation. In understanding these scholars’ commentary on how one’s dedication to an
identity linked to the nation can often trump other internal social conflicts and inequality,
we can explore the idea of the nation in terms of a polis extended to larger land masses
and populations. Cohen’s (2000) work on considering Athens as a nation is rife with the
complexities of a nuanced society. Cohen engages Anderson’s work to justify Athens’
foundational role in nation studies. Although Anderson does little to acknowledge the
value of the ancient world in the historical development of the nation, Cohen employs
Anderson’s idea of “imagined communities” to ground his idea of Athens, and thus the
polis, as an early form of nation. The nation, even as an extended form of the polis,
offers us a social structure under which we can socially and culturally identify where
other commonalities may not exist. In other words, we may begin to give the idea of
nation-state some philosophical weight by engaging Aristotle’s and Isocrates’
understanding of the polis and Cicero’s analysis of the res publica. This “horizontal
comradeship” (Anderson, 2006, p. 7) that supposedly exists within individuals of the
modern nation may have also existed in Ancient Greece and Rome.
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Imagined, Discursive and Existential-Phenomenological Communities
As mentioned earlier, scholars such as Anderson (2006), Calhoun (1997) have
defined the concept of the nation through metaphors of ”the imagined community,” and
“ a discursive construct,” respectively; Deutsch (1966; 1969) sees the nation “a product
of social communication,” mostly through the channels of modern communication
technologies. He adds, “A Nation, so goes a rueful European saying,‘is a group of
persons united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their
neighbors’” (Deutsch, 1966, p. 3, emphasis added); more specifically, Deutsch defines a
nation as, “a people who have hold of a state or who have developed quasi-governmental
capabilities for forming, supporting, and enforcing a common will. And a nation-state is
a state that has become largely identical with one people” (Deutsch, 1966, p. 19,
emphasis added). Deutsch offers a rather straightforward historical, practical
understanding of the nation; his understanding is largely framed in modernity as it offers
a more technical explanation of the qualities of a nation, while tropes such as “imagined”
and “discursive” seem to provide an existential-phenomenological hermeneutic entrance
for understanding alternative renderings of what has traditionally been framed as the
nation.
In this discussion of “altering reality” (Bitzer, 1968) and “social cooperation,”
(Hauser, 1999) communication and rhetoric are the foundations and the channels through
which the nation becomes a reality through our communication with others. For these
reasons we will see that an application of Anderson’s concept of the “imagined
community” (2006) is appropriate for the various forms of the nation and nationalism
throughout Western history. Since I will define the nation largely as a communication
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construct (not mainly political, economic or cultural), by applying concepts and theories
of communication and rhetoric, we will see how our understandings of the nation have
begun a transmutation from monologic forms of communication to dialogic forms of
communication (Buber, 1988; 1996; 2002).
As a theoretical framework, this project will employ Anderson’s (2006)
understanding of the nation as an “imagined community” as a transition toward a theory
of the postmodern nation and nationalism. Such a paradigm provides us with substantive
scholarship for the way in which the nation might be conceived in postmodernity, after
investigating the various iterations of national phenomena in particular historical
moments. The “imagined community” has been cited in recent scholarship on the
contemporary nation (e.g., Appadurai, 1996; Billig, 1995; Calhoun, 1997; Smith, 1995,
1998, 2010), as it appears to touch on what seems to be most present and salient to our
understanding of the development of nations and nationalism—the constitutive power of
communicative action. Nations are not the monolithic, permanent structures that we
often consider them to be, but rather collective existential-phenomenological entities that
live in the hearts and minds of their inhabitants. Once the community is imagined, more
permanent political, economic, social and communicative structures emanate to form
what we see to be real, tangible entities. Although Anderson’s theory is clearly anchored
in post-Enlightenment phenomena, as it depends on the absence of a dynastic ruling
structure and the use of modern communication methods such as the printing press, the
underlying themes of participatory communicative structures still ring true.
Two elements of Anderson’s conceptual framework are important for our study:
that is, the development of print capitalism, and the ability for mass-produced texts to
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allow for simultaneous communication across wide geographic areas. Nations are
communities imagined in their citizenry because citizens are able to produce and access
the same information in their own language over large land areas. The development of
the printing press and the ability to distribute this information to multitudes of people
throughout one politically unified area not only allowed for the distribution of farreaching, cohesive messages to one “people” who spoke the same language, but also
allowed for a more temporal phenomenon which Anderson outlines as “simultaneity”
(Anderson, 2006, p. 24), which he borrows from Benjamin (1973). Simultaneity is the
ability for us to construct phenomena of the past and future concurrently in the present
moment. Simultaneity plays a significant role in the way people feel as members of
groups as large as nations. Here, in the recesses of “suspended” moments divorced from
our chronological understanding of time, the idea of an imagined world emerges. This
phenomenon, however, is not a metaphysical imagining of our consciousness to construct
abstract notions of national structures, but pragmatic displays of how, in fact, we
participate in the large context of nation as citizens. This phenomenon of simultaneity
channeled through powerful forms of communication, mostly mass communication in
this case, reconstructs larger, more tangible ideals of culture and nation. Anderson
attributes such phenomena to the power of the novel and the newspaper (p. 25).
The significance of the mass ceremony—Hegel observed that newspapers serve
modern man as a substitute for morning prayers—is paradoxical. It is performed
in silent privacy, in the lair of the skull. Yet each communicant is well aware that
the ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or
millions) of others of whose existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he

11

has not the slightest notion. Furthermore, this ceremony is incessantly repeated at
daily or half-daily intervals through the calendar. What more vivid figure for the
secular, historically clocked, imagined community can be envisioned. (Anderson,
2006, p. 35)
Anderson (2006) places this phenomenon at the dawn of the Enlightenment when the
understanding of cosmology and history were no longer conceptualized as one integrated
identity (pp. 22; 35); rather, the invention of new communication technologies,
particularly print media, allowed for the two to live in separate realms, where history
began to create new perceptions of peoples’ place in their worlds. One might argue, that
ancient rhetorical practices (which were often considered the basis for all forms of
education by orators like Isocrates and Cicero) are perhaps an early form of
communication that led to this simultaneity as a driving force for constituting political,
social, and cultural communities. We see the idea of community formation through moral
rhetorical practices emerge consistently throughout the works of Plato, Aristotle,
Isocrates, and Cicero that focus on politics and rhetoric itself, to name a few. As an
example, Nichols (1987) points out that, “In writing a Rhetoric about speech that aims at
the advantageous and the just, Aristotle is therefore trying to strengthen political
community…The potential harmfulness of rhetoric is outweighed by its potential good. If
rhetoric does unite men in speech about the advantageous and the just, it would promote
political community” (p. 676). For the purposes of this project, I extend the notion of
political community to that of the nation in modernity and postmodernity.
Much scholarly inquiry, such as Cohen’s and Nussbaum’s (1996) volume For
Love of Country, Benhabib’s (2006) Another Cosmopolitanism, and Appiah’s (2005)
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Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers, has posited cosmopolitan thought as a
counterpoint to nationalism through themes of patriotism (a form that takes into the
account the need to rebuke radical isolationist patriotism), hospitality to cultural others,
and ethical approaches for understanding the Other. Nationalism is often lurking deep in
the subtext of each of these conversations, but little work in the field of communication
or, more particularly, the philosophy of communication has called the idea of nationalism
to the forefront as a communicative construct that openly affects the ways in which we
talk about the world around us, our very existence in that world, and the existence of the
self in relation to the Other in the world. At best, some scholars have explored the
rhetorical power behind nationalist sentiment (Shields, 1974; Breuning and Ishiyama,
1998; Van Noije and Hijmans, 2005), but few have constructed a theory that offers an
active response to the transformative historical moment of postmodernity where national
structures appear more tenuous and, quite possibly, intercultural. One exception is
Appadurai’s (1996) inquiry into what he views as the slowly disintegrating character of
the nation, on which I will focus in more detail later. At first glance, we can credit the
growth of communication technologies, transportation and the global economy for this
transition, but if we are to excavate a bit deeper, we might find more substantive
theoretical constructs that offer an alternative understanding of why and how such a
phenomenon is emerging.
There is a need to explore this tension with nation itself and how we, as a human
family, can begin to transform traditional ideas of the nation into postmodern identities
that speak directly to the challenges, alliances, and negotiations of contemporary life.
Nationalism has been a rhetorical trope through which we seek solace, identify our

13

friends, and organize against our enemies; yet, it is axiomatic that nationalistic, political
issues have been the subject of the most powerful rhetoric ever spoken, redirecting,
recasting, and reconstituting the world in which we live. One must only refer to a few of
the influential rhetoric and speeches of national leaders such as Abraham Lincoln,
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Adolf Hitler, and Benito Mussolini
(Bytwerk, 2008; Gilbert, 2012; Safire, 2004; Welch, 1993) to understand how the role of
language and rhetoric has deployed entire societies toward communicative action at time
of conflict and national pride. At the center of this rhetoric resides the existentialphenomenological entity of the nation. There seems to be a teleological power in the
phenomenology of nationalism; however, this power is currently questioned in a context
of connected, but competing, often conflicting, narratives (Lyotard, 1984; Appadurai,
1993; 1996; Arnett and Arneson, 1999). These narratives are products of communicative
acts, whether through the increasing complexity and frequency of culturally diverse
human encounters or the proliferation of highly advanced technologies that change the
way we communicate with those within and outside of our own national structures. In
other words, we must ask: How can communication theory help us explore traditional
understandings of the nation and offer an understanding of the emergence of the
postmodern nation? How does a postmodern perspective shift our traditional
understanding of the nation and nationalism? How can the philosophy of communication
and communication theory situate an interpretative theory of the postmodern nation that
responds to the current historical moment?
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Multiple Narratives, Shifting Epistemologies
I hope to answer these questions by focusing this project will focus on
rhetorical/historical understandings of the nation within antiquity, modernity and
postmodernity. I will attempt to frame modernity and postmodernity through the eyes of
Giddens (1990) and Lyotard (1984) to situate the question at hand. Both scholars have
helped define these significant historical moments that have textured the ground from
which communication about the nation emerges.
Giddens’ (1990) sociological inquiry into the concept of modernity illuminates
various characteristics of modernity and how it has guided the direction in which
institutions and people have developed since the Enlightenment. He points out that the
emergence of modernity can, in fact, be pinned to a particular place and time—17th
century Europe, which often simplifies the complexities and social phenomena that began
to emerge, and according to him, continue to emerge today. However, Giddens believes
that modernity must be defined in terms of particular characteristics that emerged from
this rhetorical shift and continue to persist until today. According to Giddens, time-space
distanciation (p. 14), the disembedding of social systems (p.21), and the reflexivity of
knowledge (p. 36) are three phenomena that have contributed to the emergence and
establishment of modern norms.
These concepts are particularly significant because of the way modernity is
thought to have reorganized the existential-phenomenological construct of time and place
and how this bifurcation, which did not exist in premodern societies, altered the ways in
which we perceived social phenomena and our place in them. Such a phenomenon
encouraged individuals to be more “bounded” to certain modern social constructs such as
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the nation; perhaps the most obvious form of modern institutionalization thus far.
“Modern societies (nation-states), in some respects at any rate, have a clearly defined
boundedness. But all societies are also interwoven with ties and connections which
crosscut the sociopolitical system of the state and the cultural order of the ‘nation.’
Virtually no pre-modern societies were as clearly bounded as modern nation-states” (p.
14). “Disembedding” is the concept that Giddens describes as a certain form of “lifting
out of social relations from local context of interaction and their restructuring across
indefinite spans of time-space” (p. 21). Disembedding takes on two different forms,
symbolic tokens, much like the complex system of money which symbolizes value but is
not the value of something itself, and expert systems, or the reliance on professional
knowledge that reassures us that information is valid and reliable without questioning its
legitimacy. We rely on these disembedded systems and trust them without question (pp.
21-29).
Reflexivity is how we epistemologically systematize our world based on the
knowledge we gain from the “lifting out” and bracketing of particular social phenomena
(p. 36). This reflexivity alters the role of tradition in that it radically shifts the ways
people have engaged the past and focuses them more on the future. Social decisions and
human behavior become a result of this reflexive knowledge and, in this sense,
knowledge is driven by rational claims backed by clear evidence. In other words, grand
narratives are guided by rational knowledge that is a result of bracketed social
phenomena on which we choose to focus our energies.
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Postmodernity, on the other hand, is often viewed with the end of this
foundationalism within modernity as well as the “end of history” (Giddens, 1990, p. 50).
Giddens (1990) interprets postmodernity as something very specific and pins it to:
[The fact] that we have discovered that nothing can be known with certainty,
since all pre-existing ‘foundations’ of epistemology have been shown to be
unreliable; that ‘history’ is devoid of any teleology and consequently no version
of ‘progress’ can plausibly be defended; and that a new social and political
agenda has come into being with the increasing prominence of ecological
concerns and perhaps of new social movements generally. (p. 46)
Postmodernity seems to lack the rigid certitude and the epistemological confidence that
seems to be a feature of modernity; rather, it throws us into a realm of contingency where
the modern structures that we depend on for knowledge and action may no longer apply.
These aspects that emerge in postmodernity may force us to reconsider the
epistemological, ontological and existential structures of our world.
Having identified postmodernity in the face of modernity, Giddens (1990)
believes that we are not actually involved in a clear historical break from modernity, but
that perhaps these characteristics are more accurately representative of what we might
consider to be “late modernity,” since the ability to do such a thing would be antipostmodern, by definition. More importantly, these uncertainties about human reasoning
and empiricism were really an essential part of the foundational thinking of modernity.
Rather, than the absolute end of modernity and the dawn of postmodernity, Giddens sees
this more specifically as “modernity coming to understand itself” (p. 48). These elements
from Giddens offer helpful insight for our understanding of modernity; these particular
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characteristics that he identifies as part and parcel of modernity all point to the existence
of what we refer to as grand narratives that guide people and social knowledge deeply.
This academic question regarding the end of modernity and the emergence of
postmodernity is an important one, but for the purposes of this study, it is necessary to
focus on how Giddens understands the shift in the way modernity has been characterized
and how it has been understood. Most importantly, Giddens sees these changing
characteristics that seem to explain modernity more accurately occurring in the power
relations of the West with the rest of the world. These power relations that are a result of
a developing modernity are, in fact, implicating the nation and referring to characteristics
of what we now call globalization (p. 52). Regardless of how we choose to define it,
rhetoric plays a role in redefining how we understand society and actively engage
communication, from the interpersonal to the international. This paradigmatic shift
shapes the ways in which we understand the nation.
Lyotard (1984), on the other hand, views postmodernity as a more imminent
emerging phenomenon. In his seminal work, “The Postmodern Condition,” Lyotard
describes postmodernity as a moment in which knowledge is framed by an “incredulity
toward metanarratives” (p. xxiv). Unlike the modernist project of constructing a
centralized, monolithic, universal narrative that guided our epistemological stance,
postmodernity recognizes a moment when critical, reflexive, hermeneutic knowledge
essentializes the organic whole of social life (Lyotard, 1984). This organic quality is
interpreted through systems of complexity and difference that are characteristic of the
postmodern moment. “Postmodern knowledge is not simply a tool of the authorities; it
refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the
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incommensurable. Its principle is not the expert’s homology, but the inventor’s
paraology” (Lyotard, 1984, p. xxv).
Postmodern knowledge questions the legitimacy of social order as it is rhetorical
and discursive in nature and lacks a central metanarrative to which the modern
framework refers. Rather, it lives in the grassroots that generate civil societies and, to
paraphrase Hauser’s (1999) concept, “vernacular publics” that force us to consider
alternative modes of social organization through discursive practices. For Lyotard, the
internal continuity of the postmodern moment not only affects culture, institutions, and
how we communicate, but also the very structure and narrative of the nation as we
understand it in modernity.
For the mercantilization of knowledge is bound to affect the privilege the nationstates have enjoyed, and still enjoy, with respect to the production and distribution
of learning. The notion that learning falls within the purview of the State, as the
brain or mind of society, will become more and more outdated with the increasing
strength of the opposing principle, according to which society exists and
progresses only if the messages circulating within it are rich in information and
easy to decode. The ideology of communicational ‘transparency’ which goes
hand in hand with the commercialization of knowledge, will begin to perceive the
State as a factor of opacity and ‘noise.’ (Lyotard, 1984, p. 5)
Lyotard situates public discourse and the diversity of messages within those discourses at
the center of a transforming idea of nation, which is situated within these conceptions of
postmodernity. Throughout this project, I will attempt to characterize the “postmodern
nation” as a phenomenon that is indeed “affected by the mercantilization of knowledge”
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and morphs into an entity that is perhaps a product of “opacity and noise,” in Lyotard’s
terms. Access to information and how that information is conveyed in the post-industrial,
postmodern moment undermines our current notion of national structures and forces us to
look beyond for systems, or, better, multiple narratives, that will tell the story of
complexity and multiplicity while recognizing the need to organize learning and
knowledge under a new rubric. Lyotard acknowledges the dissenters who believe that
“the breaking up of the grand Narratives” will disrupt society beyond repair, but contests
this notion, recognizing that modernity is not the only answer to utopian notions of
“organic” societies (p. 15). On the contrary, postmodernity engages social “organicism”
more readily and realistically than modernity and, as a result, may transform the very
notion of the nation-state, nationalism and national identity, as we know it.
President Barack Obama’s inaugural speech on January 20, 2009, exemplifies this
dialectical tension of a modernist nation and nationalism situated in postmodern
principles. Attempting to call forth a new era of optimism in the face of daunting
political, economic and cultural crises, Obama is compelled to invoke traditional, some
might say, modernist, language and images of nationalism while recognizing
concomitantly the shifting nature of modernity.
What the cynics fail to understand is that the ground has shifted beneath them,
that the stale political arguments that have consumed us for so long, no longer
apply… Our challenges may be new, the instruments with which we meet them
may be new, but those values upon which our success depends, honesty and hard
work, courage and fair play, tolerance and curiosity, loyalty and patriotism—
these things are old. These things are true. They have been the quiet force of
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progress throughout our history.” (emphasis added, New York Times, January 20,
2009)
Obama emphasizes the liminal (to borrow Turner (1964) and Van Gennep’s (1960) term)
moment in which we live—a need to “shift the ground beneath us” while continuing to
reflect on the universal qualities that have grounded us in modernity since antiquity and
the Enlightenment. Obama’s campaign focused almost incessantly on the metaphor of
change, but the fact may be that this is more a moment of “prudent change,” since we
must still rely on those virtues and values that have grounded us for so long.
Nevertheless, rhetoric like Obama’s is symbolic of a new transitional moment, where the
dialogic “between” (Buber, 2002) can become powerful and real; such rhetoric plays
directly into the transformative character of the nation and the power of nationalism in
postmodernity.
Nationalism continues to command substantive power in all levels of political,
social and economic life despite its amorphous, loosely-defined nature (Anderson, 2006);
but, more accurately, the nation is a genuine ontological expression of how we are
encouraged to live in communion with each other while simultaneously emphasizing a
world of discrete cultural, political and economic differences. One must look only to
recent international events such as September 11, 2001, to understand the power of
nationalism and national identity in the face of threats and contrasting narratives
presented to us through alternative, “other,” frameworks (Huntington, 2004). In these
cases, nationalism becomes what seems to be a natural human response to threat and
outside pressures. Images of homeland are reified in tangible institutions such as the
Department of Homeland Security that were created in response to extra-national
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pressures like the tragedies of September 11, 2001. When our governments and the public
sphere respond to conflict by enacting institutions and modes of thinking that reinforce
nationalistic thinking, it is difficult to accept that the nation-state, especially in terms of
power and protection, may transform in reaction to a shift in epistemological and
ontological narratives. I would suggest, however, that the postmodern moment announces
epistemological and ontological narratives for the condition of the nation and nationalism
that encourage us to recast traditional understandings and the current condition of the
conceptualization of the nation.
As a powerful rhetorical device, one hermeneutic entrance into understanding the
nuanced historical and philosophical underpinnings of the nation, or what some scholars
would consider the lack thereof (Anderson, 2006 p. 5), could be to explore the rich
metaphors of the nation throughout history, particularly through the words and
conceptual constructs of the rhetoricians who were embedded in their particular time and
place. By examining these various rhetorical metaphors from the Greeks, Romans,
modern, and postmodern scholars, we begin to see common themes, but also transitional
moments—the rhetorical turns—that have shaped the conceptualization of nation in
various ways, all characterized in persuasive and influential ways that work powerfully
because of their incorporation into the universe of discourse of scholars and citizens.
Although Anderson’s main objective was to show us how the nation as an “imagined
community” is largely a product of modernity, we can apply the overall concept of an
imagined community to earlier forms of communication throughout history.
An existential-phenomenological stance allows us to bracket theories of the nation
to permit them to emerge as ideas that respond to the current historical moment to create
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ground for taking action to improve public (and private) life. By bracketing these theories
we can limit their totalizing effect and allow a new understanding to emerge.
Poststructuralist approaches reflect the contingent, diverse world in which we live;
themes of “post-modernity” (Lyotard, 1984), a “post-national” society (Appadurai,
1993), “post-colonial” environments (Appiah, 1991), or “post-ethnic” contexts
(Hollinger, 2006) have emerged with vigor and have been accepted throughout the
academy. These rhetorical tropes of “post-ness” intensify our need to comprehend
existential-phenomenological reality of change in social life. Moving beyond antiquity
and modernity, post-positivist and post-structuralist approaches are indicators that we, as
a society and interconnected world, have begun to understand what intercultural
complexities present to us and how they offer a particular hermeneutic to open up a world
in flux wrought with contingency and possibility—if, in fact, we are open to experience
such phenomena. These problems are not new, but rather framed within a new, more
realistic and pragmatic context that expresses not what “is,” but what “might be” in a
complex world of multiplicity and cultural diversity. The concept of nation rests on the
cusp of this “post-ness,” as it seems to struggle between acknowledging its deep roots in
linear, unidirectional, monologic modernity while actively living in a world of holistic,
multidirectional, dialogic postmodern uncertainty.
In this exploration of the nation as a rhetorical structure we will examine
particular metaphors and thinkers in the development of nationalistic thought. This study
will not be an exhaustive historical analysis, but rather an exploration of important
rhetorical turns in our thinking about the nation, or the “imagined community.” Although
Anderson parallels contemporary ideals of the nation with metaphors of antiquity, such as
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the fall of the “dynastic realm” and the development of “print capitalism,” the metaphor
of his “imagined community” still holds true when we apply it to concepts of
rhetorical/civic education as the basis for the nation as it is grounded deeply in
communicative culture. We will explore earlier rhetorical understandings of communal
life, how its boundaries are imagined and how they contribute to our current context and
the postmodern iteration.
These glimpses provide an understanding of how the modern nation has
developed and how its foundation is formed in communicative action, which often is
taken for granted in our thinking about the nation. Such an exploration holds
implications for educational, geopolitical, economic and cultural spaces. Most
importantly, this study will attempt to offer a postmodern understanding of the nation as
opposed to the current context of our world that continues to be dominated by
Enlightenment thinking.
Dialogic Communication: A Hermeneutic for Postmodern Nationalism
To what extent, then, can communication framed by the nation be perceived as
monologic or dialogic communication? Martin Buber (2002) outlines his idea of dialogic
communication as an existential-phenomenological occurrence in everyday life. It is
through dialogic communication that we engage the world and respond to the Other;
meaning emerges “between Man and Man,” in the communities in which we live, not in a
vacuum of solitary confinement (p. 23). Buber defines dialogic communication in
relation to what he calls technical dialogue and monologic communication.
There is genuine dialogue- no matter whether spoken or silent—where each
participant really has in mind the other or others in their present and particular
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being and turns to them with the intentional of establishing a mutual relation
between himself and them. There is technical dialogue, which is prompted solely
by the need of objective understanding. And there is monologue disguised as
dialogue, in which two of more men, meeting in space, speak each with himself in
strangely tortuous and circuitous ways and yet imagine they have escaped the
torment of being thrown back on their own resources. The first kind, as I have
said, had become rare; where it arises, in no matter how “unspiritual” a form,
witness is borne on behalf of the continuance of the organic substance of the
human spirit. The second belongs to the inalienable sterling quality of “modern
existence.” But real dialogue is here continually hidden in all kinds of odd
corners and, occasionally in an unseemly way, breaks surface surprisingly and
inopportunely — certainly still oftener it is arrogantly tolerated than downright
scandalizing — as in the tone of a railway guard’s voice, in the glance of an old
newspaper vendor, in the smile of a the chimney-sweeper. (Buber, 2002, p. 22)
This notion of dialogic versus monologic communication has been appropriated
throughout the academy to describe what we might popularly call not only “effective”
communication, but also meaningful communication guided by an ethical orientation
(Anderson, Arnett & Cissna, 1994; Anderson, Baxter & Cissna, 2004; Arnett, 2004).
Although monologue and technical dialogue are important in the realm of human life and
action in appropriate contexts (Arnett, Fritz & Bell, 2009), a dialogic orientation provides
a fitting approach to the current project. Dialogic communication provides substantive
ground for a study about the postmodern nation, as it contextualizes and situates an
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understanding of contemporary nationalism within the disciplinary domain of
communication theory.
Buber (2005) also wrote prolifically on issues of nationalism in regards to the
Palestinian question in the early part of the 20th century. Buber’s philosophy of dialogic
communication pervades his work on nationalism, and like many of these aforementioned
scholars, Buber views nationalism as a necessary spiritual and pragmatic force that
organizes and gives credence to certain political goals; however, he sees a strong human
tendency for the misappropriation of such powerful ideas (p. 54). Nationalism does not
mean that individuals and society as a whole must only look within for answers; instead,
the nationalism that actually creates the possibility of difference based on physical
borders and human sentiment concomitantly allows us to exist in a dialogic world of
discrete difference. We must gaze within to see clearly without, but we should not
remain only within (pp. 57; 61; 86). An isolated form of nationalism only results in what
Buber calls “false nationalism” and misleading ideologies (p. 54). Here, dialogue seems
to allow nationalism to tell a more accurate story within the competing narratives of a
postmodern world.
My goal will be to understand how historical moments such as postmodernity,
manifested in its incessant multiplicity and lack of common philosophical center, convey
monologic or dialogic forms of communication as a substrate for philosophical and
applied considerations of the nation and nationalism. Before we attempt to interpret the
postmodern nation, however, we should explore other pertinent historical moments that
contribute to our thinking about it.

26

The Project: An Overview
For the purposes of this project, I view the nation as a communicative, discursive
public phenomenon that allows private citizens to engage issues of belonging and identity
rhetorically within strongly defined political, social, economic and communicative
boundaries. Following the work of Anderson (2006), Calhoun (1997) and Appadurai
(1996), although bound to physical characteristics in our current understanding, the
nation seems to be defined more by imagined, existential-phenomenological horizons that
offer guidelines for interaction with cultural, political, social and economic selves and
others. In this regard, physical boundaries become less stringent, more contingent and
permeable. Nationalism, then, is the intellectual and emotional manifestation of that
reality in the hearts and minds of that nation’s citizens and interlocutors. It is important
to keep in mind that the terms nation and nationalism are often conflated in writings on
the subject. Although nationalism is often the sentiment and reaction regarding one’s
nation, the term nationalism is often employed to speak about the study of the nation
itself (Dahbour & Ishay, 1995). In short, any study of the communicative nature of the
nation will ultimately affect the ways in which nationalism emerges and takes shape.
Why phenomenology? Phenomenology as applied to communication theory and
research has become an acceptable method for exploring issues of communication and
human interaction. Husserl (2012) and, later, Heidegger (2010), provided a framework
for appropriating phenomenology to the field of communication, but in the 1970s
communication scholars seemed to become particularly interested in exploring a
hermeneutic for the phenomenology of communication (Hawes, 1977), its use for the
study of organizational communication (Sanders, 1982), understanding identity issues
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and social cooperation issues (Gresson, 1978), and the dynamics of interpersonal
communication and dialogue (Arnett, 1981). “Phenomenology seeks to make explicit the
implicit structure and meaning of the human experience. It is the search for ‘essences’
that cannot be revealed by ordinary observation” (Sanders, 1982, p. 354).
Phenomenology offers an alternative for the study of human communication because it
takes a different stance from traditional, positivistic approaches where the research
scholar is often seen as an onlooker, prefiguring the world that he is about to investigate
(Hawes, 1977). The phenomenologist on the other hand, “assumes the world is
perpetually constituted, and ‘what is real’ and ‘how realness is accomplished’ become the
phenomena of interest” (Hawes, p. 35). In a phenomenological methodology then,
researchers are not only onlookers, but also participants in the world that is constantly
constituted and reconstituted before them. Phenomenology is more concerned with
ontology and what and how something is, as opposed to epistemology alone and why
something is (Hawes, 1977). Holstein and Gubrium (1994) explain that Schutz (1964)
brought Husserlian phenomenology into contemporary research methods and gave it
credence as a method that investigates the world as it actually is: “Schutz (1964) argued
that the social sciences should focus on the ways that the life world—that is, the
experiential world every person takes for granted—is produced and experienced by its
members” (p. 263). This is accomplished through the phenomenological approach of
“bracketing” certain phenomena to better explore that which reveals itself in certain
instances.
Although scholars have referred to phenomenology applied in such a way as
“qualitative research” (Sanders, 1982), this qualitative research seems to move beyond
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what is traditionally considered to be qualitative methods because it is energized by
philosophical inquiry. At moments during this study, I refer to the phenomenological
qualities of the nation and nationalism as an attempt to describe the nation as an
existential, ontological, constitutive phenomenon that is a product of communicative and
rhetorical practices. Hawes (1977) provides an explanation for the reason that this study
can benefit from a phenomenological perspective grounded in the study of
communication:
By viewing human communication phenomenologically and putting commonsense
assumptions out of play, one achieves the perspective of an anthropological
stranger. Once the familiar is rendered strange, the historicality of the
phenomenon—its horizons of possibilities in its past and future—stand out in
sharper relief. Hermeneutic explication interprets the now strange communication
by displaying it and its implicit suppositions in an understandable fashion;
understandable to the speaker as the contemporaneously present non-speakers.
(Hawes, 1977, p. 33)
I hope to not only “bracket” the idea of the nation as a communicative construct and strip
it of the common sense, shared notion the we have of the nation, but also in the spirit of
existential phenomenology, to analyze the ontological questions of the nation that
ultimately affect human life. An existential-phenomenological perspective expands on
the notion of phenomenology discussed above because the existentialist approach to
phenomenology allows us to move beyond an ontology that only takes into the
consideration the metaphysical, spiritual realm to one that considers the “wholeness of
the person” (Buber, 2002, p. 192), or in this case, the wholeness of human life. Martin
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Buber’s concept of dialogue is deeply grounded in existential phenomenology because of
the manner in which his form of dialogic communication relegates these ontological
questions that emerge through acts of communication to concrete human beings in their
lived experience (Czubaroff, 2000, p. 169).
This project will seek to establish rhetorical and philosophical ground for
recasting theories of the nation in a postmodern framework by illuminating theories of
rhetoric and communication throughout the Western canon. I will not attempt to reiterate
a chronological history of the nation and nationalism, but rather point to its power as
rhetorical and cultural currency that has emerged in selected historical moments. Most
importantly, we will see that the nation offers an existential-phenomenological, and more
significantly, existential-spiritual power that emerges from and offers responses to ideas
of belonging and interaction with others. We refer to ancient rhetorical scholarship
because of the philosophical and rhetorical foundation it provides for discussions of the
modern nation and emerging trends in nationalism. Classical rhetoric, though seemingly
distant in time and space, provide us with “elaborate theories” that ground contemporary
rhetorical situations and allow to analyze discourse productively (Welch, 1990, p. 5).
This attempt to appropriate ancient rhetoric for the purposes of this project fall under
what Welch (1990) coins the Dialectic School of Classical Rhetoric, which relies “not on
discovering palpable rhetorical ‘reality’ out there, but concentrate[s] instead on
contemporary epistemological constructions that in turn are capable of producing an
interpretation of classical rhetoric” (p. 11). My hope is that we can begin to unravel the
problem of nation and nationalism through a rhetorical and communicative lens that
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begins with those in the Western trope who have essentially established the bedrock on
which the tenets of nationalism has been constructed, which includes those in antiquity.
In Chapter 2, I will explore the idea of the nation as it was communicated
rhetorically by the single figure who might be considered not only the “Father of Liberal
Education,” (Kennedy, 1994, p. 46), who consistently communicated about the ideal of
panhellenism—Isocrates. Isocrates offers us a point of departure from which we can
explore ideas of the nation and how they are formed through rhetoric in antiquity.
Mostly, we will find that Isocratean rhetoric, a staple of ancient rhetorical theory based in
logos and phronesis, was an influential method in the way understandings of the nation
and nationalism were carried into the Roman Republic and modernity. For Isocrates,
rhetoric serves as the guiding principle for civic education, and therefore for the moral
and political development of the polis. Cohen (2000) believes that the Greek polis is
actually a viable social structure that helps us understand earlier forms of the nation
through the ways in which it influenced its own citizens as well as those living outside of
the polis. Paideia, a centrifugal social force, as described by Jaeger (1967; 1986),
pervades every element of Isocratean rhetoric and forms the foundation for his ideas
about education and culture, and ultimately his ideas about nation and nationalism. As a
nuanced approach to understanding culture, paideia becomes an essential element in later
understandings of the nation.
In Chapter 3, I will explore how the Greek understanding of the polis carries
through to the Roman Republic to affect ideas of nation and what constitutes a viable
republic. Cicero, one of Isocrates’s intellectual followers (Hubbell, 1913), continues this
conversation about nation in terms of citizenship in the civitas—Rome’s polis. I will
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attempt to understand how Rome continues to develop ideals of the nation through
Cicero’s understanding of civic republicanism and the function of the state, as influenced
not only by Isocrates, but also by foundational philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle.
Civic republicanism’s focus on justice and the common good echoes goals similar to
those of the polis. As an influential orator, Cicero advanced ideas of civic responsibility
and equality through the construct of the res publica—the republic. Again, I turn to
Anderson’s (2006) concept of the “imagined community” to understand Cicero’s res
publica as a nation, using civic republicanism as its philosophical ground. As we will
see, republicanism reflects some of the central ideals of structural diversity and
multiplicity centered on a common good, but differentiated by Cicero’s focus on human
laws embodied by natural law as a guiding principle. I will also briefly explore Cicero’s
influence on important Christian rhetoricians, such as Lactantius (1964) and St.
Augustine (1984), who would go on to explore the late Roman Empire and Christianity’s
role in the development of the nation. My goal in Chapter 3, as it was in Chapter 2, is to
set the stage for the idea of the nation and principles of nationalism as rhetorical
structures.
In Chapter 4, I will focus on how these ideas transformed into what we
understand to be the nation and nationalism today. It seems to be widely accepted in the
academy (e.g., Carr, 1945; Kedourie 1993; Anderson, 2006) that the current form of the
nation is a direct result of rhetorical forces of the Enlightenment and the work of key
philosophical figures such as Kant (1963, 1990, 2003) and his contemporaries. The
Enlightenment provided the context for a major rhetorical shift in the way most scholars
and everyday citizens perceived the structure of the nation; the notion of the nation was
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viewed as the driving force behind events such as the French and American Revolutions,
which were enactments of human freedom and democracy in a struggle for nations of
their own. I will touch on thinkers such as Hobbes (1968), Renan (1995), and Mazzini
(1995) to understand how the nation was situated in the modern moment and to explore
how they configured the nation as an existential-phenomenological expression of
“imagined” human communities and identity. Kedourie (1993) contends that Kant is the
central figure in shifting the philosophical conversation about the way we think about the
nation in modernity and how it is expressed in these terms; however, other voices such as
Gellner (1983, 1994) will challenge this notion that Kant played such a significant role
and will introduce other social forces that seemed to be more significant.
Postmodernity provides an important philosophical and rhetorical framework that
influences the nature of our communication, which in turn shapes the construction of our
world. In Chapter 5, I will explore how postmodernity may affect the way we perceive
current understandings of the nation. The nation becomes a community that is
“imagined” through a new lens, a shifting epistemology that influences the ways in which
we interact interpersonally, interculturally and socially. I will explore how scholars like
Habermas (2001), Appadurai (1996), and Huntington (1996) characterize the postmodern
nation, which seems to be a direct expression of narrative disagreement and virtue
contention. In response to this deconstructed version of the nation, I will also engage
Martin Buber’s dialogic theory as a hermeneutic entrance to the postmodern nation, and
attempt to provide a possible communicative framework within the seemingly discordant,
but productive, tension of postmodernity.
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My intention is to fill a particular lacuna in nation and nationalism studies
through the lens of philosophy of communication. Schlesinger (2001) suggests that
scholars such as Anderson and Deutsch are focused more on “communications” (mediagenerated forms of communication at a macro-level) than a “philosophy of
communication.” Although these thinkers’ ideas certainly contribute to studies in the
philosophy of communication, it seems that very few have taken the tack of deliberately
attempting to interpret the concept of the nation within philosophical and
phenomenological frameworks. By exploring the nation within these various historicalmetaphorical contexts from the ancients to postmodernity, we may find ground for
moving beyond traditional theories of the nation, whether they are historical, political,
social, economic or even based in “communications.” We may also find elements for
justifying the promotion of a theory of nation and nationalism framed by dialogic theory,
often overlooked in debates about the nation and international communication. In short,
it seems that the conversation about the salience of the nation in everyday life is still very
present in contemporary discourse. As a philosophy of communication scholar, I hope
that these shifting philosophical contexts can guide us toward an understanding of the
nation that responds to this historical moment.
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Chapter 2
Isocrates’ Rhetorical Influence on the Idea of Nation:
Civic Education, Paideia and Panhellenism
To begin, we turn to Ancient Athens and the metaphor of the polis as our first step
in this exploration. The polis itself provides ground from which can begin to understand
early concepts of the nation (Cohen, 2000). We must keep in mind, however, that our
contemporary understanding of nation is a construct of modernity, developing in the
Enlightenment, and any reference to nation should be recast within the understanding of
the polis in its historical moment. The polis, understanding the polis as a national
structure, and Isocrates’ emphasis on the power of language and the educational use of
that language to influence society in productive ways allowed the imagination of the polis
as a national structure as we understand it today.
Aristotle’s Politics (1981; 1998) provides us with a descriptive account through
which we can structure and engage a community of thinkers, workers, and outsiders
within a framework of communal action. Arendt (1998) tells us that Aristotle
characterizes the polis as a mechanism for communal action: “…[T]he political realm
rises directly out of acting together acting together, the ‘sharing of words and deeds.’
Thus action not only has the most intimate relationship to the public part of the world
common to us all, but is the one activity which constitutes it” (p. 199).
Arendt highlights this Aristotelian idea that humans are essentially, at their core, political
creatures – individual beings that are naturally organized into communal structures for
the good of the polis, the common good (Aristotle, 1981; 1998).
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To understand this Aristotelian principle, one could argue that citizens are
teleologically pulled toward community life realized in the structure of the state. For
Aristotle (1999), the polis provided the structure in which its members were free to
engage in debate and deliberation under which the minimal good could be attained and
agreed upon (Ethics, pp. 1-2). The polis provided the existential-phenomenological space
in which individuals and groups could strive for justice and rational thought. Just as the
family (oikos) provided a similar, but more interpersonal, structure under which
individuals could function, the polis provided a larger, public structure under which
individuals could work, worship, and interact productively beyond the family and
personal relationships. Although Aristotle saw the polis as a much smaller version of the
modern nation-state, he still saw its function as a sovereign political unit (Irwin, 1999, p.
320).
Communitarian scholars like Alasdair MacIntyre (1984) are important
contributors to this conversation because they ultimately reject communicative norms that
emerge in modernity and encourage us to return to an understanding of traditional and
ancient virtues that existed in the polis—a “face to face” society that readily allowed for
the creation of a moral, democratic society that was interactive, intimate, and communitybased (Cohen, 2000; Clayton, 2006). In the Politics, Aristotle defines the polis in terms of
its territorial size (not too small or large), and the fact that its citizens know one another;
if not, the essence of the polis is impossible (Aristotle, 1998, p. 199). (Arendt also offers
a perspective of the Greek understanding of the population of the polis and its political
effectiveness (1998, p. 43)). However, Cohen (2000) extends this notion of the Athenian
polis by identifying its form as an ethnos, which is more closely related to the concept of
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the nation as we understand it today. For Cohen, polis is often a confusing term that
applies to all levels of society simultaneously and does not offer a sense of continuity,
which Athenians considered to be the true essence of their society. For the purposes of
this project, the Athenian polis may be understood as a form of nation, but with a diverse
set of qualities and perceptions different from how we understand the nation today.
Cohen understands the polis as a different conception from this “face-to-face”
environment:
My Athens is quite different—a nation where households of varied origins and
individual persona, created a culturally homogenous world of intricate and
multidimensional institutions and ideas, unified by a mutually conceptualized
group identity forged partly through historical fabrication; where demographic
mobility, civil mutability, cultural complexity, and a dynamic economy generated
a society of relative anonymity; where membership in the polis (citizenship) was a
fluid asset ultimately available (or deniable) to all segments of the local
population, but where “power”—the manifold aspects of control, command, and
influence in a society—transcended political arrangements and manifested social,
economic, religious, and even sexual dimensions. (p. 9)
By refuting Athens as a mosaic of poleis, and recognizing it as ethnos (nation), Cohen is
essentially characterizing nation as a society that responds to the heterogeneity and
complexities of human life where the polis is a more provincial, limited notion of
communal life that does not allow for the possibility of phenomenological distance from
our neighbors. It is for these reasons that Anderson’s work on “Imagined Communities”
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(2006) is useful when exploring the idea of the nation, even when engaging the ancient
world.
Cohen (2000) employs Anderson’s concept of imagined community to offer a
better description for this idea of the polis. Physically, Athens was larger than many
modern nations – what made Athens different from other poleis was not only its size but
its political unity. Other poleis were not politically unified and did not function as the
political structure that Aristotle had described (Cohen, 2000). Thus, it seems that
Aristotle’s idea of “knowing each other” may not actually represent true interpersonal
relationships, but rather “knowing” others’ political affinities, cultural understandings
and ways of life in order to create a coordinated, fluid social context that was easily
identifiable among its citizens. Culture, then, provided the channel through which citizens
were able to “know” each other politically (through the polis).
Connecting Isocratic Rhetoric to Nation Studies
To investigate these ideas I turn to a prominent Greek scholar, politician and
rhetorician who would have a remarkable impact on the history of the Greek world and
its influence on Western culture: Isocrates. I choose Isocrates not only for his
contributions to our understanding of the Greek world and rhetoric, but also because
some consider his rhetoric on panhellenism to resemble “nationalist” rhetoric in antiquity
(Jaeger, 1986; Haskins, 2004); DeRomilly (1992) suggests that Isocrates was the first in
antiquity to shape his political rhetoric in terms of Greece (what she calls Europe) in
opposition to Asia (Persia). However, Haskins (2004) points out that this understanding
of Isocrates’ panhellenism as nationalistic is misguided and rather an attempt to: “to
criticize the contemporary historical situation by comparing it with mythologized
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historical past and to remind the audience of its collective identity,” and not a precursor
to Nazi Fascism as suggested by scholars such as Vitanza (1997) (Haskins, 2004, p. 125).
Most importantly, his teachings of “citizenship education” set the stage for the
justification of the power of the liberal arts in education and the effects of education on
transformational personhood, mostly for creating citizens who formed rational and
productive communities (Poulakos, 1997).
First, it is necessary for us to understand Isocrates’ rhetorical program as what he
believed to be the ultimate form of citizenship training. Isocrates saw rhetoric as a form
of practical philosophy; for him, the philosophy and rhetoric are inextricably linked. In a
sense, Isocrates’ rhetoric was a sort of compromise where philosophy and rhetoric met in
a utilitarian compromise for the good of Athens. He encourages us to “reconsider the
conceptual categories” of philosophy and rhetoric as they were traditionally understood
by conflating the two into an integrated system of thought and action (Livingstone, 2007,
p. 19). Philosophy was useless without the power of rhetoric because of the contingent
nature of reality, but rhetoric depended on philosophical ground to forge ahead. In
Against the Sophists (2000) Isocrates is mostly concerned with the potential damage
Sophistic rhetoric can cause, but like the Sophists he admits that transcendental truth is
humanly (and even divinely) unattainable; rhetoric allows us to engage contingency as
philosophical thinking which can fill this space with viable alternatives. “…Homer, who
has been conceded the highest reputation for wisdom, has pictured even the gods at times
debating among themselves about the future —not that he knew their minds but that he
desired to show us that for mankind this power lies in the realms of the impossible”
(Isocrates, 2000, pp. 163-165).
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The power of rhetorical education was the central theme of Isocratean theory.
Much like Gorgias’ (2001) critique of language having similar effects on the human soul
as drugs on the body (p. 32), Isocrates recognized this same power of language in the
context of education and politics: “Bodies are naturally built up through measured tasks,
the soul through honorable words” (Isocrates, 2000, To Demonicus, p. 22). In Isocratean
terms, education “corrected” the Platonic “cookery” of rhetoric and improved this
overwhelming power in substantive ways:
Because there has been implanted in us the power to persuade each other and to
make clear to each other whatever we desire, not only have we escaped the life of
wild beasts, but we have come together and founded cities and made laws and
invented arts; and, generally speaking, there is no institution devised by man
which has laid down laws concerning things just and unjust, and things base and
honorable; and if it were not for those ordinances we should not be able to extol
the good. Through this we educate the ignorant and appraise the understanding,
and discourse which is true and lawful and just is the outward image of the good
and faithful soul. (Nicocles or Cyprian Orations, 1980, pp. 79-81)
It is clear that Isocrates sees dialogue and rhetoric as essential elements not only for
public life in the polis, but also as a form of moral education that can ultimately generate
the good. Although language is the foundation of rhetoric, human action that is derived
from this language in particular frames Isocratean rhetoric.
Isocrates is concerned with the person’s role in the power structure of the polis
and how rhetoric and civic education cultivate this role. Isocratic rhetorical and civic
education is considered a model for life, a powerful intellectual tool that incorporates
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citizens into the larger context encouraging them to act justly for the good of the polis
(Morgan, 2003, p. 126). Yunis (as cited in Livingstone, 2007) points out that the
“rhetorical situation” of Ancient Greece was that citizenship meant a direct involvement
in politics, engaging in politics was ultimately a means of persuasion (p. 16). In other
words, citizens were rhetorical beings who shaped the identity and position of the polis
through powerful and well-educated language (logos). Isocrates believed that logos not
only makes us uniquely human, but also it challenges us to shape our social and political
milieu in distinctive ways. Therefore, the very act of communication formed the polis
and made it viable: “Isocrates assumes that all higher education of the intellect depends
on cultivating our ability to understand on another. It is not an accumulation of factual
knowledge in any sphere; it is concerned with the forces which hold society together.
There are summed up in one word logos” (Jaeger, 1986, p. 143). In this way, Isocrates
legitimizes his position in Ancient Greek scholarship alongside other significant Greek
philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle by creating a consistent narrative, particularly in
regards to public identity within the polis, which contributes to how citizens structured
the Greek state. Isocrates’ method was not what the Greeks called mere tekhne, but
rather a holistic approach for thinking and engaging in the polis (Walzer, 2007, p. 271).
Rhetorical education considered the citizen as a cause and effect of rhetorical
discourse (Poulakos, 2004). Through a “hegemonic” form of logos politikos, rhetoric is
able to lead citizens toward worthwhile ends which benefit society by constructing social
reality, building necessary institutions, and creating human communities shaped by
common beliefs (Poulakos, 2004). Rhetorical civic education was understood to mediate
political upheaval and harmonize individual and collective purposes to restore Athens to
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its inherent greatness (which was Isocrates’ priority). In other words, “hegemonic logos”
can bring forth unification, cooperation, consensus, and stability in the wake of political
turmoil (Poulakos, 2004, p.73). Rhetoric as a civic force provides direction for the state
and the citizens within that state; it equips us with the language and ideas necessary for
understanding the challenges and goals of the cultural context in which we live with one
another: paideia. Poulakos characterizes such Isocratic rhetoric as “centripetal” since it
encourages individuals to direct themselves toward a common center in moments of
disagreeable diversity, while Sophistic rhetoric’s inconsistency provided a more
centrifugal force shifting individuals to a more doubtful periphery, which did not guide
citizens to a common center for the good of the state:
Unlike the Sophists, Isocrates found himself in a dispersed culture, one plagued
with the ills inherent in excessive individuation—conflicting claims and
competing interests. His reaction to this state of affairs manifested itself in a
rhetoric pointing away from the periphery and towards a center. At this center,
there lay arguments for the need of leaders, the importance of rhetorical
education, the benefits of political stability, and the advantages of pan-Hellenism.
(Poulakos, 2004, p. 82)
Concepts such as “hegemonic” and “center” seem to suggest an inflexible system of
rhetoric in reference to political action. As mentioned earlier, Haskins (2004) explains
that some scholars have even gone so far as to posit that Isocratic theory of paideia and
logos paved the way for extreme political movements such as Nazi Germany and Hitler’s
Third Reich, and has justified actions of cultural imperialism in the contemporary world.
Regardless of how some view Isocrates’ orientation, his emphasizes on the “common
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center,” “common sense” and “citizenship” all reflect enduring themes of nationalism and
an understanding of the nation. Most important, rhetoric provided the channel through
which the polis was established, by educating citizens about the virtues of citizenship and
moral action within the construct of a formal community. This centripetal force is quite
clearly indicated in Isocrates’ belief about the Athenian power in Hellas, and therefore
panhellenism. This focus on purity plays out even as Isocrates calls for Greek unity, with
the Athenians at the helm. This idea of purity connected to the homeland, or what
scholars like Tuan (1977) and Geschiere (2009) describe through the Greek concept of
autochthony, is the notion that one has a natural connection to one’s native soil by birth,
or what Geschiere describes as “the most authentic form of belonging” (p. 2). Tuan
(1977) points out that Isocrates’ emphasis on Athenian autochthony is actually quite
evident throughout his work, especially in the Panegyricus (p. 154).
Paideia: Culture as a Central Force
One conceptual framework that applies to the idea of “imagined communities” is
the foundation of paideia from which Isocrates establishes his own arguments. These
imagined communities are created rhetorically through a process that allows citizens to
collaborate to form “common sense” in Athenian society. Vico (1999) later defined
common sense or “sensus communis” as such: “Since human judgment is by nature
uncertain, it gains certainty from our common sense about what is necessary and useful to
human kind; and necessity and utility are the two sources of the natural law of nations.
Common sense is an unreflecting judgment shared by an entire social order, people,
nation or even all humankind” (p. 79-80). Arendt (1998) engages common sense as a
mechanism by which we can collectively gauge the reality of our world. Once an

43

understanding of that which we share in common begins to decline, the more we are
“alienated from our world” (p. 209). For Isocrates, common sense takes the form of doxa
(personal and public opinion/belief) and kairos (rhetorical appropriateness to the
occasion); they are subsets of and function as characteristics of the larger whole of
paideia (Poulakos, 2001; 2004). Instead of Isocrates accepting episteme (knowledge) as
the guide for personal and public conduct, Isocrates enacts this paideic educational
program with doxa as its guide. However, doxa is not sophistic, as it must also be
mediated to reach an acceptable form that will benefit society—this mediation occurs
through what Isocrates defined as rhetorical education. (Poulakos, 2001;2004). We also
see Plato, who addressed concerns of sophistic rhetoric in the Phaedrus (1973),
recognized Isocrates’ desire to improve the inherent quality of doxa through education
(Poulakos 2001, p.49); however, Plato positioned doxa on a continuum between
knowledge and ignorance (Poulakos 2001, p.51), as it did not fulfill the need for Truth.
For Isocrates, doxa sublimates episteme by rhetorically constructing the public through
the logos, ethos and pathos. Common sense characterized as such becomes the basis for
Isocratean rhetoric and ultimately is applied to his project on Greek panhellenism.
However, before we address the controversial theme of panhellenism, it is necessary to
explicate paideia as the foundation of Greek culture, particularly as Isocrates employed it
in Greek thought.
In his landmark work, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, Jaeger (1967; 1986)
traces the development of Greek paideia through its mythology, history, politics, culture,
literature and rhetorical tradition. The idea of paideia originates from the Greek principle
of arête, or taking possession of the beautiful (Jaeger, 1967). Arête was the basis for
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happiness and the teleological principle for Greek society, the pursuit of the cultural
ideal; paideia is the integrated system of Greek arête, the cultural ideal that encompasses
the meaning of human life in ancient Greece. Paideia was “connected with the highest
arête possible to man; it was used to denote the sum total of all ideal perfection of mind
and body—complete kalokagathia, a concept which was not consciously taken to include
a genuine intellectual and spiritual culture. This new comprehensive conception of the
cultural ideal was firmly established by the time of Isocrates and Plato” (Jaeger, 1967, p.
286).
Although mostly present in aristocratic circles, paideia also extended to the polis,
as it was the center of Greek life. Jaeger (1967; 1986) tells us that the polis encompassed
the whole of Greek life; the polis was the context in which education occurred and
allowed for a consistent, integrated message to create cohesive cultural ideals in Greek
society. Paideia is perhaps one of the first systematic attempts to create a framework that
would envelop the whole of Greek life and within which education, and rhetoric for that
matter, would become the center of life in the polis not only for elite aristocracy, but all
citizens who participated directly or indirectly in the process.
The emergence of the Sophists and their controversial educational program was a
clear indication that the nature of the Greek state structure was transforming (Jaeger,
1967, p. 281). The Sophists’ engagement of culture through intellectual pursuits was
conducted with the Greek polis not only as its context but as its ultimate goal. The polis
was a comprehensive educative force and the Sophists, although their methods were
questionable at times, sought to create a complete program using paideia as its main
thrust (Jaeger, 1967, p. 321). The polis was the main field in which sophistry was
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executed; rhetoric became the mode of communication that created productive citizens
who then advanced the highest arête. It was the Sophists who began the timeless
conversation about why and how to teach civic engagement. The following exchange
between Socrates and Protagoras, one of the most prominent Sophists of the 5th century
BCE, in Plato’s Protagoras elucidates this point:
“What I teach is sound deliberation, both in domestic affairs—how to best
manage one’s household, and in public affairs—how to realize one’s maximum
potential for success in political debate and action.”
“Am I following what you are saying? [Socrates] asked. “You appear to
be talking about the art of citizenship, and to be promising to make men good
citizens.”
“This is exactly what I claim, Socrates.”
“Well, this is truly an admirable technique you have developed, if indeed
you have…The truth is, Protagoras, I have never thought that this could be taught,
but when you say it can be, I can’t very well doubt it…Protagoras, I just don’t
think virtue can be taught. But when I hear what you have to say, I waver; I think
there must be something in what you have to say…” (Plato, 1992, pp. 13-15)
Protagoras’ discourse is significant, particularly because it originates from a Sophistic
orientation. For Socrates, this debate about the ability to teach the concept of citizenship
is ongoing. The key turning point here is that the Sophists open up the field of inquiry
about education and moral virtue; the problem was that the Athenians viewed Sophistic
education as a model that lacked a strong moral standpoint (Barrett, 1987; DeRomilly,
2002). The Sophists’ lack of moral direction and questionable activities put their

46

educational system and their goal of citizenship education in jeopardy (Barrett, 1987;
DeRomilly, 2002). Nonetheless, we see that the question does not die; rather, it takes on a
new form through Isocrates. Isocrates insists on the power of rhetorical education in
citizenship formation, but understands how such an approach must be grounded in the
cultural context — the paideia — of the historical moment (Jaeger, 1986). Isocrates’
work attempted to infuse a moral consciousness driven by the solid foundation of Greek
paideia (Marsh, 2013). Although Plato felt obligated to search for more definitive
responses to what he and others considered morally reprehensible Sophists, Isocrates
attempted to marry the two perspectives and transforming sophistic practice by grounding
it in philosophical inquiry to orient his rhetoric toward higher moral standards. Isocrates’
deep understanding of Greek paideia within the context of the power of the Athenian
polis elicited his unique form of rhetoric (Jaeger, 1986; Poulakos, 1997).
Morgan (2003) suggests that Isocrates' idea of paideia is consistent because its
focus begins with individuals, extends to the polis, and then to the larger political
structure – in this case, the Greece beyond Athens. Isocrates was committed to the
fluidity and dynamism of paideia, the rich, textured culture of a society, and not Platonic
a priori worldview (Jaeger, 1965, p.84). Isocrates viewed culture as a wider, deeper and
more indicative field of inquiry than Plato; it was a space where humans are able to
engage a truth, which is located in everyday living-in-the-world. For this reason, many
view Isocrates conception of paideia as not only culture, but education in an appropriate
cultural context. Isocrates (1980) notes:
[Athens] knew…that whether men have been liberally educated from their earliest
years is not to be determined by their courage or their wealth or such advantages,
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but is made manifest most of all by speech, and that this had proved itself to be
the surest sign of culture [paideia] in every one of us, and that those who are
skilled in speech are not only men of power in their own cities but are also held in
honor in other states. (Panegyricus, p. 149)
Isocrates believed that specific schemata structuring rhetoric, such as the rhetorical
guidelines put forth by Aristotle, limited its inherent abilities; rather, rhetorical education
could find the mean between what Isocrates saw as moral indifference and education to
create practical political action (Jaeger, 1965). In other words, Isocrates points us in the
direction of critical thinking and balanced arguments, not rote technical instruction on
how to be an effective and virtuous citizen (Walzer, 2005). In Isocratic terms, rhetorical
education cannot change a person, but it can shape and cultivate his/her thoughts through
the negotiation of nature, art and paideia. Such an education could provide communities
with the means to bring the polis back to its original vigor and its spiritual renaissance
since moral forces were lived out in the communal structure; education helps individuals
and communities attain spiritual leadership to find new approaches for life (Jaeger, 1965).
As we have seen, Isocratic rhetorical principles are based in civic education, the
foundation on which Athenian culture is constructed and guided. A holistic education
creates citizens who can participate in social discourse while changing it from within.
Philosophy and rhetoric are inseparable, one and the same, but this practical approach to
philosophy requires a solid ground on which it can successfully function and call
attention to the importance of the polis’ citizenry. Isocratean rhetoric could quickly
devolve into sophistry because it appears to lack philosophical ground. Paideia fills this
void. Paideia might be understood as the philosophical ground for everyday Athenian
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life, as it provides a “common center” to which citizens can refer and construct new
realities. Said differently, culture is the philosophical ground from which rhetoric, and
civic education, can thrive and serve the polis.
[Isocrates] held that the nation, the ideal of Greece, was the point round which
new elements in the spiritual renaissance were to crystallize…The new rhetoric
had to find an ideal which could be translated into practical political action. This
ideal was a new moral code for Greece. It gave rhetoric an inexhaustible theme;
in it the ultimate topic of all higher eloquence seemed to have been discovered
once and for all. In an age when the old beliefs were losing their binding force
and the long-established structure of the city-state was breaking up (the structure
in which, till then, the individual had felt his own moral foundations securely
embodied), the new dream of national achievement appeared to be a mighty
inspiration. It gave life to new meaning. (Jaeger, 1986, pp. 52-53)
Taking into account Jaeger’s description of this “spiritual renaissance” based in the
formation of new attitudes toward the nation, we could view Isocrates’ conception of
rhetoric and rhetorical education wrought with the intricacies and nuances of culture as
“imagining” a transformed community of citizens—a nation. Yes, this rhetoric still took
the form of orations and pamphlets, but by recasting and combining the two conceptual
categories of philosophy and rhetoric to create a new form of education, particularly civic
education, Isocrates was forming a new rhetorical approach to social life that would carry
into subsequent ages. The goal of this new approach was the good of the polis achieved
through the highest Greek arête available— paideia. Isocrates no longer saw rhetoric as
an instrument of politics but rather as an educational tool that allowed Athenians to rise
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above political life and direct the pursuit of political life itself (Jaeger, 1986). By
teaching and engaging rhetoric properly, students form ideas and patterns of thought and
argument to enhance spiritual life, and therefore the practical life, of the polis. But, in a
sense, it becomes difficult to term Isocrates’ method of education as rhetoric or
philosophy; instead, it becomes an entirely new system of thought and instruction that
leads the conversation about Athens, the polis in general, and the whole of Greece in a
new direction (Livingstone, 2007, p. 19). Isocrates’ new form of formal communication
and education, centered on uniquely human logos and rich paideia, is contextualized by
the community of citizens called the polis. The polis is the common center to which
citizens refer and direct transformative action simultaneously. One cannot transform the
polis through persuasive measures without the engagement of paideia.
For Isocrates, quality rhetoric produced practical reasoning, or the Greek ideal of
phronesis, by educating students about rhetorical techniques, eloquence and fitness to the
occasion — a complex Greek concept termed kairos (Marsh, 2013). Kairos is an essential
element of effective and realistic rhetoric for Isocrates, and which played a major role in
his overall educational program, or paideia. Stated in more contemporary terms, Marsh
(2013) explains that kairos is both the responsiveness to a particular moment and the
ability to act adroitly within that moment: “The Isocratean concept of kairos, then, is
somewhat similar to the moment in a wrestling match one wrestler, through rigorous
training, simultaneously recognizes an opportune instant and a complementary maneuver
that will lead to success” (p. 129). Farrell (1993) defines kairos as a form of refigured
phronesis, which can be defined as “proper choices at propitious moments” (p. 39) or a
“mastery of the moment” (p. 236). In Against the Sophists (2000), Isocrates outlines three
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necessities of rhetoric to develop an educated rhetorician, in which kairos occupies a
prominent place: “But the greatest proof of the difference between [letters (techne) and
rhetoric (the creative art)] is that oratory is good only if it has qualities of fitness for the
occasion, propriety of style, and originality of treatment, while in case of letters there is
no such need whatsoever” (p. 171). Paideia provides the parameters for kairotic action
within rhetoric. Again, Isocrates’ teachings are grounded in the real world, constantly
guided by that which surrounds us: “…[I] hold that men who want to do some good in
the world must banish utterly from their interests all vain speculations and all activities
which have no bearing on our lives” (Antidosis, 2000, p. 335).
Poulakos (1997) explains that Isocrates’ use of rhetorical education promoted
individual self-understanding that would then encourage citizens to work toward a good
for the polis. In addition, rhetorical education meets its goals and encourages cultural
change by tapping into available narratives within society. Poulakos goes on to note that
citizenship is not an a priori concept; rather, it is constructed through logos and paideia.
Isocrates adds to such ideas of logos by ensuring a kairotic response to paideia.
Ostensibly, for Isocrates a panhellenistic approach to the Greek poleis, with Athens at its
intellectual and cultural center, was a fitting response for the cultural and historical
moment.
Isocrates’ Panhellenism: A Model for Early Nationalism?
Isocrates’ orations, letters and discourses discuss the importance of Greek politics
at the time and the need for the Greek poleis to put down their weapons and join forces in
a loose confederation of Greek states to defeat and dominate their eternal enemy, the
Persians (Norlin, 1980). Sophists such as Gorgias (speech of 392 B.C.) and Lysias
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(speech of 388 B.C.) introduce themes of panhellenism and encouraging citizens to band
against the barbarians in their famous speeches on Mt. Olympus (Walbank, 1951), and
although Isocrates’ was not the first to introduce the idea of panhellenism, his efforts
expanded upon these ideas as they were geared toward political education textured by
paideia (Norlin, 1980; Jaeger, 1986; Walbank, 1951). Walbank (1951) suggests that
Isocrates was the rhetorician to give the concept of panhellenism “cultural value” (p. 46).
Isocrates believed it necessary for the various city-states of Greece to band
together in order to form a more cooperative, integrated effort against the “barbarians” in
Persia. “It is not possible for us to cement an enduring peace unless we join together in a
war against the barbarians [Persians], nor for the Hellenes to attain to concord until we
wrest our material advantages from one and the same source and wage our wars against
one and the same enemy” (Panegyricus, 1980, p.231). Panhellenism entailed a
“brotherhood” of Greek cultures coming together to deal with the complexities of
Isocrates’ time (Nash, 1968, p.71).
De Romilly (1992) discusses how Isocrates was among the first to recognize and
highlight the cultural difference between Greece (which he refers to as Europe) and
Persia, as not much of a distinction was made before the Persian Wars. We might
consider Isocrates as a cultural conservative because he considered the Athenian culture
as superior, not because of blood and race, but because of its central influence on the
intellectual culture of society—a superior paideia. Throughout the Panegyricus (1980),
Isocrates makes claims regarding the superiority of Athens and its role as a leader for
Greece, particularly in opposition to Persia (Tuan, 1977), but also attempts to create
solidarity among the Greek poleis in the name of panhellenism.
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For it is admitted that our city is the oldest and the greatest in the world and in the
eyes of all men the most renowned…And so far as our city has distanced the rest
of mankind through and in speech that her pupils have become the teachers of the
rest of the world; and she has brought it about that the name ‘Hellenes’ suggest no
longer a race but an intelligence, and that the title ‘Hellenes’ is applied rather to
those who share our culture than to those who share our common blood. (pp. 131133; 149)
Such a feat, however, would not have been possible without Isocrates’ educational
program. Nash (1968) explains that Isocrates education system stood out among other
systems in terms of promoting a “universal concept of culture” in the creation of a unified
Hellas; he suggests that Isocrates’ rhetorical-educational program has been more
influential on the Western canon than even Alexander the Great’s controversial political
program for panhellenism (Nash, 1968, p.75).
Isocrates’ push for panhellenism is articulated in what is often considered to be
his masterpiece, the Panegyricus (Kennedy, 1999, p. 43; Norlin, 1980, p. 119; Romano,
2012, p. 555). Isocrates’ ideas of panhellenism necessitate a horizon of nationalism and
isolationism, buttressing Greek power while separating it from the rest of the world. He
identifies Athens as the political and cultural center of Greece that is capable of leading
the effort of joining various city-states under one entity. Athens is the most appropriate
haven for those that are both “prosperous and unfortunate,” but seek refuge in a
“welcoming and friendly city” (Isocrates, Panegyricus, 1980, p. 143). Isocrates seems to
echo the Aristotelian phenomenon of friendship for the good of the polis: “…[W]e come
together in one place, where, as we make our prayer and sacrifices in common, we are
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reminded of the kinship which exists among us and are made to feel more kindly towards
each other for the future, reviving our old friendships and establishing new ties” (1980, p.
145). Throughout the Panegyricus, we hear Isocrates’ intention to create a single nation
against an enemy by encouraging the common paideia they all share with Athens at its
center.
Isocrates’ rhetorical structure is holistic in that he does not depend solely on
dialectical Truth like Plato, rhetorical structure and mechanisms like Aristotle, history
like Herodotus or Hesiod or myth and narrative like the great Homer. Instead, Isocrates
transforms rhetoric to combine all these elements to create a paideia and an integrated
message to the Athenian people. This rhetorical work may, in turn, influence citizens’
attitudes about their nation to form a powerful nationalism that would surmount other
political and cultural problems amongst various poleis. Jaeger (1986) explains that
Isocrates’ Nicocles or Cyprian Orations lay the groundwork for his paideia that
eventually lead us to the work that structures his entire educational program, the
Panegyricus. These Cyprian Orations are directed at the leaders in Greek society in
hopes of changing the paideia as a whole; this paideia is grounded in education which can
result in a rather structured understanding of nationalism. “…[T]hese speeches introduce
us directly to a problem, which must, in these circumstances, be of the very first
importance – the possibility that culture may influence the state by educating its leaders”
(Jaeger, 1986, p. 85). Again, we see how Isocrates’ practical stance is focused on the
direct impact logos and paideia have on creating a new spiritual context for Greek
nationalism. This spiritual context, in turn, “imagines” a community into new attitudes

54

and practices. The leaders who embody the Greek ideal and carry it into the everyday
life of the polis exemplify these attitudes and practices.
To Nicocles (1980) is a prime example of what Isocrates was attempting to
accomplish when educating leaders. He not only seems to direct their thoughts and
actions from a standpoint that would benefit Greek society, but attempted to create a form
of paideia that would result in Greek nationalist ideals. Jaeger (1986) points out that
Isocrates’ advice to Nicocles, a new Cypriot leader, rests in the idea of “practical
statesmanship,” a compromise between the “Periclean tradition of practical politics…and
the ethical criticisms of the philosophers” (pp. 93-94). In other words, rhetoric serves as
the engine for which a ruler can function well and in the citizenry’s favor. Paideia, then,
is the field in which practical statesmanship functions and gives life to nationalist
phenomena. The nation is formed through communication and education of leaders who
impart their wisdom on their people and help them “imagine” what the Greek state should
be and how it materializes. “…[F]or it is evident that that [kings] will reign well or ill
according to the manner in which they equip their own minds. Therefore, no athlete is so
called upon to train his body as is a king to train his soul; for not all public festivals in the
world offer a prize comparable to those for which you who are kings strive every day of
your lives” (To Nicocles, 1980, p.47). What is pertinent here is the king’s thoughts, or
imagination, toward how a nation is formed through its citizenry. Rhetorical education is
how leaders are trained in order to bring the citizenry together through nationalistic
ideals. Fitting communication is the key to how a nation is formed, and it begins with its
leaders, who have been trained to think and act appropriately through rhetorical
principles. Rhetoric is the engine through which its citizenry is educated and formed to
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create political communities that not only make life manageable, but with a collective
sense of the good, the highest paideia found in arête. For Isocrates, the highest arête for
the Greek people will result in Panhellenistic paideia, a world that is teleologically driven
toward defending Greek life against its eternal enemy—the barbaric Persians.
Like Gorgias’ Helen, at first glance Isocrates’ Encomium of Helen, although
considered to his least important works, is an alternative to the sophistic model for
rhetoric, employing the power of sophistical rhetoric to defend Helen’s position in Greek
history within Isocrates’ practical rhetoric grounded paideia (Poulakos, 1997; Van Hook,
1968). However, such works also point to Isocrates’ focus on cultural historicity and
identifying the cultural needs of the moment. Poulakos (1997), like Walbank (1951),
suggests that Isocrates’s rhetoric was not tied to the traditional rhetorical devices, but
dependent more on culture and art: “More closely tied now to the cultural and the
thematic, eloquence could afford the time it needed to become an art” (p. 70). He grounds
his argument in deeply entrenched understandings of history and Athenian paideia while
creating new conception of why and how a united Greece can save its people, just as
Helen did. The encomium not only trains the student in effective rhetorical technique,
but also is a justification and praise for Hellenism. As the most influential figure in
Greek paideia, Isocrates persuades the Greeks to consider Helen as the central figure in
the first movement toward panhellenism (Kennedy, 1958). For the Greeks, Helen is the
ultimate cultural ideal, or arête, that persists throughout history and forms the ground on
which the Greek structure their thought and practice; Helen encompasses ideals of
beauty, virtue, influence, power, and her influence directed Greece in ways that secured
its dominance and protection against the barbarians. “Out of fear of strife the states all
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swore to unite on behalf of the one who won her. That is, panhellenism was achieved for
the first time under the one who possessed Helen [Theseus]” (Kennedy, 1958, p. 82). As
a result, Helen becomes a metaphor for the Greek imagination in political rhetoric and
literature, and Isocrates effectively employs the power of her cultural ideal to create a
strong case for panhellenism (Kennedy, 1958). While attempting to instruct students on
rhetorical principles for the formation of important political ideals and citizenship,
Isocrates invokes emotional connections for the Greek mind and unites Greek citizens
through powerful metaphors that engage them to a common goal.
From Panhellenism to Modern Nationalism: Isocrates’ Influence
Isocrates is an important point of departure for the way in which we can
understand the rhetoric and culture of nationalism in the ancient canon. We focus on
Isocrates not only for his rhetorical “philosophy” but also for what seems to be his
understanding of the nation-state and its significance for the Greek citizen, and ultimately
the relationship between the citizen and the nation in many contexts. We can apply
Isocrates’ rhetorical methods to contemporary understandings of rhetoric and
communication practices (see, for example, Marsh, 2013) and to the requirement to
communicate effectively by deploying logos as the energy that drives (and transcends)
that which we need to accomplish in both the political world and everyday interactions of
citizens within a shared culture and nation-state. The scholarship reviewed thus far as
well as scholarship that we will explore later in this project suggests that our
contemporary understanding of the nation was formed in the Enlightenment, but as we
see, its foundations in the Western trope may begin in Greece and are exemplified by
rhetorical figures such as Isocrates.
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For Livingstone (2007), Isocrates provides substantial ground for shifting our
conversation about rhetoric and its subject matter from a monologic form of
communication to a dialogic view. I would argue that Isocrates’ focus on nationalism
also helps us interpret the history of thought behind nationalism that may lead us to a
postmodern understanding of the nation and nationalism. However, before we venture
into this territory we need to understand how such thinking leads to other understandings
of nationalism through a rhetorical standpoint throughout the Western trope. Isocrates’
nuanced approach to rhetoric within deeply entrenched Greek paideia not only forms
works from within Greek culture itself, but expands and develops more complexity
within Greek paideia. While a traditional view of Greek paideia and rhetoric is often
interpreted through a form of one-way, monologic style of education, Livingstone
suggests that Isocrates’ approach carries rhetoric into much more textured ground.
By creating an adaptable, self-confident Hellenic political discourse which takes
“commonsense” ethical values for granted, Isocrates inaugurates the tradition of
Hellenic paideia, and thus, indirectly, the later humanist culture built on GrecoRoman models, with the ideal of culture as a mutually respectful exchange
between (elite) individuals united by their commitment to edifying and civilizing
the power of logos. On the other hand, in abandoning antilogy in the name of
consensus and homonoia, he also anticipates situations in the modern world where
the transition from the public or parliamentary debate to monologic
communication in the mass media risks creating an overweeningly confident,
unitary political discourse in which dissent and critique are easily marginalized as
irrational or absurd. (Livingstone, 2007, p. 31)
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Livingstone’s analysis directs us to an important theme of this study. By understanding
the salience of paideia and directing his attention to it in all his work, Isocrates seems to
see the slippery slope that occurs in what we now philosophically comprehend as
“monologic communication.” Although not always an inappropriate form of
communication, monologic communication is problematic in this particular instance
since, in Isocratean terms, it would not be considered kairotic because it does not seem to
fit his notions of participatory rhetoric and communication, as Livingstone points out
above. Instead, I advance the notion that dialogic communication may emerge as a more
fitting response to this historical and contextual moment. Although not often part of
scholarly opinion, Isocrates’ approach may be understood as participatory and somewhat
inclusive when it came to citizen development, as it encouraged more involvement in
civic life while evoking action and results. Thus, the polis, or the nation, was a result of
citizens who were well trained to participate and interact within the complexities of the
nation.
Implications
So, we begin with Greece, and by proxy Isocrates, as the first logical foundation
for the nation as a rhetorical structure. Although countless other rhetoricians that came
before him and lived alongside him constructed the paideia that provided the context for
Greek life and the way citizens lived within the polis, Isocrates’ focus on panhellenism
and ideas of national and nationalism paved the way for others that would follow and
employ rhetoric, education and an holistic understanding of the world around them to
create national identities and devotions to their particular paideia. Jaeger (1986)
advances that no other culture that we know of advanced the ideals of community in the
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way the Greeks did, and this organized notion of community helped formed the
foundation for the modern nation as we know it. Most important, the way in which ideas
of the nation were communicated, in turn, created a culture that understood citizenship,
democratic participation and the function of the polis. However, access to the polis, as in
contemporary society, was not always inclusive for certain groups. Literature regarding
the Athenian metic (foreigner) and his or her rights within Athenian society suggest that
many foreigners may have been active participants, but not without limits to particular
rights and access to democracy (see, for example, Cohen, 2000; Whitehead, 1977);
however, addressing these issues in detail would reach far beyond the scope of this
project. Nevertheless, understanding Greece through the eyes of Isocratean rhetoric at
least forms a consistent paideia under which these ideals were allowed to flourish and
translate into new, shifting cultural ideals that would then carry into the transformed
historical moment.
[The Greeks] established an entirely new set of principles for communal life.
However highly we may value the artistic, religious, and political achievements of
earlier nations, the history of what we can truly call civilization — the deliberate
pursuit of an ideal — not begin until Greece. (xiv)… It is true of Greek art as
well as of Greek literature that until late in the fourth century it is principally the
expression of the spirit of the community...But the true representatives of paideia
were not, the Greeks believed, the voiceless artists – sculptor, painter, architect –
but the poets and musicians, orators (which means statesmen) and
philosophers…They considered that the only genuine forces which could form the
soul were words and sounds, and — so far as they work through words or sounds
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or both—rhythm and harmony; for the decisive factor in all in paideia is active
energy, which is even more important in the culture of the mind than in the agon
which exercises physical strength and agility. (Jaeger, 1967, p. xxvii)
Jaeger’s comments are salient because they highlight why Greece and its pursuit of a
cultural ideal were so important in Western history, and for the purposes of this project,
essential to ideals of community and the establishment of nations.
Isocrates positions his “imagined community” within the holistic nature of the
world around us; in other words, it is situated in the liberal arts. If we take Livingstone’s
(2007) interpretation into account, this imagined community could presumably result
from an early form of dialogic communication as we understand it today—
communication grounded in this understanding of common sense that emerges from
multiple voices and participation centered around a common goal. Isocratean
conservatism originates from the idea of paideia centered on a common goal and from the
concept of kairos. The nation forms and flourishes from such ideals. However, his
ability to invoke a rhetoric based in intellectual thought that incorporates myriad areas of
life and shared experiences draws on a dialogic understanding of communication. As
Jaeger (1986) states, the rhetoricians were considered responsible for the formation of the
polis and the nation. The nation and its various systems are formed out of logos — the
thoughts and words of its leaders and citizens. The nation is “imagined” through rhetoric
and therefore communicative life. Grounding the initial phase of our conversation in the
Greeks and Isocratean participatory rhetoric may offer new openings for the goal of
exploring postmodern nationalism framed by dialogic communication theory.
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Our next step will be to carry this unique Greek ideal into the consequent
historical moment experienced in the Roman Republic and its approach to “civic
republicanism.” Civic republicanism, and Cicero in particular, build on the profound
statements and rhetorical tradition of Greece and Isocrates to expand on the
understanding of community and the nation.
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Chapter 3
Cicero’s Political Rhetoric: Early Foundations of the Republic
“But when you view everything with reason and reflection, of all the connections none is
more weighty, none is more dear, than that between every individual and his country.
Our parents are dear to us; our children, our kinsmen, our friends are dear to us; but our
country comprehends alone all the endearments of us all” (Cicero, 1855, On Duties,
Book I, p. 32).

The great Roman rhetorician, Cicero, offers a nuanced understanding for our
thinking about the ancient rhetorical roots of the nation and the idea of nationalism.
Cicero, like Isocrates, was a proponent of liberal arts education who not only provided
important observations and lessons about rhetoric in general, but whose rhetoric shaped
the ways in which the Roman Republic, and the Roman Empire for that matter (Digeser,
2004), considered concepts of justice, the common good, civic morals and virtue, and
citizenship within Rome’s version of the polis, the res publica—the republic. We see
that Isocrates’ and Cicero’s notions of civic education and a focus on the common good
influence notions of nationalism and some of the essential elements of what we now
understand as the structure of a nation.
Cicero’s focus on a dialogic form of rhetoric is also significant for the purposes of
this study. Casaregola (1998) points out that Cicero’s revival of Platonic dialogue is
perhaps an early understanding of how rhetoric and oratory can produce “shared
meaning” among publics (p. 73). Ancient rhetoric serves as a foundation where dialogue
was seen as more of an intellectual conversation—the ever-important dialectic—to
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expand on philosophical ideas and moral conversations, as we can see in Plato and
Cicero. We do not necessarily see the concept of dialogue developed philosophically as
we understand it today through thinkers like Buber (1988,1996, 2002, 2005), Bahktin
(1981), Levinas (2004), but Casaregola’s point helps us connect the study of Cicero’s
traditional rhetoric to more contemporary ideas of dialogue. Czubaroff (2000) also points
out that a case should be made for a “dialogic rhetoric” that moves beyond the ancient
ideal of dialectic and a modern form of rhetoric that focuses exclusively on social and
psychological aspects but ignores the ontological and existential notions of the dialogic
act (p. 170). Although Cicero was quite obviously engaged in dialectic quite deeply, we
may be able to make a case to recast his traditional rhetoric regarding the republic as an
ancient form of dialogue that in fact attempted to create an existential-phenomenological
realm of civic engagement for the Roman Republic. In other words, ancient rhetorical
antecedents like the work of Cicero may have begun the conversation that eventually
leads us to dialogic theory. When analyzing Cicero’s dialogic rhetoric in works such as
the Republic, it seems that dialectic may serve as a point of departure for producing
“shared meaning” in the Roman community that perhaps helped shape his ideas about the
Roman republic itself.
Cicero’s concept of res publica set the stage for ancient renderings of the nationstate and the contemporary concept of the republic. Scholarship regarding Cicero’s
influence on the concept of the nation tends to be confounding at moments since terms
like state, nation, nation-state, country, and republic are often used interchangeably and
without consistency. For the purposes of this project, I see the state and the nation as
symbiotic concepts that rely on each other. Cicero’s system of state serves as an essential
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foundation and hermeneutic entrance for the formation of the nation, but the concept of
the nation allows the states to function as a social mechanism. (see Gellner, 1983; Smith,
1983, 1998, 2010 for treatment of state and nation).
With recent scholarship dedicated to the revival of civic republicanism in contrast
to the Western focus on liberalism (Digeser, 2004; Honohan, 2002; Nederman, 2000;
Weinstock and Nadeau, 2004), we turn to Cicero to understand the origins of the republic
situated in the Roman civitas, which provides a foundation for contemporary
understandings of the state (Wood, 1988).
Rhetoricians Isocrates and Cicero played an essential role in understanding how
human dialogue and education contribute to the development of the nation-state. Plato
and Aristotle grappled with comprehending and espousing notions of the polis for the
greater good in canonical works such as Plato’s Republic and Statesman and Aristotle’s
Politics, but as a rhetorician, Cicero makes a pragmatic move toward viewing rhetoric
itself as an essential element for the development of the state. In De Oratore (1904),
Cicero draws a direct connection between the rhetorical ability and human
communication and the development of the state:
It is the fact this one characteristic that give us our chief superiority over the brute
creation, the habit, I mean, of conversing with one another, and the power of
expressing our feelings in words…Finally, to come to what are the main
advantages of speech, what other power could have gathered the scattered
members of the human race into one place, or weaned them from a wild and
savage life to the humane and civilized life of citizens, or, when their various
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communities were once established could have defined for them their laws, their
judicial procedure, and their rights? (Cicero, 1904, p. 14)
We continue to see this connection to rhetoric and communication can be seen
throughout his seminal works, but through Cicero’s political-rhetorical lens. In De
Officiis, or On Duties (1855), Cicero again highlights the human ability to communicate
and reason to the good society: “…[T]hat which is perceived in the society of the whole
human race, and of this the bond is speech and reason, which by teaching, learning,
communicating, debating, and judging conciliate men together, and bind them into a kind
of natural society” (Cicero, 1855, pp. 27-28).
Plato and Aristotle provided a solid foundation for discussing the philosophical
characteristics and complexities of the ethical and moral embodiment of a state and its
function, but as was already discussed in the previous chapter, Isocrates and Cicero as
rhetoricians in the tradition of the School of Civic Rhetoric see philosophy and rhetoric as
symbiotic, the function of each dependent on the other (Hubbell, 1913). Like Isocrates,
Cicero foregrounds human action through language and community, as he utilizes
rhetoric as the vehicle through which community is formed and maintained—
demonstrated by his belief that the functions of the orator and statesmen must be joined
as one and the same (Hubbell, 1913). Where Isocrates’ conservative focus is on
recognizing and developing a common ground among citizens through the available
means of persuasion (Poulakos, 1997), in The Republic, Cicero recognizes the need for
common ground contextualized by ratio, the human ability to reason and to reflect on
that reason. For Cicero (1998), reason is a God-given ability only available to humans
who can engage language for the formation of community and, therefore, the republic
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(On Laws, p.105). Reason not only has the ability to teach us, but also the ability to learn
from itself (On Laws, 1998, p. 107). Above all, we see how rhetoric in antiquity
contributes to the larger conversation about nation and citizenship. Through antiquity,
rhetoric is an essential force in the ways we enlarge our thinking about our embeddedness
in the social and political context as a whole.
Since the “imagined community” (Anderson, 2006) is our hermeneutic entrance
to our renderings of nationhood and nationalism, we will also explore the idea of Cicero’s
republic as an imagined community in the late Roman Republic. How did rhetoric and
education capture the political, social and cultural narrative of the moment? Why is
Cicero’s conception of the republic important for understanding the nation as an
existential-phenomenological instance, allowing its participants to imagine their
situatedness in a particular way? How can his ideas lead us to a theoretical understanding
of the nation and nationalism in the postmodern moment? In short, why is Cicero’s work
on the republic an important component of nationhood as a communicative construct in
contemporary times? Do these ideas burst asunder our contemporary notions of the state,
or do they reinforce and enlarge the individual’s role in society, and therefore, the nation?
Cicero’s Philosophical and Rhetorical Influences: Moving from Isocrates to Cicero
Although a student of rhetoric can readily recognize the various principles and
elements of rhetoric both Isocrates and Cicero share, very little scholarship has identified
Isocrates’ prominent influence on Cicero’s work in any direct way. Muir (2005) states,
“Cicero’s Republic and Laws are modeled on Plato’s dialogues of the same titles, but are
intended to provide an Isocratic alternative to them, substituting Isocrates’ learned orator
for Plato’s philosopher king” (p. 182). A relatively obscure work by Hubbell (1913)
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addresses this issue in much detail. Hubbell (1913) purports that both men had a
tremendous respect for a comprehensive knowledge of the liberal arts and that the idea of
universal knowledge was paramount to a rhetorician’s ability to persuade and educate
those who would serve the polis or republic. He notes that both men recognized the
power of language for political influence and practiced those principles of influence,
engaging human action as an essential element of rhetoric that, when engaged properly,
can benefit the greater whole—the nation, in this regard. Isocrates and Cicero understand
that human action should not be bracketed but must emerge and resolve within a complex
social framework; in short, rhetorical action requires social conditions for its performance
(Hubbell, 1913). Therefore, becoming a virtuous citizen requires acculturation, example,
and education (as repeatedly advanced by Isocrates and Cicero throughout their works
like Against the Sophists and De Oratore, respectively). A good state can allow us to
realize these common goods and to exercise virtues to participate in society and to
reciprocate the gifts society has bestowed upon us (Cicero, 1998, The Republic, p. 8).
Cicero and Isocrates also place a strong emphasis on rhetoric as a mode of
education; rhetoric is education in their worlds, and education prepares citizens for
service to the polis and res publica. Aristotle (1998) in the Politics espouses that
education makes citizens aware of their interdependence and of the importance of
supporting the common goods shared in the polis: ”...[O]ne should not consider any
citizen as belonging to himself alone, but as all belonging to the city-state, since each is a
part of the city-state” (p. 227). Both Isocrates and Cicero follow this line of thinking and
believe that speech/language and communication allow us to sustain life; however, the
republic is essential in providing a field, an existential-phenomenological context, in
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which this communication and hence education is productive and apparent (see Chapter 2
regarding Isocrates advocacy of panhellenism; Cicero, 1998). For Cicero, a political
community is the highest association in which we function, the embodiment of rhetorical
action that manifests in communicative acts (Cicero, 1998, p. 4; Honohan, 2002).
As part of this discussion, then, rhetoric as an expression of the nation is not an
expression of permanence but is rather purely contingent, responsive and contextual to
the historical moment. As we explored earlier, Isocrates “sees logos as the expression of
a particular kind of truth, and he locates it within a given cultural and social context,
moving in space and time” (Fontana, 2004, p.29). Rhetoric and the nation are
interdependent—each provides the existential-phenomenological space in which the other
can respond to the issues, actions, and culture at the time. Rhetoric is essentially a form
of republican and democratic communication that thrives within an environment of
conflict, multiplicity, plurality and difference, which simultaneously attempts to bring
some stability to the contingency caused by these uncertain conditions. For these
reasons, effective orators take on a significant role in the functioning of the state
(Fontana, 2004, pp. 29-30).
Isocrates sees participation in the public sphere differently from Cicero in that
Cicero does not view it as full participation but rather as the participation of the ruling
elite that keeps the “interests of the whole of society at heart” (Honahan, 2004, p. 36).
Cicero’s (1998) ideal republic is governed by a mixed constitution that grants power to
both the aristocracy and a democratic government, but gives precedence to an aristocratic
ruling class that keeps the best interests of the common citizens in mind. In other words,
although both were committed to the idea of the civic republican tradition, Isocrates
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considered civic participation in self-government at a broad, inclusive level while Cicero
placed enormous emphasis on constitutional rule of law, monitored and regulated by the
ruling class (Honohan, 2002, p. 40).
Isocrates’ belief that the orator has great authority over political questions guided
his principle that orator, statesman and philosopher are one and the same (Hubbell, 1913).
Cicero bases his ideas of the orator in De Oratore largely on Isocratean ideals (Hubbell,
1913). “Yet in the debate between philosophy and rhetoric, philosophy and politics,
Cicero seems to return to Isocrates’ understanding of rhetoric. It is a technique and
method by which power may be acquired, but also, precisely because it is a means to
power, it assumes a determinate political, moral and social order within which it acquires
meaning and value” (Fontana, 2004, p. 51). Still into the modern age, there was much
criticism about how these thinkers were actually practicing philosophy. Karl Marx,
although applying Ciceronian thought to his own studies in political science, declared
that Cicero “knew as little about philosophy as the President of the United States of North
America” (Wood, 1988, p. 7). Regardless of this debate, Ciceronian principles have
impacted the way in which scholars have understood the Roman Republic and the
function of the state into modernity.
For Cicero, the orator is by default a statesman at large, a leader, educating
citizens and imparting useful knowledge to citizens in the res publica (Hubbell, 1913,
pp.19; 30). Cicero saw the orator as a powerful player in the rehabilitation of the Roman
Republic, which was slowly deteriorating before him (Lacey & Wilson, 1970). Isocrates
viewed oratory as the main function of the state, an art responsible for the transmission of
ideas and practices that contribute to and transform the state into nation (Hubbell, 1913,
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pp. 2; 11). Rhetoric reigns as the supreme art for creating a social and national
consciousness among its citizens; the idea of nation is a state of mind within its citizens,
shaped by the language, ideas, and culture, or in Greek terms, paideia. Cicero’s work
reflects how the orator as statesman uses the craft of rhetoric to convey very distinct
language to persuade Roman society of what a political society should look like. His
ability to address national issues reflects his predecessor’s ability to speak (and write)
quite convincingly about the state of affairs in their own political environments — polis
for Isocrates, and res publica for Cicero. For both men, rhetoric is ultimately a moral
venture, educating fellow citizens about the needs and the best conditions of their
political environment (Hubbell, 1913).
As discussed earlier, Isocrates expounds ideas of the Greek polis and statesmen,
but above all the idea of panhellenism. Cicero’s rhetorical philosophy is not confined to
the function of oratory and language. Like Isocrates, he carries his expertise particularly
as a rhetorician to outline and influence the nature of his republic in very specific terms,
particularly when it comes to the role of reason in rhetoric. However, unlike Isocrates, as
we will see in The Republic, Cicero is not necessarily promoting a Pan-Roman world, but
rather turning within to strengthen his own society, which consequently bolsters its
political structure and the overall ideal of the nation through which citizens can thrive,
function and serve. To explore this point more deeply, I will focus mainly on two
Ciceronian texts, On The Republic and On Law, to explain how Cicero sets the stage for
premodern ideals of state, nation and nationalism.
In summary, both Isocrates and Cicero emphasize metaphors of the common
center/common good to convey ideals of political economy (Honohan, 2002). Cicero
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develops on Isocratean rhetoric about nation and nationalism through understanding how
moderation and regulation are central to the republic, and he understands how the nation
is a physical manifestation of a phenomenological context in which laws guide our
freedom and provide justice. Like Isocrates, Cicero is the quintessential pragmatist; both
men seem to be engaging the resources that are available to them to create a political
community that seems even more accessible and possible for the quotidian citizen.
Plato’s Statesman: Cicero’s Guiding Document
Although this connection to Isocrates is clear and important, I would be remiss
not to acknowledge Plato’s direct influence on Cicero’s system of state, particularly in his
work The Statesman. Plato, and Aristotle to a certain extent, provide philosophical
ground for Cicero’s understanding on the influence and utility of rhetoric on the republic.
(Wheeler [1952] points out that Cicero’s work is often attributed to Plato’s work on the
state, but any reference to Aristotle’s Politics in reference to the republic is most likely
“not causal but coincidental” [p. 51]). Cicero’s core ideas also seem to emanate from the
philosophical and rhetorical influence Plato and Aristotle had on ancient Western
thought, particularly regarding our ability to reason for the sake of social and political
development (How, 1930). Cicero integrates Platonic and Aristotelian contemplative
thought into his own work by effectively applying them into the Roman context of action
(How, 1930). Seminal works such as the Republic and Laws are not “philosophical
fiction but [are] real and historical” because they described what was actually emerging
in the Roman republic at the time (How, 1930, p. 26).
There are several core ideals such as moderation in rule, the interaction of rule of
law with the chosen leader, rule of a few over the rule of many, and the power of rhetoric
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in the role of the state, that Cicero seems to borrow from Plato for use in the Roman
world (Wheeler, 1952); however, How (1930) points out that the “differences [in Cicero]
are as clear as, and more profound than, the resemblances” (p. 26). Plato believes, in an
uncharacteristically Aristotelian sense, that the state cannot function or succeed without
looking toward moderation in how one rules and in how society behaves. “…[A] view to
the attainment of the mean, seems to afford a grand support and satisfactory proof of the
doctrine which we are maintaining” (Plato, The Statesman, 2008, p. 89).
The rule of law is also given to us as an a priori, but for Plato, the rule of law
alone does not suffice because it is itself rhetorical—it does not “comprehend what is
noblest and just for all” (Plato, The Statesman, 2008, p.104) and therefore must be
administered by wise men who understand this and can respond to the temporal quality of
the law. The rule of law and the statesman have a complex, symbiotic relationship—one
cannot function without the other. Law would have no legitimacy without the guidance
and wisdom of the endowed ruler who possesses the true art of leadership; the law is
necessary, but cannot create any form of good rule without a leader who possesses
knowledge of the “art” of rule itself (Plato, The Statesman, 2008, p.104).
Plato believes in the divinity of law, its a priori nature, but also understands its
imperfections when engaging human complexity. God’s law has been given to us, but
God is displeased with our ability to apply it well; he has handed it over to the earthly
domain in order for us to apply it justly and fairly (Plato, 1998). Thus, the philosopher
king’s duty is to moderate the law and apply the art of leadership to human behavior for
the benefit of society.
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Although a proponent of the philosopher king, one endowed with the abilities to
rule moderately through law, Plato prefers the rule of a few (an aristocracy or oligarchy)
over the rule of many (democracy); mobs can easily turn the state into a anarchistic
tyranny (Plato, The Statesman). Cicero’s ideal state rests in an aristocracy that rules under
a mixed constitution. In The Republic Cicero also believes that pure democracy can be
detrimental to a successful state, but that the rule of one individual will quite easily spiral
into an opportunity for despotism. For Plato, the king can negotiate those a priori laws
that are complicated by humans en masse.
For Plato, rhetoric plays an important role in the development and maintenance of
a just state, but he does not believe it to be the art by which a state is formed and
maintained. Plato very clearly states that rhetoric is quite different from politics
(“Rhetoric seems to be quickly distinguished from politics, being a different species, yet
ministering to it” (The Statesman, p. 217)), where Cicero and the Romans believe that
rhetoric and politics are one in the same art. Walzer (2007) points out that Roman
rhetoric was civic rhetoric in that it was “taught in the context of telos,” not merely as a
technical practice, but as a form of citizen education for the good of the civitas (p. 271).
Cicero’s De Oratore points to the character of oratory as such:
It may, indeed, occur to an objector that oratory ought to be compared with other
pursuits such as deal with more abstruse subjects and imply a wide acquaintance
with literature, rather than with the excellence of a general or the practical
wisdom of the good statesman; but let him only turn to such other branches of
study, and observe how numerous are the distinguished names in each, and he
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will realize what a great paucity of orators there is, and always has been. (Cicero,
1904, p. 4)
Cicero cannot emphasize the importance of rhetoric and oratory enough; oratory forms
the foundation on which all other disciplines are grounded and provides the channels
through which knowledge and moral conversations are disseminated. Most importantly,
rhetoric and oratory are essential to the creation and function of a just republic.
On the other hand, for Plato, politics and the affairs of the state are arts of their
own, and rhetoric is not an essential element for creating a just state. Rhetoric, when not
Sophistic, can act as a guide aiding “the pilot” (p. 195)—a recurring metaphor in the
Statesman— of the great ship of the state to steer toward moderation and justice.
Sophistic rhetoric will persuade citizens to disregard the rule of law, but an ethical
rhetoric can point citizens to desirable ends (Plato, 1998, p. 111). Politics take a
hierarchical precedence over rhetoric since politics is the art that helps us decide whether
we should engage rhetoric as a tactical measure; the art of politics creates the
epistemological field in which rhetoric functions. “And the science which determines
whether we ought to persuade or not, must be superior to the science which is able to
persuade? Of course” (Plato, 1998, p.119). Although rhetoric is not a requirement for
effective politics, by fluidly and artfully combining the arts of politics and rhetoric, the
ruler can “weave” (Plato’s metaphor) the various abilities of the masses to form a state
that benefits all of its citizens. The art of politics, not the persuasive abilities of rhetoric,
actually grants the a priori ability to choose the capable politician/leader:
Then the true and natural art of statesmanship will never allow any State to be
formed by a combination of good and bad men, if this can be avoided; but will
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begin by testing human nature in play, and after testing them, will entrust them to
proper teachers who are the ministers of her purposes – she will herself give
orders, and maintain authority…(Plato, 1998, p. 127)
It is important for us to extrapolate these various themes from Plato’s work on the
Statesman in order to gain a full understanding of Cicero’s influences from the Greek
world. This project contends that Isocrates has a strong linkage to Ciceronian thought
through the ways in which the polis and republic, and therefore the nation, were
conceived in antiquity. However, Plato, particularly regarding his requirements for an
ideal state, had a strong impact on the way Cicero thought about the republic. By
combining the technical and political aspects of Platonic thought on the state and
Isocratic principles for civic rhetoric and social engagement, Cicero recasts a version of
the republic through Roman ideals that serves as a transition to later understandings of
the nation in general.
Civic Republicanism: Early Notions of a Nation?
The next phase of our discussion involves a pragmatic move toward viewing
rhetoric as an essential element in the development of the nation. Cicero is often
considered the last great republican statesman of antiquity: “Through his modification of
Stoicism, Cicero erected the basic conceptual framework of the ‘law of nations’ within
which, or against which, all subsequent international law and normative international
relations theory has defined itself” (Pangle and Ahrensdorf, 1999, p. 51). Cicero was
“one of the national heroes of old Rome” and was the first to be called the “Father of His
Country” (Rolfe, 1963, pp. 108; 110) because of his unwavering support of a republic
that not only cared for its citizens, but also encouraged participation by its citizens.
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Cicero’s influence reached far in terms of distance and time, as he heavily influenced
modern politicians in post-Enlightenment England and France, particularly in Republican
France during their struggle for liberty and civic participation (Rolfe, 1963).
Coined the “Prince of Eloquence,” (Wood, 1988, p.3), Cicero is one of a few rhetoricians
considered an ancient “antecedent” to the conception and development of the idea of
civic republicanism in contemporary times (Honahan, 2002, p. 41). Even Parenti (2003)
who writes an unusually scathing account of Cicero’s controversial role in Roman
society, criticized for his ideas and methods behind the creation and maintenance of the
republic, still acknowledges Cicero as an exemplary orator.
Today there is a movement towards reinvigorating the merits of civic
republicanism in the contemporary world (Digeser, 2004, Honohan, 2002, Maynor, 2003,
Nederman, 2000). Communitarian scholars like Taylor and MacIntyre contend “that
liberal theory and practice yield an impoverished and distorted conception of human
community and public life” (Nederman, 2000, p. 17), where the foundations of civic
republicanism are reflected in important indicators such as civic participation and the
primacy of human interdependence (Honohan, 2002). This theme of a common center is
the main focus of modern republican thought, and hence often considered a “conservative
mentality” politically and intellectually (Wood, 1988, p. 206). Aristotle and Cicero can
be viewed as civic republicans in the sense that they view this notion of
interconnectedness, particularly as a political construct, necessary for the foundation of
the nation, which takes on a very different character and function of other communal
associations in society (Honohan, 2002, p. 15).
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It is evident from these considerations, then, that a city-state is among the things
that exist by nature, that a human being is by nature a political animal, and that
anyone who is without a city-state, not by luck but by nature, is either a poor
specimen or else superhuman. Like the one Homer condemns, he too is ‘clanless,
lawless, and homeless.’ For someone with such a nature is at the same time eager
for war, like an isolated piece in a board game…Hence that the city-state is a
natural and prior in nature to the individual is clear. For if an individual is not
self-sufficient when separated, he will be like all other parts in relation to the
whole. Anyone who cannot form a community with others, or who does not need
to because he is self-sufficient, is not part of a city-state – he is either a beast or
god. Hence, though an impulse toward this sort of community exists by nature in
everyone, whoever first established one was responsible for the greatest of goods.
(Aristotle, Politics, 1998, pp. 4-5)
Thus, it is with Aristotle that we begin to see that the concept of community is a priori to
our existence and that belonging to a community is essential for human life; we are
savages without the support, and acceptance, of community. This idea that a man without
a land is a man without a home comes into focus in the Greek polis.
Cicero contributes to the conversation about civic republicanism in a much
different way than many of its contemporary proponents, especially concerning ideas of
national defense and the necessity of war—two very important discussions tied to the
notion of contemporary nationalism. “For Cicero, the pursuit of peace, rather than war,
and statesmanship, rather than military command, are the prime tokens of patriotism and
exemplars or republican virtue” (Nederman, 2000, p. 19). Cicero saw the need for just
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war when the security and integrity of the republic were threatened from the outside, but
overall his republican system of government and the concept of nation called for the need
to consider alternatives to war and foster peace and civic participation in the public
sphere (Nederman, 2000; von Heyking, 2007). Laws that are led and enforced by learned
leaders create an environment that encourages civic participation that is energized by a
clear understanding of the state—that entity which promotes and provides protection,
particularly in moments of strife (Cicero, The Laws, 1998, p. 150). Civic republicanism
is an understanding of the state through its purest communal roots; those interconnected
communities of active citizens are not left to their own devices, but rather thrive in a
context that is framed by good laws and leaders who understand the laws (Honohan,
2002). The state then becomes the existential-phenomenological manifestation where
justice is not only recognized, but also applied to quotidian life. Civic republicanism,
then, may be considered an early form of nation: It provides the ground on which a state
must form and function, guided by principles of law, leadership and justice (for which
both Plato and Aristotle planted the seeds). Cicero builds on these principles to drive a
theory of civic republicanism that breathes life into the idea of the republic through
Roman paideia, to use the Greek term.
Res Publica as Nation
Although Cicero elucidates the notion that rhetoric and the idea of republic are
inextricably linked in his orations, letters, and dialogues, two of his most important
works, the Republic and the Laws clearly outline his program for a public entity that can
thrive and serve its citizens ethically and responsibly. As we have explored earlier,
Cicero’s rhetorical approach to understanding statehood and his state in particular
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attempted to create a cultural framework that resonated in the hearts and minds of its
citizens. However, we must understand the foundations of republic and the indicators
that elevate it from purely a technical system of state to a cultural construct, a Greek
paideia, for the Roman populus.
The most basic understanding of Cicero’s Republic is contained in the meaning of
the word itself. Res publica literally translates from the Latin to “public thing” or “public
business.” Cicero saw the republic as a function of its citizenry, a field for public
participation, under the guidance of a learned ruling class (Fott, 2014; Powell & Rudd,
1998). “Part Aristotle, part Cicero, part Machiavelli, civic humanism conceives of man
as a political being whose realization of self occurs only through participation in public
life, through active citizenship in a republic. The virtuous man is concerned primarily
with the public good, res publica, or commonwealth, not with private or selfish ends”
(Kramnick, 1982, p. 630). As far as we can tell, Cicero was the first to have phrased the
idea of a public state in these terms. “And who are ‘the people?’ ‘The people’ is a union
of a number of men, acknowledging each other’s common rights, and pursuing in
common their advantage or ‘interest.’ Res publica then is a community, and the business
of such a union of men, no more, and no less” (Lacey & Wilson, 1970, p. 1). Res publica
is a complex statement about communal relationships, and therefore rather difficult to
translate directly; this is clearly indicated by the ways in which the title of Cicero’s work
itself has been translated, as Res publica is sometimes referred to as a republic, a state, or
a commonwealth. All of these factors encompass various aspects of Cicero’s republic,
but none truly grasp the essence of his system completely (Lacey & Wilson, 1970).
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For the purposes of this project, it is important to explore the specific
characteristics of a republic as well as the question of why Cicero’s republic fits into our
understanding of a nation. Wood (1988) contends that Cicero’s state is “non-ethical and
secular,” and that there is “the separation of the state from both government and society,
all of which have a beginning in the thought of Cicero” (1988, p.125). Civitas is the
technical term regarding the complex system that regulates the states, while res publica is
based in common interest and rights (1988, p. 128). Civitas tends to be somewhat less
normative and emotive term than res publica,” but that patria (fatherland, in a sense) is
the most emotive of all (p. 126; p. 139). In other words, the more we move down the
hierarchy of social constructs, the more pragmatic and technical they become; patria is an
existential-phenomenological construct that lives in the hearts and minds of its citizens,
while res publica and civitas are the technical constructs that inform the patria through
systems of justice and common humanity (Wood, 1988). These two statements, however,
seem to confound the function of Cicero’s Republic. On one hand, we have an entity that
is non-ethical and secular, but on the other hand we are asked to view the res publica as a
philosophical construct grounded in common humanity and justice that then shapes the
way the civitas functions. In other words, the res publica conjures up notions of the
“material world,” the actual social mechanism that invokes the emotions and actions of
his fellow citizens to form a functional state (Dugan, 2007, p. 19).
Cicero’s focus on an Aristotelian style of moderation within the state is
noteworthy as well. In The Republic, Cicero (1998) makes it very clear that temperance,
particularly the temperance of a leader, helps to construct a practical collective
experience that produces the characteristics of a solid republic; “excessive license”
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promotes an environment of anarchy that quickly devolves into tyranny (Cicero, 1998, p.
31). In other words, clear and distinct boundaries between the leadership and citizenry
create the necessary phenomenological distance that makes the construction and function
of the state possible and accessible. Mob rule will undoubtedly bring about destruction,
but knowledgeable and ethical leaders are able to impart justice through the law that is
supported by a constitution. A true state is grounded in philosophy from which emerges
a strong practical approach that forms and manages that state.
Thus, the Republic provides a pragmatic context for moral excellence in which
citizens can improve their lives. Philosophy’s practical home is located within the state.
[The] most important field of [moral] practice, moreover, is in the government of
the state…For nothing is laid down by philosophers—nothing right and honorable
at any rate—which has not been brought into being and established by those who
have drawn up laws for states...We are led by a powerful urge to increase the
wealth of the human race; we are keen to make men’s lives richer and safer by our
policies and efforts; we are spurred on by nature herself to fulfill this purpose.
(Cicero, 1998, p.4)
The state is a function of rhetoric, the practical philosophy that helps citizens make sense
of their world and provides refuge in a constantly contingent world. There is no greater
activity closer to the divine than the creation of a state (Cicero, 1998); the creation of a
state is a practical moral act that not only helps us form communities but allows us to
understand our situatedness in those communities (Cicero, 1998, pp. 17, 19). The nation
is ethical, rhetorical action as it provides the natural existential-phenomenological context
for its citizens; however, we only arrive at this pragmatic entity through grounded
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philosophical thought from which the creation of laws and natural leadership emerge. In
short, the state is teleological, providing a vision for what is possible: “…[F]or it is the
crowning achievement of political wisdom…to divine the course of public affairs, with
all its twists and turns. Then, when you know what direction things are taking, you can
hold them back or else be ready to meet them” (Cicero, 1998, p.49). Within such
rhetorical constructs public and personal liberty is a reality.
Cicero’s Rhetorical Contribution to the “Imagined Community”
Although ancient rhetoric can be viewed as a technical art, applying the necessary
rhetorical mechanisms for successful persuasion, such as the case with Aristotle’s
Rhetoric (1984) and Cicero’s De Inventione (1949), we can also readily regard rhetoric as
a mode of communication and way of life that shaped the cultural mindset. Dugan (2007)
argues that Cicero’s rhetorical approach is not only technical, but sets up a cultural
framework for his place and time; it plays directly into the public imagination of the
republic in the Roman historical moment. Cicero’s works are “culturally significant,” not
only technical: “Rhetoric is treated as a cultural construct embedded in society” (Dugan,
2007, p. 16), as rhetoricians like Cicero were conveying the “Roman cultural
unconscious” (Dugan, 2007, p. 18). We can see this framing in Cicero’s treatment of his
notion of the res publica; not only did he provide guidelines for what ideals should be
applied for successful governance, but the very notion of his republic reflected what was
occurring in that historical moment while he was attempting to transform it from within.
Powell and Rudd (1998) elude to this quality in the republic by addressing Cicero’s focus
on the profession of the politician and ultimately how it affected the common citizen:
“Cicero was concerned not just to encourage political participation, but to present politics
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as a branch of knowledge which needed to be studied and mastered, and which aimed at
the greatest good not of the politicians themselves but of the governed” (p. xxii, emphasis
added).
Cicero was writing these seminal works at a time when the Roman Republic was
in major distress, wrought with corruption, and on its way toward the new Empire
(Cowell, 1968; Hamilton, 1932). His emphasis on civic republicanism was an attempt
not only to strengthen his state, but also to work this idea quite deliberately into the
public consciousness to shift the cultural framework and the actual structure of his state at
the time. He does this by engaging justice as the foundation on which the cultural and
political landscape in the Roman world could be transformed. In short, rhetoric and
jurisprudence needed each other in this growing populace; Cicero’s emphasis on law and
justice is enveloped in rhetoric and pulls everyday citizens into republican life.
Rhetoric had an influence on matters of the republic not only at the elite levels but
on that of the commoners as well (Alexander, 2007). When Cicero was writing his
masterpiece of political theory and statehood, the moral character at the time of Cicero
preceded by Cato was in ruins and much of Cicero’s ideal emerged out of a politically
vital but socially doubtful moment (Cowell, 1967; Hamilton, 1932). De Republica is
more and more an idea that was a reflection of the concern of the republic’s demise
(Cowell, 1967). Although De Republica outlines specific guidelines for the success of a
just and moral state, at a more global level it creates a cultural framework for society;
Cicero’s republic is an “imagined community” not in the sense that it is only a pure ideal,
but in the Andersonian sense that it can truly exist in the hearts and minds of its citizens
when communicated effectively (Anderson, 2006). In the Roman world, rhetoric is the
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tool and method of communication through which this “imagining” occurs. One way in
which we can explore this notion of rhetoric as a method of cultural significance is to
delve a little more deeply into some of Cicero’s writing focused specifically on rhetoric
itself. We can see that even in some of his earlier writings on the art of oration and its
function as a public good, the question of state is at the center.
De Oratore (On Oratory) does not only provide the function and utility of oration
in Roman society, but integrates the function of rhetoric into more global concerns for the
state in general. In De Oratore, Cicero underscores the two major questions before the
republic: “The reform of judicia, and the extension of the civitas to all the Italian
yeomen” (Moor, 1904, p. viii). For good oratory one needs knowledge of moral
philosophy and law – the former allows the orator to persuade well (Moor, 1904), but
without law and reason there is no justice to guide us. “….[M]y deliberate opinion is, that
the controlling influence and wisdom of the consummate orator is the main security, not
merely for his own personal reputation, but for the safety of countless individuals, and the
welfare of the country at large ” (Cicero, 1904, p. 13, emphasis added). As we can see in
De Oratore, Cicero viewed rhetoric as one of the most important, if not the most
important, methods for creation and maintenance of a just republic. Rhetoric was the
available means of public communication and persuasion in Roman society, and through
both word and deed, leaders could convey the importance of reason, law and justice
within that entity which could protect and provide for its citizens. In Ciceronian terms,
then, rhetoric is necessary for the development of a national consciousness.
On Duties (1855) advances Cicero’s program for pragmatic morality. Leaders
and citizens alike contribute to society through active citizenship; as members of an
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organized state, we are behooved to act not in our own interests but in the interests of the
republic for the good of all that surrounds us. Like many of Cicero’s other discussions,
both reason and justice compel duties—we serve to benefit every level of society. We
are justified when defending our country, but at the same time, we must regard others
around us by acting in moderation and beneficence. Cicero’s penchant for the Stoic
cosmopolitanism and his love of country contradict, yet somehow support, each other
when thinking about nation particularly in postmodern terms. There is a fine line
between what we hold as our own, and what all of mankind is meant to share. The nation
is the social construct in which we carry out our duty to engage in an active political life
that is enforced by justice and ethics. Regardless of the evils that pervade political
activity, Cicero believes that its benefits far outweigh the costs. As animals with reason
and language, it is our obligation to serve and protect the community of which we are a
part.
But (as has been strikingly said by Plato) we are not born of ourselves alone, and
our country claims her share, and our friends their share of us; and, as the Stoics
hold, all the that the earth produces is created for the use of man, so men are
created for the sake of men, that they may mutually do good to one
another…(Cicero, On Duties, 1855, pp. 14-15)
Mutual, communal action is natural—our duty to every level of society from country to
family is implanted in us to serve and protect the common good. The res publica is the
practical manifestation of our duty to ourselves and our fellow citizens, but ultimately the
res publica conceived as nation is a nation among nations, participating in the larger
context of an international web of associations. For Cicero, the state creates a society
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that realizes full human potential in the world; it provides a tangible context and acts as a
guide for its citizens to act justly in communion with their fellow human beings.
Through the law, the state provides protection for personal property, both tangible
property and intangible human properties such as human rights and freedom. The state is
a moral entity because it is the work of the gods; it is the pinnacle of human community
and is tantamount to the survival and success of the human race. “All that is distinctively
human, according to Cicero, depends on the existence and well-being of the state…The
state provides an environment conducive to the flourishing of culture and it highest
manifestation, philosophy. With the state, philosophy would not have been born, and
without philosophy’s guidance the state is like a rudderless ship (Wood, 1988, p. 120121).”
Wood (1988) contends that Cicero was among the first to define the state in a
concise manner, but was more concerned about the non-moral, technical aspects of the
state as opposed to something that would shape the human soul. Thus far, we see that
although Cicero did in fact create a technical program for the state, the underlying
intention was that these guidelines would allow us to form an understanding of the state
that was pleasing to the gods by protecting fellow humans through acts of justice and
providing a space for meaningful conversation about our relationships with our fellow
citizens and those beyond our “borders.” For these reasons, perhaps Wood fails to see
the rhetorical forces behind Cicero’s work, as his rhetoric contextualizes the goals of his
technical guidelines for the republic. It is difficult to see that Cicero’s work, which is
deeply grounded on justice and reason, is “non-moral.”
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Again, we see that Anderson’s notion of the nation as an imagined community
continues to assist us with even ancient conceptions of the nation. It is important to point
out, however, that Cicero’s Republic may be “imagined” in a theoretically rich,
Andersonian sense as it forms common ground; it is not “imaginary” in the sense that it is
overly ideal and unattainable (Wood, 1988, p. 139). Rather, Cicero’s Republic is a real,
tangible system grounded in significant Roman ideals. The imagined community is
constituted through human language and communication and the distribution of that
communication to the community. Cicero’s writings on the republic not only convey the
ideal political community, but they delineate an imagined community because they
capture the pulse of the historical moment and speak directly to the problems that
everyday citizens are facing in the late republic. Cicero’s idea of the republic is an early
rendering of the nation as he attempts to prefigure an identity for the citizens of Rome
that is tied to place politically, culturally, and juridically while engaging rhetoric as the
available means of persuasion and the most accessible form of public communication.
Cicero engaged rhetorical methods and principles which he had outlined for Roman
citizens, as in De Inventione, to convey a message of statehood that would resonate in the
minds and hearts of its citizens throughout a burgeoning, yet troubled, society, and create
a shared meaning for nationhood and citizenship within that nation.
The Centrality of Natural Law
Such a discussion leads us to Cicero’s notion of nature and natural law. Rhetoric
and, therefore, the state are not exclusively social constructs, originating from the
complex relationships with community; rather, they are products of natural law, a
common center that derives from the divine. “[I]n all times and nations this universal law
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must forever reign, eternal and imperishable. It is the sovereign master and emperor of
all beings. God himself is its author, its promulgator, its enforcer” (Cicero, On the
Commonwealth, 1929, p. 270). Laws that result in justice are not human, earthly laws but
rather a result of the laws that the gods have handed down to us, which then become
human constructs (Cicero, 1929, p. 254). Natural law ensures that the law is in fact
centered on a common good that emerges through the way we view and enact justice, and
therefore allows us to form common goals and aspirations within a political structure
regardless of the diversity that exists. We can see this influence as referred to in Plato’s
Statesman: Humankind cannot precisely understand how the law guides us, nor does the
law understand human nature, but it strives to infiltrate our political associations and
control our ways. Plato and Cicero agree that the wise ruler, the philosopher king for
Plato and educated royalty for Cicero, must mediate the function of the law with human
action as well as its converse. We can see both of these ideas emerge in Plato’s
Statesman (2008, p. 104) and Cicero’s Republic (1998, pp. 4; 14), respectively. Cicero
(1998), although he ultimately admits that Plato’s design for the state was more idealistic
than practical (in Cicero’s words, “desirable” rather than “feasible” (p.51)), he follows
those same principles as a foundation for his vision of a functioning, just republic.
The state, then, is a teleological manifestation of nature, or natural law in
particular, which is the ground on which the development of functional communities
emerges. At its very core, reason—rational reflection, or phronesis in the Greek
lexicon—is the channel through which natural law reaches the wise rulers and is applied
to the state (Cicero, 1998). Laws emerge from reason. Of course, reason itself
“moderates” communication in the Aristotelian sense, which Cicero then carries into his
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own goals for a realistic republic. However, we do not necessarily observe Isocrates
engaging reason as a starting point in the same way, but rather focusing on phronesis to
accomplish his task (Schwarze, 1999). We see all of these influences in Cicero. In On
Law, Cicero describes the importance of reason and how this hierarchy of virtue allows
us to arrive at the functional state, the necessary structure for human community and
communication. Reason, which is inherent in nature, results in law, which Cicero
believes to be the highest form of human reason. “For law is the force of nature, the
intelligence and reason of a wise man, and the criterion of justice and injustice” (Cicero,
The Laws, 1998, p. 103). Law, and therefore justice, is the manifestation of practical
reason. Cicero explains the Roman diversion from the Greek in the way the cultures
viewed the law—the Greek word for law, nomos, was defined as something that was
bestowed upon the polis that focused on ideas of “fairness,” while the Roman word, lex,
was not simply something that was granted to the Romans, but rather a matter of “choice”
in the ways in which they behaved for the good of the republic (Cicero, The Laws, 1998,
p. 103). Cicero agrees that both elements are central to the law, but we see the penchant
for Roman action over the Greek contemplation. “…Cicero distinctly claims to speak
with authority on the ground that he combined both theory and practice, thus excelling
his predecessors, who…were either mere theorists or, if practical, devoid of skill in
exposition” (How, 1930, p. 25). Reason is the pure essence of all that regulates human
interaction; without reason we will not arrive at laws that promulgate justice. More
importantly, the crucible of republic provides the existential-phenomenological space for
reason and justice to emerge.
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“…[T]here is nothing better than reason, and reason is present in both man and
God. But those who share reason also share right reason; and since that is law, we
men must also be thought of as partners and with the gods in laws. Furthermore,
those who share law share justice. Now those who share all things must be
regarding as belonging to the same state; and much the more so if they obey the
same powers and authorities. And they do in fact obey this celestial system, the
divine mind, and the all-powerful god. Hence this whole universe must be
thought of as a single community shared by gods and men. (Cicero, The Laws,
1998, p. 105, emphasis added)
It is interesting to note Cicero’s expansion of the concept of the republic in this regard. A
community is a product of shared laws and justice; however, he does not see law and
justice as specific to a particular state, but rather universal laws that encompass the whole
of humanity. For that reason, community extends beyond the political structure of the
state to the larger, universal community. As we will explore later, such a focus on the
whole of humanity plays directly into Cicero’s understanding of the larger human
community as influenced by the Stoics, and the balance between the need for a republic
and this human community at large.
For Cicero, then, the state is grounded on the notion of what we, as citizens, all
agree to be just and how that justice is preserved: “For what is a state other than an equal
partnership in justice?” (Cicero, The Republic, 1998, p. 22-23). Agreement within the
state, which is regulated by justice, is akin to the natural harmony within music—the
bonds of difference that work in concert to keep the state functioning well. “What, in the
case of singing, musicians call harmony is, in the state, concord; it constitutes the tightest
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and most effective bond of security; and such concord cannot exist at all without justice”
(Cicero, The Republic, 1998, p. 58). Natural law and reason all result in how justice is
perceived and practiced; if justice is not guided by the law, and natural law in Cicero’s
case, then it is selfish kind of justice that does not consider the Other in its application.
For Cicero, the law ensures that justice is oriented toward the Other, which in turn helps
to create the true essence of the purpose of a republic; that is, a space in which we agree
upon the tenets of justice, but also where justice is applied with our fellow citizen in mind
(Wood, 1988).
The Dream of Scipio is perhaps Cicero’s most prominent chapter of the Republic
because of the effective use of narrative and metaphor that grounds his major ideas of the
republic in a cohesive, and memorable, narrative for the Romans. Scipio’s dream is
otherworldly, as Scipio, a great leader descended from great leaders, is flying through the
cosmos with the gods (1998, The Republic, Book IV). Such a perspective on the world
not only demonstrates the importance of a nation in the minds of the gods, but it
emphasizes Cicero’s main ideas about the significance, origin and structure of a republic.
From the cosmos, the earth is miniscule and society even smaller; even in their seemingly
insignificant presence, well-ordered societies please the gods, and the leaders in those
societies, who are chosen by the gods, are granted a direct link to divinity (p. 88). From
this perspective Scipio sees a nation for what it really is: A significant, but small element
in a much larger system deemed invaluable by nature (the gods). Should these societies
be well-ordered and led by those naturally chosen to carry out the function of a state, the
gods will grant their blessings upon the nation (Barham, 1841): “I want you to know this:
for everyone who has saved and served his country and helped it grow, a sure place is set
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aside in heaven where he may enjoy of life of eternal bliss” (Cicero, The Republic, 1998,
p. 88). From the gods’ perspective, the nation is the most manageable and accessible
form of the divine for earthly citizens, and therefore is the work of the gods: “To that
supreme god who rules the universe, nothing (or at least nothing that happens on earth) is
more welcoming than those companies and communities of people linked together by
justice that are called states. Their rulers and saviors set out from this place [the cosmos],
and to this they return” (Cicero, The Republic, 1998, p. 88).
Cicero’s rhetorical technique of setting Scipio’s dream in a somewhat fantastical,
out-of-this-world context connects the practical function of the state, and the effective
ruling of the republic, to the cosmos and the larger, a priori context. The mind, or what
some might consider more accurately the soul, is an a priori creation of the divine. Cicero
believes that God has granted us life and formed our souls to be stewards of the earth; the
republic is the organizing entity that allows us to carry out that responsibility (Cicero,
The Republic, 1998, p. 89). We must act according to the requirements within a republic
to attain an understanding of our origin while creating an acceptable structure that pleases
the gods. The human soul is eternal, and the republic allows for the earthly existence of
the eternal soul. A nation is not formed out of a vacuum, but rather the earthly
manifestation of a sort of divine ordering of our world. Scipio learns from his forefather
Africanus that all things good derive from an “Eternal Being,” and when not derived
from such a source “all nature must perish” (Cicero, On the Commonwealth, 1929, pp.
310-311). In this life, altruistic political activity that is focused on those with whom we
share our world is rewarded in the afterlife.
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Cicero’s application of the law to justice, and the communication of these ideas to
fellow citizens, is yet another example of how Cicero and the Romans “imagined” their
community and developed their notion of the republic. Law and justice are not possible
without citizens sharing these ideas and applying them to everyday life in order to form a
just and ethical republic. Works such as Cicero’s Republic and Laws were foundational
pieces that reinforced the Roman pragmatic ideal into the minds of its citizens to form a
more desirable space for nation, the space where an understanding of common justice
was made possible and a space where its citizens granted the privilege of protection and
freedom.
Cicero’s Cosmopolitanism
Given the above elements of Ciceronian thought, we can invoke such ideas of the
republic as foundations of what we understand to be a contemporary concept of the
nation. Although not directly “national” in our contemporary understanding, they are
important ancient antecedents to the ways in which we view the nation and nationalism.
As mentioned earlier, I understand the concept of nation to be a communicative,
discursive public phenomenon that allows private citizens to engage issues of belonging
and identity rhetorically within strongly defined political, social, economic and
communicative boundaries. Although bound to physical characteristics in our current
understanding, the nation seems to be defined more by imagined, existentialphenomenological horizons that offer guidelines for interaction with cultural, political,
social and economic selves and others. In this regard, physical boundaries become less
stringent, more contingent and permeable. Nationalism, then, is the intellectual and
emotional manifestation of that reality in the hearts and minds of that nation’s citizens
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and interlocutors. These existential-phenomenological horizons explored by Cicero, and
to some extent, Isocrates earlier, are driven by the law and thus justice as a common,
moral center that allows citizens to make sense of the political, social, economic, and
cultural world around them. Nations allow citizens to “moderate” the world around
them, as they make social, cultural and political issues manageable and accessible for the
masses. Of course, the nation, or the republic in Cicero’s terms, is not possible without a
knowledgeable leader who respects the presence of the law derived from the a priori
conditions that guide the ways in which we act and interact to form the common ground
for justice and, eventually, peace.
Cicero was considered a patriot to the Roman Republic, but, like Aristotle, he
understood that moderation was necessary to live a chaotic political, social world (Rolfe,
1963). As a cosmopolitan Stoic, Cicero, particularly in On Duties, vacillates between
the greatness of the Roman citizen while acknowledging the need to incorporate others
into the political community (Pangle, 1998). Patriotism is an important aspect of life in
the republic, but must be balanced so as to not degenerate into forms of nationalism that
are damaging and disregard the existence of other surrounding communities. Rolfe
explains that in even Cicero’s world that was less connected than in the contemporary
world, recognizing others outside of one system played an important role in patriotism.
“Still, love of country when it does not degenerate into chauvinism and national
selfishness, is the mark that distinguishes a good citizen from a bad, and this quality
Cicero possessed to an unusual degree and put it on record” (Rolfe, 1963, p.167).
We cannot deny his love of country, his need to regulate the masses while
encouraging active participation, and the ability to extol human freedom within the
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construct of the republic. Freedom and justice are possible only within an organized,
concerted effort to “herd” citizens (to use Plato’s extended metaphor in the Statesman
(2008), p. 99) and provide resources that create an environment where freedom is made
possible through justice. The republic was the highly organized manifestation of a
community that provided that manageable context.
At the heart of this complex and highly nuanced rhetorical project is an appeal to
certain transnational rules of conduct embodied in the Stoic notion of “natural law” and
the kindred conception of the “law of nations” (ius gentium) (Pangle and Ahrensdorf,
1999, p. 52). The Stoics evidently promulgated the first widely influential cosmopolitan
ethical ideal, rejecting the need for allegiances to country and political affiliations: “All
good men, whatever their social or geographic position may be, are equally citizens of the
larger polis which embraces the entire cosmos: they are in fact…citizens of the world”
(Hadas, 1943, p. 108-109). Reinvigorating Stoic principles, to a certain extent, Cicero is
seen as an important advocate of a Roman form of cosmopolitanism. Law, not power, is
the guiding principle through which all human relations are governed, and pave the way
for how citizens not only interact within their own political entities but within the
enlarged space of the human race as a whole (Hadas, 1943). Substantive relations
between citizens grounded in justice emanates to the larger whole of the world beyond
one’s borders. Cicero’s focus on natural law is quite different from that of the Stoics—a
contemplative life is truly perfection, but because we can never reach perfection, action is
the way to live on earth (Pangle, 1998). True commitment and participation in political
life brings us close to the gods since the active life reserves a contemplative life in the
afterlife. The Stoics are starkly conservative where Cicero liberalizes their ideals to be

96

more engaged common, everyday life (Pangle and Ahrensdorf, 1999). Cicero’s
cosmopolitan ideals that focused on common humanity are based in duties, qualified by
stages of commitment to nation, family and then all of humanity.
It is important to note that Cicero’s cosmopolitanism is grounded in Stoic ideals,
as he believes in a community of citizens, but not in the same nation-less sense the Stoics
believed. Because of this relationship to the Stoics, we tend to idealize Cicero when it
comes to our contemporary understanding of cosmopolitanism. At its very core it speaks
to a common world of citizens, but not the Stoic intercultural, international community
that transcends borders; rather, it is a practical, utilitarian form of cosmopolitanism that
focused on community and is realized through law, justice, moral order and the affairs of
the republic.
Today…some scholars have concluded that Cicero’s humanitas and societas
generis humani (society of mankind)—both a Stoic derivation—have more to do
with a common culture, a community of interests, or shared values originate in
reason and speech than with an inner or emotional feeling of universal love or
kindness. Human solidarity, then, for Cicero, despite his sometimes misleading
rhetoric of spiritual brotherhood and fraternal intimacy, implies not so much a
loving sympathy or compassion for other as it does the kind of relations and
shared interests existing in a community of citizens, with all the inequalities
entailed by such a traditional social order. (Pangle and Ahrensdorf, 1999, p. 52)
We can see how Cicero’s understanding of the republic is not a selfish one, but a
practical application of what we could coin “othering.” Cicero’s “othering” of citizenship
is a recurring theme that also leads some scholars to discuss his work as an early
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cosmopolitan (Pangle and Ahrensdorf, 1999). We live in communion with our fellow
citizens, and the nation exists not only to share what we hold in common with our fellow
citizens, but also to regard those outside of ourselves as essential elements of the nation.
The structure and space that the republic creates allows for citizens to live together in a
practical manner with those who may be different from them. For Cicero, citizenship
itself is the pragmatic manifestation of the republic, where the citizens create the
possibility of the republic and, by the same token, the republic grants the space for
participation and protection. “Cicero had a clear conception of the rights and duties of
citizenship and the dynamic relationship between citizenship and the health of the
republic. A citizen of Rome was entitled to expect his government to grant him libertas
and justice, on the one hand, and on the other, he was obliged to consider and treat all
Roman citizens as his equals under the law and as his kin” (Digeser, 2004, p.8). Reason,
law and justice created the requisite rhetorical space where citizenship was formed—a
space for citizen participation and interaction. In Ciceronian terms, Roman citizenship
was a powerful concept in that it not only acted as an identifier for its people, but also
granted the portable “protection from arbitrary treatment” that could “command
respect”(Digeser, 2004, p. 6). Roman citizenship protected its citizens well beyond its
political and existential-phenomenological borders. In terms of our study, Roman
citizenship is the practical manifestation of an “imagined community” through the ways
in which reason is understood, the law is shared, and justice is conceived.
Cicero provides insight into this idea in the way he prioritizes allegiances and
commitments to our more immediate communal units while recognizing how
contributions affect the larger context, the nation. This systemization of citizenship is an
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early attempt to justify a concept of postmodern nationalism that recognizes the need for
national entities while acknowledging their impermanence, permeability and
interconnectedness. Additionally, Cicero exhibits elements of cosmopolitanism in the
ways he treated ideas of interconnectedness and interdependency in an expanded
community.
Cicero’s Influence on Christian Rhetoric: Transitions to Modernity
Cicero makes the pragmatic move from Plato’s and Aristotle’s forms of state that
provide a context for the development of human souls and facilitating moral virtue
(Wood, 1988). However, in Ciceronian thought, much of what we have seen in this study
has everything to do with creating a pragmatic social entity for protecting, providing, and
promulgating an environment for peaceful, virtuous action in society. Like Isocrates,
Cicero is a civic rhetorician concerned with the practical applications of the more global
issues of justice and citizenship grounded in a common center.
Although Cicero was not completely revived in a scholarly context until the
Middle Ages, Christian rhetoricians such as Lactantius and St. Augustine of Hippo
recognized his impact on political thought, and exploited his political/rhetorical theory in
different ways. Lactantius (1964) offered the first type of Christian overlay to Ciceronian
thought (Digeser, 2004), and Augustine expanded on Ciceronian concepts of public
virtue, but also challenged his notion of shared justice within the commonwealth (St.
Augustine, Book II, Ch. 21). Although the scope of this project does not allow for a full
exposition of Lactantian and Augustinian thought, it is important to touch on their
timeless contributions as key transitions from the ancient world to more contemporary
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renderings of Ciceronian thought, particularly as it pertains to our thinking about the
structure of the nation.
A Christian humanist follower of Ciceronian rhetoric, Lactantius promoted the reimagination of the republic at a tumultuous time for Christians in the forth century
Roman Empire; Lactantius’ most important work, the Divine Institutes, serves as a De
Officiis for the “new” commonwealth (McDonald, 1964, p. 5). Most notably, he carried
the idea of natural law in the Christian context of the state, which was a new
understanding of natural law in Christianity (Digeser, 2004).
The writings of Lactantius, therefore, were composed in one of the most eventful
epochs of ecclesiastical history. The Church, after suffering the most severe of
despotic persecution, was suddenly received under state protection and began to
enjoy, not merely tranquility and legal status, but even a considerable portion of
political influence. The fourth century saw the great fusion of Christian Church
with the Roman state and Hellenistic culture, the fusion which was to spell out
Western civilization and determine its achievements. (McDonald, 1964, p. x)
Thus, we can trace Lactantius’ intellectual lineage from figures like Cicero and, as a
result of our study, Isocrates. For these reasons, Lactantius has been coined the
“Christian Cicero” (MacDonald, 1964; Digeser, 2000).
The existence and immediacy of God was central to Lactantius’ Christian
understanding of reason, law, and justice within the state; where Cicero recognized the
presence of the a priori understanding of law and the cosmological realm of the gods,
Christianity recognized the existence of a monotheistic realm from which our a priori
understandings originated. Lactantius, a rhetorician, engages Cicero as his rhetorical
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guide, and argues that wisdom is a gift from God; philosophy alone cannot be the
provider of truth without the presence of God. In the true tradition of rhetoric then,
philosophy has no real effect on us if it is not employed ethically, practically and
meaningfully. God has given us knowledge, but waxing philosophically will do us no
good; rather, we must engage it practically. “If the precepts of philosophy are to be
learned, then, surely, they are to be learned for this reason, that we may live rightly and
wisely; but, if we are to live civilly (or as to become private citizens), then philosophy is
not wisdom since it is better to live civilly than philosophically” (Lactantius, 1964, pp.
199-200). Lactantius (1964), like Cicero, also deals with questions of justice, and
explores whether justice is the highest virtue or the origin of virtue itself (pp. 338-339).
Pure justice is realized through the worship of one God; Jesus was sent to guide us back
to the true form of justice to listen to the divine wisdom, the natural law, which has been
granted to us. “But God, the most indulgent parent that He is, when the end of time was
drawing near, sent a messenger to lead back that old age and the justice that had been
routed, so that the human race would not be thrown about by great and everlasting errors”
(Lactantius, 1964, p. 343). Lactantius connects the notion of a return to Cicero’s concept
of the republic to a divine state, one that includes the idea of one God, exemplified by
Jesus Christ. “[F]or the Son of God [was] to descend upon the earth in order to erect a
temple for God and teach justice; but He was to come, however not in the strength or
heavenly power of an angel, but in the form and mortal condition of man” (p. Lactantius,
1964, p. 263). Justice, and therefore an understanding of our origin of wisdom, had gone
astray and God sent his only Son to our earthly dwelling to emphasize the centrality of
justice and divine wisdom; more importantly, Jesus was the embodiment of practical
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reason and justice. This form of justice is the foundation on which the Christian world,
the Roman Empire in this case, moved into subsequent historical moments (particularly
as we will see in St. Augustine’s account of justice). God, and his only Son Jesus, then
becomes the center of everything, including the conditions of our human community as
composed by the nation. Although Lactantius is a follower and student of Cicero, his
focus is on divine providence; he attempts to “synthesize” religion and philosophy to
legitimize the role of Christianity in the face of those who were attempting to dismantle it
(McDonald, 1964, p. xx).
In the Roman world, membership in the republic also implied allegiance to one’s
spiritual connection. “One’s citizenship determined not only the law to which one was
subject, but also, in part, the god to whom one was bound. Thus, the grant of Roman
citizenship to all the empires’ free inhabitants had profound implications for Christians,
who recognized this intimate connection between cult and citizenship” (Digeser, 2004,
p.16). Here, we see the precursor to our modern preoccupation between the concept of
state and religion, where the two concepts are often linked within the existentialphenomenological structure of the nation. Even through Cicero we see the importance of
acknowledging spiritual guidance, but Lactantius who is writing in the throes of the
Roman Empire, attempts to revitalize republican thinking using Christianity as its
lifeblood. “A return to res publica, then, would – as in Cicero – return the populace to a
condition of libertas in which deliberative reason could prevail. Accordingly, even
polytheists would have their full citizen rights in Lactantius’ res publica” (Digeser, 2004,
p. 18). When deliberative reason prevails, communal and political participation ensue and
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a republic, particularly in the Ciceronian sense, becomes the juridical construct where
common ground is formed.
Justice, and therefore, public deed, continue to be the centerpiece of social life
even 300 years after Cicero’s death. The Christian moment provides Lactantius with the
tools to suggest modes of living the good life in community with others. Although much
less known as his predecessors like Cicero and other contemporaries, Lactantius shows
how Ciceronian republican thought, and practice to some extent, continued to thrive well
into the rule of the Roman Empire (Digeser, 2004).
One hundred years later, St. Augustine, one of the most important figures in
Christian rhetoric, would emerge to discuss similar issues, enhancing a Christian
understanding of the foundations for citizen action within a republican context.
Augustine challenges Cicero’s notion of justice while providing both an expansion and a
critique of the Roman world (von Heyking, 2001). Essentially, St. Augustine rejected the
notion that a true Ciceronian republic could exist for two reasons: On a basic level, a true
republic could not have existed without the existence of Christianity, and that the notion
of a justice held in common was unattainable, because of this lack of Christianity.
For I intend in the appropriate place, to examine Cicero himself in which…he laid
down in brief what constitutes a “commonwealth” and what constitutes a
“community”…I shall do my best to demonstrate the that commonwealth never
existed, because there never was real justice in the community…But true justice is
found only in that commonwealth whose found and rule is Christ…we may say
that at least there is true justice in that City of which the holy Scripture says,
“Glorious things are said about you, City of God.” (St. Augustine, 1984, p. 75)
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Christian principles called for a new understanding of shared justice; for Augustine,
justice was not simply a product of the law, guided by natural law, and reason, but a
virtue conditioned by the proper ordering of “loves.” Augustine’s access to Christianity
allows him to create this notion of what our place is in the world and how we must focus
our attention and love in order to recognize what is deserving of love, and how those
things are to be loved (Naugle, 1993). In language of the Greeks, love must be kairotic, a
fitting response, to all that surrounds us. Once these loves are “rightly ordered” and
responsive “kairotically,” happiness and positive conditions of life can be achieved in the
City of God (Augustine, 1984), and such an order would result in actions of justice that
create a earthly community of citizens that serves its members. The greatest “right” love
is the true love of God. From that, rightly-ordered earthly love follows.
But if the Creator is truly loved, that is, if he himself is loved, and not something
else in his stead, then he cannot be wrongly loved. We must, in fact, observe the
right order even in our love for the very love with which we love what is
deserving of love, so that there may be in us the virtue which is the condition of
the good life. Hence, as it seems to me, a brief and true definition of virtue is
‘rightly ordered love.’ (Augustine, 1984, p. 637)
Augustine’s understanding of Love expands Cicero’s notion of common justice. God is
Love, and without virtuous love that begins in God and is acted out among his earthly
subjects, can we even achieve the remote possibility of justice and therefore the just
nation? Justice is realized in the Heavenly City of God, it is unattainable in any earthly
city (Gregory, 2008). Because the ordering of loves is a human choice (Naugle, 1993),
justice is always in question; the human factor, regardless of law and reason, will always
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be subjected to the perils of earthly domain, and justice becomes more difficult to attain.
How could society be bound by an unachievable common justice? It is Love that takes
its place, but Love can also be employed wrongly resulting in vice and sin. The complex
relationship between love and sin is a human construct, which often results in political
injustice and the disregard for human dignity. “…[S]in is a species within [Augustine’s]
internally diverse conception of love. Vice always lurks among the virtues. Love, like
cholesterol, can be healthy or deadly” (Gregory, 2008, p. 33). Accordingly, it seems that
Cicero influenced Augustinian thought on a number of levels. Most importantly,
Augustine paid much attention to Ciceronian social thought and offered a transformed
version of Cicero’s res publica, challenging the notion of common justice and assigning
it to the role of love and choice.
…[I]f one should say, ‘A people is the association of multitude of rational beings
united by a common agreement on the objects of their love,’ then it follows that to
observe the character of a particular people we must examine the objects of its
love. And yet, whatever those objects, if it is the association of a multitude not of
animals but of rational beings, and is united by a common agreement about the
objects of its love, then there is no absurdity in applying to it the title of a
‘people’. And obviously, the better the objects of this agreement, the better the
people; the worse the objects of this love, the worse the people. (Augustine, 1984,
p. 890)
Augustine’s “rightly ordered loves” pervades his analysis of Roman society,
particularly in terms of Cicero’s understanding of the res publica. One could argue that if
Cicero had access to the same Christian theology and philosophy as Augustine, the result
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may have been very similar. We see Cicero referring to the gods regularly, an
otherworldliness that guides reason, law, action and justice. The a priori understanding
of the world, on which Augustine builds his monotheistic philosophy and rhetoric, was
the ground on which Cicero formulated his notion of res publica and the conditions under
which public virtue and justice emerged.
Lactantius, who seems to be a direct intellectual descendant of Ciceronian rhetoric
(MacDonald, 1964; Digeser, 2000), and later Augustine (Eskridge, 1912), are important
links to Cicero and subsequent moments in which these religious, social and political
issues are discussed within the context of rhetoric. Christians and non-Christians alike
seem to build on Ciceronian thought, particularly when it comes to “communities of
interest” and the foundations on which communities are “imagined” in the hearts, minds,
and worlds of its citizens.
Implications
Cicero’s works on the republic in particular are seminal to our thinking about the
concepts of nation and nationalism, especially through our rhetorical/communicative
lens. Cicero is a frequent reference in terms of political science and rhetoric, but rarely a
point of reference when thinking about the concepts of nation and nationalism
themselves. Like Isocrates, who was coined the Father of Nationalism, Cicero inherited
the title of Father of his Country precisely because of his work on the republic, the
rhetorical context he attempted to create for his fellow citizens, and the goals of justice
and peace he wished to espouse throughout his work. It is appropriate to explore
Ciceronian rhetoric particularly when it comes to discussing origins of nation-state theory
and the concept of the “imagined community” in the context of dialogic theory. Isocrates
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and Cicero play a foundational role in the ways they related individuals and communities
to their larger political and social context through rhetoric, but they also seem to address
existential-ontological issues as well. For Cicero, the state offered ground for the
technical aspects that made the nation possible, as the manifestation of humans living
together in community—not only a phenomenological entity, but also an epistemological,
existential, and ontological construct that encouraged dialogue to produce shared
meaning among publics.
So, why consider Cicero as an essential antecedent to our thinking about the
social construct of the nation? Like Isocrates, Cicero attempts to expose a field of
existence where his fellow citizens can live productively and ethically. Cicero’s res
publica is both a practical construct of what happens in society everyday, and a cultural
manifestation of the historical moment. Pre-Christian Rome still understood that life was
subject to the gods, and the state satisfied the need to construct a system that pleased
them. The former characteristics of Cicero’s Republic are deeply pragmatic, the latter
perhaps more controversially idealistic. However, for the purposes of our inquiry,
Cicero’s work foregrounds essential issues that situate the idea of the nation throughout
history framed by a dialogic form of rhetoric. There is a multitude of scholarship that
would point us in similar directions to discover various foundations and understandings
of the nation-state, but a rhetorical/communication perspective of the nation and
nationalism would not be complete without exploring the foundational work of Cicero.
Because of his prominent position in Roman society, and his effectiveness and influence
as a successful orator, Cicero’s ideas have remained a centerpiece of Roman thought, and
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have been passed down through the centuries to help us understand why the Roman
Republic is an essential piece of the historical puzzle.
From this intellectual lineage we see that Plato, Aristotle, Isocrates and Cicero all
occupy themselves with timeless questions of human community and the manifestation of
that community in the formal structure of the state. Those who are considered to be
“civic” rhetoricians like Isocrates and Cicero offer a particular perspective of nationalism
as they not only grapple with the important questions raised by their predecessors, but
they engage the questions that confront human action, and lead us to not only
philosophical renderings of the human community and the nation, but also the quotidian
concerns for citizens and their role in the nation itself. Nationalism, in this sense, is not
an emotional sentiment, but rather the apex of Roman pragmatism about how the
structure of the state is a part of our everyday lives and how it responds to the historical
moment.
As we continue to explore this notion of a contemporary understanding of a
nation and nationalism, Cicero not only teaches us about the foundations of a formal,
thriving community, but he directs us to the need to respond to our historical moment by
constructing entities that constantly refer back to laws of nature and the a priori
understanding of the world, while rhetorically and dialogically engaging the dialectic
nature of community in all its complexity. Cicero’s political and personal demise did not
allow for the full realization and application of these rich principles in the end, but his
foundational ideas endure as seminal works when engaging rhetoric, dialogic
communication and political science.
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The next step in this analysis will be to understand the modern conception of the
nation and the rhetorical interruptions that encouraged a shift in our understanding about
nation and nationalism from the ancient to the modern. The Enlightenment provides
some substantive knowledge about how philosophical thought influenced social and
political thought, grounding the nation in these ancient principles of the state while
shifting commonly held notions about how society and communities were structured and
organized in relation to each other. Kant, among other notable luminaries, offers the
groundwork for modern notions of state and nation. One might argue that the ways in
which we perceive and communicate the modern shift of the nation from ancient and
Christian renderings is in fact seismic.
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Chapter 4
Modernity’s Rhetorical Shift:
The Enlightenment and Kant’s Philosophical Influence on the Nation
“As the custodian of reason, philosophy conceives modernity as a child of the
Enlightenment.” (Habermas, 2001, p. 133)
“Without Country you have neither name, token, voice, nor rights, no admission as
brothers into the fellowship of the peoples. You are the bastards of humanity.” (Mazzini,
1995, p. 93)
Thus far we have explored the ancient philosophical and rhetorical antecedents to
ideas of the nation and how they are a response to both divine law and communal life.
The nation has endured as a field in which communication organizes social, political and
economic life simultaneously while serving as the catalyst for the emergence of these
phenomena. In this chapter, we will attempt to understand the concept of nation and its
philosophical underpinnings in the context of modernity, more specifically how Kant’s
philosophy may have influenced the role and nature of the nation in modernity, and how
contemporary scholars understand the origin of the nation and nationalism. We will see
how certain scholars of nationalism like Kedourie (1993), Gellner (1983; 1994), and
Smith (1992, 1998, 2008, 2010) interpret the origins of nationalism differently and how
they contest the concept’s genesis as a result of varying social and communicative
phenomena. Most importantly, I will explore how these scholars disagree about the role
of Kant’s philosophical influence on the development of the modern nation. However,
before we delve into these conversations about the origin of the nation and the role of
Kantian philosophy, I will focus on significant philosophical voices like those of Hobbes
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(1968), Ferguson (1995), Mazzini (1995) and Renan (1995), who have situated the nation
through particular metaphors that seem to respond to Enlightenment ideals. Furthermore,
I will continue to keep the notion of “imagined communities” present as a retrodictive
existential-phenomenological construct for exploring such origins.
In following with the theme of the nation as a communicative phenomenon, we
should consider some of the theories that have characterized nation and nationalism as an
imagined, discursive, existential-phenomenological construct. Some of the most
significant works of philosophy, politics, art, music and science throughout history have
emerged out of a commitment to (or one’s displeasure with) one’s nation-state:
“Nationalism has emotional power because it makes us who we are, because it inspires
artists and composers, because it gives us a link with history (and thus with immortality)”
(Calhoun, 1997, p. 2). The power of the nation has moved individuals and groups to some
of the most enduring thoughts and actions throughout history. Nevertheless, nationalism
seems to be engrained as an unreflective act in the everyday, or what Billig (1995) coins
as “banal nationalism:” a nationalism that is subtly influential through the everyday
nationalistic symbolic messages that reinforce our commitment to our nation and
everything for which it stands (i.e. the pledge of recited in U.S. schools each day, or a
nation’s flag passively displayed in a corporation’s lobby) (p. 6). “Daily, the nation is
indicated, or ‘flagged’, in the lives of its citizenry. Nationalism, far from being an
intermittent mood in established nations, is the endemic condition” (Billig, 1995, p. 6).
The question is: What are some of the philosophical and historical indicators that have
formed our modern unreflective understanding of the nation and how has this unreflective
understanding influenced us to communicate the concept so forcefully (through
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diplomacy and war), and how has it shaped the ways in which we communicate socially
and interpersonally on a daily basis?
Through our previous analysis, we can see nationalistic tendencies manifest as
early as the Ancient World in understanding conflicts between the Hellenistic “nation”
and Persia or even within the Roman Empire, but some scholars believe our
contemporary understanding of nations and nationalism emerge as a result of the
Enlightenment, when the “rational man” was encouraged to seek other forms of identity
outside of the realm of religion and dynastic realms (Anderson, 2006; Calhoun, 1997).
Marx, in particular, has influenced our analysis of the modern nation-state, but countless
scholars, politicians and social commentators have contributed to a robust conversation
about what national identity and the “imagined” nation mean throughout history. Before
we embark on a journey to understand the modern shift to our current understanding of
the nation, it is important to understand how current renderings of the nation have been
explained from those thoroughly engaging it. We see that “space” articulated by the
ancients and pre-modern thinkers persists but takes on a new character that seems to
recenter human epistemology, sentiment and emotion. The existential-phenomenological
home becomes apparent.
Modern Metaphors of the Nation
Hobbes’ Leviathan (1968) set the stage for these conversations about the interplay
of social consciousness and the formation of the nation. Functioning from a mechanistic
approach, which favored a sovereign form of governmental control, Hobbes established
the foundations from which community and civil society emerge, but are eventually
subsumed into the monolith of the nation, or what he coined the Leviathan. Individuals
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within society agree to a Covenant — a social contract, a central guiding principle, which
allows them to function under the rule of government and therefore live under protection
and well-organized systems.
This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is real Unitie of them all, in one and the
same Person, made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as
if every man should say to every man, I Authorise and give up my Right of
Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition,
that thou give up thy right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner.
This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a Common-Wealth, in
latine Civitas. This is the Generation of that great Leviathan, or rather (to speak
more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the Immortal God,
our peace and defence. (Hobbes, 1968, p. 227)
One interpretation of Hobbes, however, is that society is in constant tension between
individual sacrifice and community; he conceives everything in conflict to be a result of
competition, but to limit competition we sign a social contract with the sovereign
government because in the long term it benefits our own self- interests (Hobbes, 1968).
Atack (2012) tells us the in Hobbes’ Leviathan the social contract is derived through
individuals relinquishing their individual rights and forming a collective for the good of
the state; this “real unity” grants the states its ultimate sovereignty and power (pp. 42-43).
Hobbes’ construct is an interesting contrast to the various “spiritual” conceptions
of nationalism offered by scholars such as Eliade (1959) and Mazzini (1995), yet
continues to follow the Ciceronian view of natural law, to some extent. For Hobbes, the
nation-state is an artificial manifestation of natural occurrences. “For by Art is created
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the great Leviathan called the Commonwealth, or State, (in latine Civitas) which is but
Artificial Man; though of greater stature and strength than the Natural, for whose
protection and defense it was intended, and in which the Sovereignty is the Artificial
Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body….” (Hobbes, 1968, p. 81). His
mechanistic viewpoint offers a discrete sense of nation building while emphasizing the
need for individual action within civil society. Again, we see nation advanced as an
“artificial,” or man-made manifestation of natural law. In Hobbes’ analysis, then, the
machinations of the Leviathan thus create a powerful structure under which we not only
agree to function, but under which we wrap our allegiances and identities. Not only is the
nation an influential spiritual occurrence, it is an effective mechanical social structure
that literally transmutes these natural occurrences into concrete, tangible events that help
us make sense of the world around us. As we will see, Hobbesian thought is not only
influenced by ancient philosophy but it seems to be a precursor to the influential
Enlightenment/Industrial political thought, perhaps influencing the nation-state and its
organizing power in modernity (Pagden, 2013).
Similarly, Adam Ferguson (1995) recognizes the power of individual action
within society while engaging the Aristotelian inclination toward communal life. Unlike
Hobbes, Ferguson’s civil society does not embody a unidirectional construct that requires
us to surrender our individual self-determination in such a dramatic manner. He views
this naturally occurring phenomenon of human interaction in the form of civil society
where men band together to function in societal context, but not necessarily within a
national structure per se. Ferguson’s concept of civil society seems to extend itself to our
modern conception of the nation as he recognizes why the rational man joins together to
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respond to social forces: “The state of nature is a state of war or of amity, and men are
made to unite from a principle of affection, or from a principle of fear, as if most suitable
to the system of different writers” (Ferguson, 1995, p. 21). Through our contemporary
understanding, we view the nation as the structure under which we come together to ward
off threat or welcome accord. For Ferguson, civil society is a necessary foundation for
national thought, but civil society can exist without the nation. For Hobbes, there is no
distinction between the state and civil society (Pagdon, 2013); civil exists for the nation
and the nation eventually subsumes and consequentially transforms civil society. This is
an important contrast for the purpose of our study since the concept of civil society seems
to speak directly to the issue of nationalism in the context of postmodernity. Although
civil society and nations are products of Enlightenment thought and a modern move
toward social organization, civil society’s diverse and less formally organized character
tends to reflect the multiplicity and fluidity of postmodern thought — that is, “Pluralism
and polycentricity are the hallmarks of civil society…[C]ivil society is fairly well
synonymous with what Cicero would have called res publica, i.e. a free society in its
entirety, or again, a society organized in a particular way, viz., in away designed to
promote the freedom of all its members” (Madison, 2001, p. 220). Given this discussion,
it is important to acknowledge that civil society is an inherently rhetorical phenomenon
(Hauser & Grim, 2004, p. 9). In civil society, individual interests often will diverge and
conflict, but it can also serve as a communicative space for productive discourse and
eventual mutual cooperation (Hauser & Grim, 2004). Such a characterization of civil
society helps us see its relevance and applicability for contemporary understandings of
the nation and its constitutive role for the construction of political, economic, social and
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cultural spaces. It has also been seen as yet another indication of the transitional moment
of the modern nation-state within an international context, or what I characterize as
postmodern nationalism (Bell, 1989).
Nineteenth century political theorist Ernest Renan (1995) attempts to define the
essence of a nation as an imagined, existential-phenomenological entity. Although he
recognizes the human tendency to accept race, language, religion, community and
geography as essential factors in national formation, he ultimately rejects them, leaving
us to find other reasons for the emergence of national sentiment. He concludes that a
nation is, in fact, the culmination of collective memory (or lack thereof) and moral
consciousness. Renan offers a substantive approach to nationalistic origins and
encourages us to ponder why a nation is ultimately a powerful phenomenon on which we
structure our thoughts and actions as political and cultural beings.
The nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which are really only one,
go to make up this soul or spiritual principle. One of these things lies in the past,
the other in the present. The one is the possession in common of a heritage of
memories; and the other is actual agreement, the desire to live together, and the
will to continue to make the most of the joint inheritance. (Renan, 1995, p. 153)
By shunning the “transcendentalists” he refuses to accept the amorphous, ungrounded
nature of national thought, but rather sees that spiritual, moral consciousness legitimizes
the very existence of nations. For Renan, nations are organic entities always subject to
change and transformation, according to the moral collective consciousness of a
community of memory. In short, memories are steeped in historicity (Arnett & Arneson,
1999) and play a rhetorical role in how a national consciousness plays out at any point in
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time. Most importantly, Renan agrees with Kantian analyses, as we will see later, as he
advocates that a uniform global political structure would ultimately result in despotism,
and that the natural state of the world should be organized into national entities that
regulate the ways in which we structure moral consciousness and interact with the Other.
Renan’s use of collective memory (or better stated, a collective amnesia) within a
spiritual framework also strongly suggests an existential-phenomenological approach to
analyzing national structures. “To forget and —I will venture to say—to get one’s history
wrong, are essential factors in the making of a nation; and thus the advance of historical
studies is often a danger to nationality…Now it is the essence of a nation that all
individuals should have much in common, and further that they should all have forgotten
much” (Renan, 1995, p. 145). Here, Renan espouses that nations are collectively formed
around common goals and aspirations; the less fragmentation within a society the more of
a potential for a cohesive nation. To challenge Renan, however, it is difficult to say that
citizens are not products of their history; rather, a nation is composed of citizens who are
in fact products of their unreflective history. Most citizens may be aware of their historic
past, but do not actively reflect on their historic origins; their common belief in the
unspoken philosophical foundations and principles join them together in a national
collective; in addition to Renan, Billig’s (1995) and Deutsch (1966) have commented on
similar issues of the lack of conscious reflection about the nation. Again, Renan’s focus
on consciousness and shared experience is at the core of his understanding: “That moral
consciousness which we call a nation is created by a great assemblage of men with warm
hearts and healthy minds: And as long as this moral consciousness can prove its strength
by the sacrifices demanded from the individual for the benefit of the community, it is

117

justifiable and has the right to exist” (Renan, 1995, p. 154). These philosophical
foundations of a nation do not emerge from a vacuum, but are rather steeped deeply
within unquestioned meaning and existence. It seems that nations are direct results of
history, but more importantly, well-orchestrated systems of unreflective collective belief.
From a similar perspective, nations are a form of “sacred space” protected by a moral
consciousness at a particular historical moment (Eliade, 1959). The issue, however, is
how and why this concept of such sacred space is so resistant to the change of which
Renan speaks. Collective memory seems to be an essential force behind this seemingly
impermeable sacred space.
As Tuan (1977) explains, one’s homeland is often viewed as the center of one’s
cosmos. All life and activity originate from this point of reference while all else extends
from this point. “The stars are perceived to move around one’s abode; home is the focal
point of one’s cosmic structure…Should destruction occur we may reasonably conclude
that the people would be thoroughly demoralized, since the ruin of their settlement
implies the ruin of their cosmos” (p.149). He insists however, that this type of place is
not based on place itself but on human beings who are literally at the center, and can
easily move this “anthropomorphic center” to another place to become the center of their
cosmos (p. 150). Tuan believes that the power of such a place is enacted by religion “the
guarding spirits and gods” and the beliefs, commitment and memory that these belief
systems invoke in its human subjects (1977). Memory is an essential element when
comprehending the power of place phenomenologically (Tuan, 1977).
Although Eliade’s (1959) use of sacred space was originally appropriated for
religious contexts, we could apply such a concept to nationalism theory as the nation
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flourished when religious life became more and more divorced from the public realm and
encouraged the public to seek alternative belief systems that could provide an existentialphenomenological “home.” Eliade’s concept of sacred space has also been employed by
scholars such as Jacobsen (1996) to discuss the idea of a nation’s impenetrable borders as
a result of immigration policy. The power of the nation can have such a profound effect
on the way people think about themselves as individuals and within groups in relation to
others that it creates what can only be understood as sacred demarcations. For Eliade
(1959), we must exist in something, and “it is for that reason that religious man has
always sought to fix his abode at the ‘center of the world.’ If the world is to be lived in, it
must be founded – and no world can come to birth in the chaos of the homogeneity and
relativity of profane space. The discovery or projection of a fixed point—a center—is
equivalent to the creation of the world” (p. 22). Even within extreme cultural variation,
like the Ancients, Eliade finds that we always tend to situate our world “at the center” (p.
42).
Although modernist in his approach given his orientation toward a universalist,
centrifugal mode of thinking, Eliade’s (1959) metaphor is helpful when thinking about
the structuration of the nation as an abode for humanity. As we join together in
community, “settling in a territory is equivalent to founding a world” (p. 47). Eliade’s
analysis is certainly applicable to the concept of the nation as he creates substantive
philosophical ground for an ontological space that ultimately emerges from a “center.”
Although the creation of a “center” is the work of the gods, it lives in human beings
through religion, politics, communication, in the lived experience of the church, temple
or mosque, local communities and neighborhoods, and the nation-state. The notion that
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we are communal creatures who live in space and time is essential for understanding the
powerful, often readily accepted idea of the nation. Human interaction converts such
places into spaces (Appadurai, 1996; Tuan, 1977). However, I would advance that
understanding the nation as a product of centripetal thinking leads us to engage
nationalism as unreflective quotidian experience that forms our social, cultural and
economic consciousness and eventually encourages us to behave and interact with the
Other in particular ways (Billig, 1995).
This idea of this existential-phenomenological center, a centrifugal force, is
reiterated in the work of notable historical figures such as Giuseppe Mazzini, a prominent
figure in the reunification (il Risorgimento) of Italy in the 19 th century. He underscores
this idea when attempting to convince the Italian citizen-to-be that the nation is a human
necessity as it provides the political, cultural and economic space that individuals, a
province, or the world cannot provide on their own (Mazzini, 1995). Mazzini makes the
case for a societal shift in order to cure the ills of the discontent (the provincial
fragmentation of Italy) and by improving the well-being of others by uniting the nation of
Italy from its many provinces—remnants of the medieval city-state structure. Mazzini is
attempting to uncover social structures that can educate and protect all citizens, and
which can assist them in resolving conflicts and misunderstanding. Most importantly,
however, he defines the nation as a conglomeration of duties that ultimately serve the
greater good. The nation acts as a practical and unencumbered entity that allows us to act
responsibly and serve our fellow countrymen and humanity in general. It is our duty to
serve humanity, which prepares us for God. “We seek the reign of God upon earth as in
heaven, or better, that the earth shall be a preparation for heaven, and society an endeavor
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towards a progressive approach to the Divine idea” (Mazzini, 1995, p. 91). The nation is
the philosophical and practical space in which individuals perform duties and leads them
to the Absolute.
It seems then that, for Mazzini, the nation is a mechanism that can help
individuals negotiate the larger issues of the world—it is neither too close to us nor is it
too far from us, but rather attainable and accessible. Mazzini thinks of Country as an
organizing principle that can help men carry out their duties and contribute to
Humanity—God is too vast and the individual is too small, but a nation can liaise
between the two and relieve some the tension that exists within the vastness of Humanity
(Mazzini, 1995).
The individual is too weak, and Humanity too vast. My God, prays the Breton
mariner as he puts out to sea, protect me, my ship is so little, and Thy ocean so
great! As this prayer sums up the condition of each of you, if no means if found of
multiplying your forces and your powers of action indefinitely. But God gave
you this means when he gave you a Country, when, like a wiser overseer of
labour, who distributes the different parts of the work according to the capacity of
the workmen, he divided Humanity into distinct groups upon the face of our
globe, and thus planted the seeds of nations. (Mazzini, 1995, p. 92)
Thus, we may be existentially lost if it were not for the safe abode of the nation. Nations
remedy the discomfort and confusion that ensue in a complex world; they provide a home
and fulfill a particular function in the larger context of social relations.
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For Mazzini, it is the Italian citizen’s moral duty to support the idea of one single
nation that could protect and provide for the Italian people; to suggest otherwise would be
detrimental to a people seeking political identity in the contemporary world. Culture,
along with more tangible demarcations of geography and language, is the driving force
that brings a people together, but ultimately for Mazzini they are not enough; the
pragmatic structure of the nation will satisfy this higher need (Mazzini, 1995).
“Il Risorgimento” is an example of how cultural, linguistic and social forces
contribute to the manifestation of not only a physical national space, but also to a national
identity. Mazzini (and Renan, for that matter) is influenced by Cicero’s notion of the res
publica, as nationalism is based on human action, which offers us the possibility of
citizenship—a sense of belonging to a structure that serves us as long as we agree to
serve. In a Ciceronian sense, Mazzini believes that fulfilling our duties to society retains
our rights as citizens; these rights are enclosed within the protection of the nation
(Mazzini, 1995). Just as the United States Constitution ensures “inalienable rights and
the pursuit of happiness” within its political boundaries, Mazzini asserts that citizens’
rights are protected by the nation.
Through this metaphor of moral duty, Mazzini sees a co-dependent relationship
between the nation and its citizens; we must actively contribute and perform our “duties”
as citizens in order to form our nation and for the nation to reciprocate and provide its
protections and political stability. “Without Country you have neither name, token, voice,
nor rights, no admission into the fellowship of the Peoples. You are the bastards of
Humanity” (Mazzini, 1995, p.93). Mazzini’s approach to nationalism is steeped in
rhetorical principles; word is transformed into action, and the rhetorical, imaginative
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construct of the nation is formed through citizenship and duty, while the imaginative
construct informs duty. Nationalism is the spiritual, existential-phenomenological
experience that others emphasize, but is impossible without men taking definitive
collective action toward a common good. The good, which points us to God and
Humanity, exists in the Nation. “A Country is a fellowship of free and equal men bound
together in a brotherly concord of labor towards a single end. You must make it and
maintain it such. A Country is not an aggregation, it is an association” (Mazzini, 1995,
p.95). Mazzini, however, sought to accomplish this duty through “brute force” (Mazzini,
1995, p. 89) to form a united Italy that would respond to the nationalistic needs at the
forefront, but this force would not be made possible without the rhetorical context that
was formed by Mazzini and his colleagues, Garibaldi and Cavour.
Isocratic and Ciceronian concepts of “center” and natural law seem to influence
the conservative approach to understanding the nation as an existential-phenomenological
construct emerging from a particular “center,” as mentioned in the first chapters of this
project. In other words, the existential-phenomenological manifestation of the nation is
made possible through functional a priori characteristics that provide the necessary
guidance for the creation of a nation through history, culture (paideia), and the marriage
of the two. Again, we see how ancient social and political thought provided a solid
foundation, and even a point of reference, for other concepts that would emerge during
subsequent periods of history, particularly as it pertains to ideas of social contracts and
the construction of civil society.
Although these are just a few characterizations of the idea of a nation, they
represent a significant recurring theme throughout various historical moments. So, why

123

does Anderson view nationalism as loosely defined, lacking adequate philosophical
ground if we can point to these various thinkers and philosophies when discussing
nationalism and the nation-state both in antiquity and in modernity? Perhaps it is the
inherent dialectical tension and overarching competing narratives that exist within the
concept itself. As we see, many argue that we need nations to organize our cultures and
politics, provide a space for our collective memories, create a sense of place and
belonging, and offer space to imagine particular metanarratives: the important
communicative concept that there exists an overarching story, wrought with complexity
and nuance, that guides our social, political, economic and personal lives (Arnett and
Arneson, 1999), but at the expense of misinterpreting and misunderstanding a larger,
more complex world.
Modernity as a Centripetal Force
All of these ideas continue to point to the idea that nations are products of human
communication and the nation acts as a persuasive mechanism for providing an
existential-phenomenological home and identity for its members who create contracts
with the nation to serve in return for protection and solace. In our contemporary world,
we are often perplexed by individuals who seem to lack real or imagined citizenship —
those who lack a home, or through Arnett’s (1994) concept, are “existentially homeless.”
Deutsch (1969) alludes to the powerful rhetorical manifestation of nationality as the
following:
The nationalist… is a person dedicated to his own nation. He devotes most of his
attention to it and gives preference to his countrymen. He is afraid of the rest of
the world because his early experience taught him that the rest of the world is
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uncertain, dangerous, and rather incomprehensible. He fears his environment, and
he fears the foreigner; his attention and preference are centered on the in-group as
if he is an intense nationalist, he’s often using his ability to perceive the outside
world at the same time that he zealously strives to promote national power. If he
has his way, his nation ends up resembling the nightmare of the Detroit
automobile designer: a car with an even more powerful engine than ever and a
shrinking windshield guided by even weaker headlights. It would be an excellent
design for committing individual or national suicide. (p. 32)
Deutsch (1969) presents us with an important paradox: the tension between the positive
organizing power of the nation and the unfortunate narrowing phenomenon of what
nationalism can do to the human mind and, ultimately, community. Although a nation
fulfills a variety of human needs, from the physical to the emotional, and provides us
with the practical services that make everyday life more navigable and secure such as the
economic, legal, juridical, and cultural, it may come at the cost of isolationism and a
failure to understand the needs of our neighbors or those who are not “native” to our
nations (p. 33).
Buber (2005), in his contributions to the Jewish-Palestinian problem, espouses
this idea almost 50 years earlier. Buber, like many of these aforementioned scholars,
views nationalism as a necessary spiritual force that organizes and gives credence to
certain political goals; however, he sees a strong human tendency for the
misappropriation of such powerful ideas. Nationalism does not mean that individuals and
society as a whole must only look within for answers; instead, the nationalism that
actually creates the possibility of difference based on physical borders and human
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sentiment concomitantly allows us to exist in a world of discrete difference. We must
gaze within to see clearly beyond the confines of our existential-phenomenological home,
but we should not remain only within. An isolated form of nationalism only results in
what Buber calls “false nationalism” and misleading ideologies (Buber, 2005, p. 52). We
will explore the tenets for Buber’s philosophical contributions to ideas of nation in more
detail later.
Many of the aforementioned conceptions of the nation are often considered to be
direct descendants of Enlightenment thinking, led by Kantian philosophy, as Kant’s
system is often viewed as the basis for modern understandings of nation and nationalism
(Kedourie, 1993). However, given our discussion of Isocrates and Cicero, it is clear to
see how their philosophical systems guided by concepts of culture, common center,
natural law and rationality all contribute to understanding the nation as an organizing
structure that provides a common point of reference for complex social phenomena. So
important is Kantian thought that influential scholars such as Kedourie (1993) believe
that it provided ground for national movements such as the French Revolution and Italian
Reunification. The remainder of this chapter will explore the influence of Kant’s
philosophy on the aforementioned philosophers, and the scholarly conversation that has
emerged around understandings of nationalism in modernity.
The Enlightenment: Kant’s Contribution to the Idea of Nation
In the spirit of this project, I have attempted to show various salient historical
moments in which nationalism was at the center of the metanarrative and how a
rhetorical, existential-phenomenological focus can help us unravel the challenges and
issues connected to ideas of nation and nationalism. Enter Kant. Kedourie (1993)
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contends that political events as well as philosophical thought during the Enlightenment
were transforming the idea of the nation, as both had a great effect on the political, social
and economic structure of the world as we understand it today. Kantian philosophy
provides a significant rhetorical interruption in the way that the world has thought about
several epistemological questions, including those of national structures (Kedourie,
1993). Kant becomes a central figure in the conversation about nationalism because of
the manner in which he views the existence of natural law, human liberty and their affect
on human society. Kant essentially disagrees with Luther in that morality must originate
from God, because a focus on morality and freedom from God would not afford us true
freedom. For Kant, the individual, under guidance from God, was at the center of power
and determination — a major shift away from the faithful stance of Martin Luther and
Augustine centuries before.
For Kant, the categorical imperative, obedience to which makes us free, is not a
divine command. It is a command which wells up within the soul, freely
recognized and freely accepted. Just as the natural world cannot be the source of
moral value, so neither can the will of God. If the will of God is the ground of the
categorical imperative, the man’s actions are dictated by an external command,
freedom disappears, and morality becomes meaningless. This then is Kant’s ‘new
formula’ that the good will, which is the free will, is also the autonomous will.
...For Kant’s doctrine makes the individual, in a way never envisaged by the
French Revolutionaries or their intellectual precursors, the very center, the arbiter,
the sovereign of the universe. (Kedourie, 1993, pp. 16-17)
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Thus, the shift occurs, and Kant’s rhetorical stance more than ever affects the ways in
which society, and national structures, are formed, maintained and contested. Kant’s
understanding that human morality originates within the individual is then translated into
the national context. A nation is a collection of individual wills where the love of nation
resides in the souls of those individuals; it is not an external political entity that imposes
itself upon its citizens. As we will see throughout his seminal works, Kant’s system is
primarily based upon individual liberty, morality and pure reason; these all work together
to ensure one’s freedom in the context of the political formation of the nation. Kant’s
system of political morality plants the seeds for various post-Kantian Enlightenment
thinkers who cultivate these seeds to define the nation and nationalism as we mostly
understand it today.
To dissect Kant’s understanding of the nation and the modern Enlightenment
foundations of the nation-state and nationalism, we will focus on three essential Kantian
texts as they refer to individual freedom, the individual’s situatedness in the nation, and
the moral system that ultimately forms the idea of a nation: Lectures on Ethics (1775-80),
the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) and Perpetual Peace (1795). We will deal with these
texts chronologically as they might offer a glimpse into the intellectual progression of
Kant’s arguments as they pertain to the impetus and structure of the nation-state.
Lectures on Ethics. Very early in his Ethics, Kant justifies the existence of the
state and the presence of the individual within the state. He states that ethics based on
“outer grounds” rests on two elements: education and government (Kant, 1963, p. 12).
As two very essential components of nation, his system of ethics is already guided by
principles that emerge from the nation. For Kant, ethics is the pinnacle of practical
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philosophy, which is lived out in communal structures. However, Kant’s most notable
concept of the “categorical imperative” shapes the ways in which philosophers and
statesmen start to reconceptualize contemporary iterations of nation. Kedourie (1993)
credits modern Enlightenment ideals of the nation to Kant, with the categorical
imperative as its foundation. Philosophy played a powerful role on the political events of
the time, influencing the transformation of nations through the social, political and
economic structures that legitimized them. Kant plays a central role in understanding not
only important political and social structures, but also the essential role of the individual
within these particular structures. Within Kantian ideals, individuals play a pivotal role
in the way their societies are structured. Free will and self-determination become the
central elements for the ways in which individuals influence the direction of the state,
which in turn, provide an organizing social structure for the way they live.
The free man asserts himself against the world; by the strength of his soul he
bends it to his will, for conviction can move mountains; and his head is bloody
but unbowed. The characteristic euphory is the product of self-determination…
Nationalism, which is itself, as will be seen, largely a doctrine of national selfdetermination, found here the great source of its vitality, and it has therefore been
necessary to examine how self-determination came to have this central
importance in ethical and political teachings. (Kedourie, 1993, p.23)
Kant’s practical philosophy and system of ethics provides the basis for free will and selfdetermination. Morality does not rest with God, nor is it God’s responsibility; rather, it
rests with the individual and how that individual chooses to engage the a priori guidance
God has provided to him. “Principum morale est intellectual internum” – basic moral
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principles are products of internal intellectual morality (Kant 1963, p. 14); however, these
internal intellectual principles are guided by universal, natural laws handed down by God.
When individual morality and the universal a priori come into harmony with each other,
human morality is at its zenith and works toward a universal good. Reminiscent of
Cicero’s conception of natural law and human law, Kant argues that ethics must
harmonize with the Divine in order to reach the highest law and morality. “It is only in
the observance of the divine laws that ethics and law coincide. Insofar as God is
concerned both are compulsory; for God can compel us to ethical as well as logical
action, but He demands that we should act not from compulsion but from duty…A moral
law states categorically what ought to be done, whether it pleases us or not; its origins,
therefore, are purely within how humans choose to interpret and act on divine guidance”
(Kant pp. 35-37). Moral law is not a product of interpretation, rather a product of free
will that is enacted regardless of the end (Kant, 1963).
This argument in particular is very important as it contests Hume’s notion of
ethics and human behavior purely as a product of experience and sensation. Kant
believes that the categorical nature of moral law cannot be a result of experience, but
rather originates in an intellectual a priori approach, which is universal to all humanity
(Kant, 1963). “Thou shall not kill” is not based on experience, the law exists as an a
priori imperative designed by the Divine. In the Treatise of Human Nature, Hume
intricately dissects human nature by attempting to understand how humans make
decisions and come to particular conclusions regarding human experience, behavior and
choices. Hume and Kant are at odds regarding the origin of moral law and the ways in
which we, as its human actors, arrive at certain conclusions. Hume states,
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Most of the philosophers of antiquity, who treated of human nature, have shewn
more of a delicacy of sentiment, a just sense of morals, or a greatness of soul, than
a depth of reasoning and reflection. They content themselves with representing the
common sense of mankind in the strongest of lights, and with the best turn of
thought and expression, without following out the chain of propositions, or form
the several truths into a regular science. But ‘tis at least worth while to try if the
science of man will not admit of the same accuracy which several part of natural
philosophy are found susceptible of…The sole end of logic is to explain the
principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas;
morals and criticism regard our tastes and sentiments; and politics consider men as
united in society, and dependent on each other. (Hume, 2000, p. 407)
Kant contests this notion; he states that moral law is not a “feeling” and could never be
based only on intellect and sensation; rather, it is categorical and precise (Kant, 1963).
“The ethical principle is, therefore, sheerly intellectual principle of the pure reason”
(Kant, 1963, p. 39). Theories of modern nationalism as advanced by scholars such as
Kedourie (1980; 1993) and Gellner (1983; 1994) also diverge according to the Kantian
and Humean schools of thought, which we will explore more in depth later. Although we
must acknowledge this intellectual lineage and rhetorical dialectic in order to understand
the concept of nationalism in modernity, this project focuses more directly on Kantian
ideals of nation for two reasons: Its affinity to ancient ideals of natural law, pure reason
and human action as well as the genesis of discourse about cosmopolitanism, which leads
us through our conversation of the nation in modernity and postmodernity.
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In sum, Kant’s Ethics provides ground from which we can begin to understand the
modern version of the nation and our contemporary understanding of how nation and
nationalism are structured today. However, before we move into further explanations of
nationalism in modernity, we must consider Kant’s philosophy in the context of his other
works that paved the way for modern nationalism emerging out of ideals of free will and
self-determination.
Critique of Pure Reason. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1990) begins to establish
the principles set forth in his Lectures on Ethics. Similar to his system of ethics and
morality, Kant places humanity, as opposed to an external rational order that was very
much advanced by proponents of the Enlightenment, at the center of his philosophy. He
elevated the need for transcendental idealism and metaphysics at a time when the real
physical world was considered the only proof of humanity and existence, and develops an
alternative theory beyond the readily accepted theories of rationalism, empiricism and
pure transcendentalism. Such an approach seemed to affect the ways in which we think
about communicative action within the nation and it philosophical foundations into
modernity.
Kant’s argument centers on the question of how we come to understand the world. Is
the world revealed through our experiences alone or does the world have the potential to
reveal itself to us? Although Kant attempts to construct a theory that argues against pure
empiricism, where experience is central to understanding our world, he accepts its place
and power in human epistemology. However, he also wants to advance the importance of
understanding the need for a priori knowledge that comes to us through concepts that are
outside of our experience – space and time. His modern a priori approach favors the
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metaphysical realm where first theoretical principles often trump the physical world and
position knowledge outside of experience. Through such an approach Kant is able to
raise such an ideal of the transcendental a priori to a universal principle that governs
human epistemology.
There is no way than through intuition or conceptions, as such; and these are
given either an a priori or a posteriori. The latter, namely, empirical conceptions,
together with the empirical intuition on which they are founded, cannot afford any
synthetical proposition, except such as it itself also empirical, that is a proposition
of experience. But an empirical proposition cannot possess the qualities of
necessity and absolute universality, which, nevertheless, are the characteristics of
all geometrical propositions. As to the first and only means to arrive at such
cognitions, namely, through mere conceptions or intuitions a priori, it is quite
clear that from mere conceptions no synthetical cognitions, but only analytical
ones can be obtained. (Kant, 1990, p.18)
Again, Kant responds to Hume’s (2000) experiential, cause-effect claim that all
knowledge derives from experience. Kant, instead, seeks to raise our awareness
regarding existence and that experience rather conforms to knowledge. In the end, Kant
attempts to challenge the close-ended Empiricists (such as Hume and Locke) and tempers
the scientific revolution from completely disregarding God, Pure Reason and the
Transcendental Ideal. He restores the universal “a priori” during the Enlightenment when
experience ruled supreme. Ultimately, his solution lies in the ancient Greek ideal,
phronesis or practical reason, where human liberty, God and immortality exist
concurrently. By searching for a bond between earthly materialism and idealism, Kant
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engages in a praxis that allows us to transcend and understand the a priori. Kant forces us
to consider alternatives to human understanding and makes us realize that morality comes
through not only theory or practice, but rather a powerful union of the two: praxis. As a
descendant of Greek and Roman ideals, morality is embodied in practical reason.
Although Kant claims to explore another alternative to traditional approaches, he still
must rely on those existing claims to build his argument. Kant ends up relying on a
Platonic universal a priori to structure his claims for transcendental idealism, which does
not necessarily offer us a new alternative to understand human knowledge and
experience. Kant allowed the debate of experience and reason over universal a priori to
continue into modernity and create formidable ground for a justification of
communication and rhetoric as useful methods of understanding our world, and for the
sake of our argument, the ways in which we structure society and the contexts in which
we organize our lives, most notably the nation in political, economic and cultural
contexts.
Kant is an essential figure in helping us understand the continuing arguments about
human knowledge and whether it originates in experience, the scientific methods, and
empiricism or if they it resides in a larger Truth that is lived through practical reason.
First and foremost, however, is Kant’s emphasis on praxis and how we can use theory
together with practice to create substantive and realistic versions of life. The
quintessential embodiment of this praxis is experienced in our social lives, which are
governed by the nation-state—the political structure that dictates laws, justice, economy,
and communication.
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Kedourie explains that Kant, particularly in the Critique of Pure Reason, sought a
solution to the problem of empiricism and morality. This reasoning eventually led to an
understanding of the roots of free will and subsequently the role of self-determination in
communal life. Universal laws derived from a priori are then found within human nature,
not solely through experience and appearances. Man is free when he is guided by
internal a priori, moral laws and not by external, a posteriori experience; by moving
inward Man is free and, therefore, virtuous (Kedourie, 1993, p. 15).
The conception of morality and free will places the individual at the center of the
narrative that unfolds in communal life. Individuals are empowered through universal a
priori guidance who allow them freedom and the ability to act morally and good. This
autonomy leads to self-determination, and for Kant, “Self-determination thus becomes
the supreme political good” (Kedourie, 1993, p. 22). Kedourie (1993) attributes the
strong, deterministic political movements that formed the states of the modern era, such
as the French Revolutionaries and the leaders of Italian Reunification, to this form of
self-determination derived from Kant’s system of ethics and morality. “…[T]he
influence of Kant’s thought was decisive; the solutions he provided for the problems of
philosophy, and the difficulties which these solutions raised in turn, left a lasting,
unmistakable imprint of subsequent speculation” (Kedourie, 1993, p. 24). Thus, for
some, Kant is credited with transforming the structure of modern thinking in a way that
empowers individuals to follow certain “pure” principles while exercising their rights to
freedom and the ability to organize their public lives in the ways in which benefitted
them the most.
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Although Kant does not directly address concerns for the structure of the nation,
his philosophy and defense of pure reason in the face of pure empiricism leads the way to
thinking about how humans choose to organize themselves in society. Pure reason led to
a morality that afforded individuals the autonomy to choose what was appropriate and
beneficial to all. Later, Kant begins to discuss his vision of a world that would be
rendered as possibly one of the first defenses of a cosmopolitan world. Perhaps Kant
began to see both the possibilities and limitations of a world comprised of selfdetermined individuals in need of narrow communal structures.
Perpetual Peace. If individuals are free to determine their destiny, and this
destiny can be realized within the structure of the state, then it would align that this
“state” could include everyone that strives for this existence. In other words, for Kant
(2003), peace is realized in a cosmo-political version of divided states. I refer to this
concept as hyphenated for the very reason that we must heed the rhetorical influence of
both the cosmopolitan nature of society while bracketing the need for understanding the
political as a separate but related concept. Although the origin of “cosmopolitan” derives
from the terms “cosmos” and “polis,” their meanings are frequently disguised in this oftmisunderstood concept. By the same token, although Kant’s political philosophy has
been discussed in terms of cosmopolitanism, we must be careful to directly closely align
the two closely as it may be more of an imposition of the current modern understanding
of cosmopolitanism and not the actual complex system of cooperating nations that would
ultimately create what he coined “perpetual peace.”
For Kant, peace, a state grounded in the universal a priori principle of goodness,
is a natural phenomenon, while evil, war and conflict are not. Peace is not some bogus
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ideal, but rather a real, pragmatic phenomenon that is fueled by moral action where
politics becomes the structure of that moral action, which ultimately culminates in the
republic. Politicians and philosophers must work together to preserve peace, and politics
and morality must be united to create peace. Moral politicians are those who choose
politics consistent with morality; the political moralist is one who forges morality in such
a way that it conforms to the statesman’s advantage (Kant, 2003).
Kant does not oppose the idea of a republican state, as advanced my many of his
predecessors and peers, nor does he balk at the need for aggression when absolutely
necessary; however, he realizes that peace is practically possible through the cooperation
of states on a higher, more coordinated level.
A state is not, like the ground which it occupies, a piece of property
(patrimonium). It is a society of men whom no one else has any right to
command or to dispose except the state itself. It is a trunk with its own roots. But
to incorporate it into another state, like a graft, is to destroy its existence as a
moral person, reducing it to a thing; such incorporation thus contradicts the idea
of the original contract with which no right over a people can be conceived.
(Kant, 2003, p. 4)
A world state, then, is not wise; rather, it is the powerful connection between states,
expressed in his proposal for a league of nations that ultimately addresses the need for
peace.
The law, and ultimately republican constitutions carried out by representative
democracies (not pure democracies, which Kant considers despotic) are the true vehicles
for peace and cooperation. Constitutions not only implore citizens to function within the
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law, they encourage citizens to author the law themselves to create civil order. Perpetual
peace is a priori through what Kant refers to as natura daedala rerum (nature, the great
artist); the law enables such a priori approaches to social life to emerge naturally (2003).
Kant sees the cooperation of the moral and political only possible through the
engagement of collective pure reason. Without a sense of reason, the free association of
world leaders that preserve peace becomes impossible. “That is, they must not be
deduced from volition as the supreme yet empirical principle of political wisdom, but
rather from the pure concept of the duty of the right, from the ought whose principle is
given a priori by pure reason, regardless of what the physical consequences may be”
(Kant, 2003, p. 45). Pure reason culminates in the “public-ness” of morality, which enacts
the practice and enforcement of reasonable morality by engaging a check and balance for
all to consider.
Kant’s approach to peace is grounded in reason and pragmatism. He sees the
natural states of the world as a peaceful association of humans that behave morally as
guided by man-made legal imperatives. He recognizes the instability of man while
acknowledging the natural occurrence of peace simply because man has been forced to
share this globe together. In other words, peace is a natural phenomenon until humans
become part of the equation. It is not clear through Kant’s argument, however, if peace is
truly a natural occurrence since it requires the interaction of humans in communion with
one another. He wants to achieve the possibility of a cosmopolitan world where humans
think and behave according to collective pure reason, but understands that humans are
corrupted through the various political structures that have emerged and govern our
behaviors and interactions with one another. “Since the narrower or wider community of
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the people of earth has developed so far that a violation of rights in one place is felt
throughout the world, the idea of a law of world citizenship is no high-flown or
exaggerated notion. It is a supplement to the unwritten code of the civil and international
law, indispensible for the maintenance of public human rights and hence also of perpetual
peace” (Kant, 2003, p. 23).
Most importantly, he constructs a paradigm for the true nature of peace and its
earthly necessities. Juridical and political structures that are truly grounded in morality
and pure reason will help forge international political relations that constantly recognize
peace as a moral duty. Ultimately, however, behavior must be fueled by moral action.
Constitutions have no meaning or value in a state where moral action is not paramount.
By considering moral action as the basis for legal action, we are forced to entertain the
notion of immoral agents that rule states and blemish possibilities for perpetual peace.
One subcategory under such a rubric includes the movement of people across national
borders, namely issues of immigration, national membership or citizenship. Conflict,
which is originated through inhospitable approaches, counteracts the natural phenomenon
of peace. Rather, the free movement of people around the world is a significant indicator
(and ultimate test) of peace.
We can see, even in actual states, which are far from perfectly organized, that in
their foreign relations they approach that which the idea of right prescribes. This
is also in spite of the fact that the intrinsic element of morality is certainly not the
cause of it. (A good constitution is not to be expected from morality, but
conversely a good moral condition of a people is to be expected only under a
good constitution). Instead of genuine morality, the mechanism of nature brings it
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to pass through selfish inclinations, which naturally conflict outwardly but which
can be used by reason as a means for its own end, the sovereignty of law, and, as
concerns the state, for promoting and securing internal and external peace. (Kant,
2003, p. 31)
Nussbaum (1997) explains that much of Kant’s philosophy on perpetual peace and
cosmopolitanism were based on the teachings of ancient philosophers such as the Stoics,
Cicero and Marcus Aurelius. The Stoics focus on pure reason paved the way for
thinkers, such as Kant, who based their philosophies on a priori principles, and provided
a context for cosmopolitan thinking. The Stoics considered politics as a divisive force
that legitimized the alienation of other groups outside of one’s political and social
context. They believed that we should be more inclined to engage in “empathetic
understanding,” even with our enemies, to foster an environment of cooperation focused
on a common telos. The Stoics were practitioners of empathy who believed that, in the
words of Marcus Aurelius, we should “enter into the mind of the other,” to accomplish
our goals and create productive communities of interest (Nussbaum, 1997, p. 33).
Kant’s philosophy of peace and his insistence on the need for international
cooperation becomes one of his core beliefs, which provides a foundation for scholars
and practitioners of peace and conflict studies. However, Kant reconceptualizes
cosmopolitanism in the context of modern social structures and sees the need to
understand the intricate balance between individual self-determination and public action.
The negotiating mechanism between these two opposing forces is Kant’s concept of pure
reason, and how it can assist us in justifying how peace is an a priori phenomenon only to
be threatened by “unnatural” and “unreasonable” human action. Such an approach to
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peace that ultimately avoids cultural and political conflict is grounded in moral human
beings who create juridical and political structures that perpetuate peace in quotidian,
pragmatic ways.
Although some scholars such as Gellner (1983) emphatically oppose Kedourie’s
characterization of the philosophical foundations of the nation and nationalism in
modernity, Kant’s concepts of the categorical imperative, self-determination, and
cosmopolitanism frequently emerge in discussions about the nation and the history of
contemporary nationalism. Although this debate is important and productive, Kant seems
to remain a pivotal voice in the ways in which the modern nation is characterized through
his foundational ideas of the self-determined individual in society, the guidance that is
provided to these individuals through a priori pure reason, and the communicative nature
of nations for healthy international cooperation.
Origins of Nation: The Philosophical Debate
So far we have explored these core Kantian concepts to provide a philosophical
foundation and hermeneutic entrance for a modernist understanding of nationalistic
structures. Nonetheless, there has been significant scholarly debate about Kant’s actual
influence on such thinking and how it has influenced the shaping and organizing
principles of the modern world. As mentioned earlier, Kedourie (1993) has viewed Kant
at the significant rhetorical interruptive power in the shaping of modern nationalistic
structures, and Kedourie himself shifted the contemporary conversation of nationalism by
beginning what some have called the “modernist school of nationalism” (Thompson and
Fevre, 2001, p. 305). Ernest Gellner (1994), on the other hand, has challenged Kedourie
and introduced other possible alternatives for the origins of modern nationalistic thinking.
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Some scholars suggest that Kedourie’s focus on conceptual philosophical origins rather
than historical accounts of the nation disconnects the issue from real world issues and
provides no solid ground from which we can begin to understand the problems associated
with nationalism in the contemporary world. Kedourie’s connection to Kant “not only
suffers from ‘conceptual determinism’ but from considering German nationalism as the
historical manspring for all nationalisms” (Englander, 1978, p. 39). However, Kedourie
(1989) defends such a characterization of this misleading assumption:
The idea of the individual as the fundamental, primordial element in society and
politics can be said to be a European seventeenth-century invention. This
individual—along with his fellow individuals—is a sovereign king, to use
Locke’s description. It cannot, however, be supposed that this individual
emerged fully fledged from the minds of philosophers. Rather, before and along
with the theorizing of this individual, we see in Western society the spread —
whatever its reason—of an ideal in which men and women increasingly look
upon themselves as foci of independent judgment, final arbiters from whose
verdicts there is no further appeal, alike in their preferences and aversions, and in
their notions of right and wrong. The theorizing of this ideal issues in the
philosophical abstraction know as the individual – and on this abstraction
Liberalism is erected. (Kedourie, 1989, p. 266)
For Kedourie, then, Kant and other Enlightenment scholars constructed epistemological
and ontological approaches to ways in which the individual began to emerge in social
settings. From the interaction and communication of these self-determined individuals
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sprang a new conceptual framework from which the home (oikos), community, society,
justice, education, politics, economics and the nation were re-enacted.
Gellner’s (1983) critique of Kant vis a vis Kedourie is a significant argument in
understanding theories of the nation. We explore Gellner’s approach not only to offer an
alternative line of thinking for theories of nationalism, but also to understand the
rhetorical discord behind ideas of nationalism and what seems to be a constant inherent
internal conflict within the concept itself, a position with which various scholars
mentioned previously concur.
Before we delve into the philosophical disagreements proposed by Gellner
(1983), we should understand his basic understanding of nationalism. First and foremost,
Gellner recognizes the necessary symbiotic relationship between the state and nation; for
him, the natural ordering principles of the state are necessary prerequisites for nations,
and therefore nationalism. Gellner takes the stance that nations cannot exist without the
state, whereas others thinkers that we have mentioned earlier have seen the nation as the
driving force for creating the actual state. He defers to Weber’s definition of the state,
where the state is the legitimization of violence and order (p. 3). “The ‘state’ is that
institution or set of institutions specifically concerned with the enforcement of order
(whatever else they may also be concerned with). The state exists where specialized
order-enforcing agencies, such a police forces and courts, have separated out from the
rest of social life. They are the state” (p. 4).
Apart from this technical description of the state, Gellner (1983) recognizes the
existential-phenomenological and emotional power the nation has conjured in the modern
mind. The frequently uttered phrases about “men without nations” come to mind when
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considering Gellner’s characterization of the nation. The need for humanity to be
enveloped by national structures is most likely not a natural occurrence: “Having a nation
is not an inherent attribute of humanity, but it has now come to appear as such” (p. 6).
Human history, and thus the development of the concept of nation, is divided into
three rather distinct periods: pre-agrarian, agrarian and industrial (Gellner, 1983). The
state has no real foundation and organization within the pre-agrarian cultures, but it began
to emerge with agrarian societies, and more importantly and unavoidably in the Industrial
Age, where a need for order and legitimate violence were necessary requirements within
the web of chaotic relations (Gellner, 1983). It is important to recognize that Gellner is
not simply tying the advent of the nation to the rise of industrialization; rather, he sees
unequal distribution of modernization and industrialization as the catalyst of nationbuilding and nationalism by providing a common existential-phenomenological center
and perhaps a replacement for religion at a time when the complexity of social life was
overwhelming and disparate. “Thus, in the agrarian world high culture coexists with the
low cultures, and needs a church (or at least a clerkly guild) to sustain it. In the industrial
world high culture prevails, but they need a state not a church, and they need a state each.
That is one way of summing up the emergence of the nationalist age” (Gellner, 1983, pp.
72-73.
The Industrial Age provided the practical ground from which scholars like Hume
and Kant could present their arguments about rationality and experience, where human
relations in the world and across state structures, and therefore cultural identities, were
more complicated and textured by communication at macro, international levels as well
as more micro, interpersonal levels. Industrialization demanded a reshaping of the
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narrative that contextualized not only structures of law, government, and order, but also
the role of the individual within this shift in narrative. Industrialization introduced an
enlarged mentality that expanded the world on every level: “[Industrialization] was a
totally new vision. The old worlds were, on the one hand, each of them, a cosmos:
purposive, hierarchical, ‘meaningful’, and on the other hand, not quite unified, consisting
of sub-worlds each with its own idiom and logic, not subsumable under a single overall
orderliness. The new world was on the one hand, morally inert, and on the other, unitary”
(Gellner, 1983, p.23). The philosophy of the moment, as shaped by individuals such as
Kant and Hume, grounded a rhetoric that could offer a new vision which organized the
macrostructures in the world, but also, for the purposes of our argument, affected the way
in which “petits recits” (or micronarratives) (Lyotard, 1979, p. 60) and interpersonal
relations would eventually morph to accommodate this “web of affiliations” (to borrow
Simmel’s term, 1955).
For Gellner (1983), there are clear antagonistic forces that helped create
nationalism: When society begins to experience economic, educational and social
inequality and cleavages, culture begins to align with polity to form a nation based on
ethnicity for its members. There is a way to exclude or include others when necessary,
and an identity is formed (Gellner, 1983). Two essential forces contribute to nationalism
– communication and mobility (Gellner, 1983). The ease of communication, like the
discovery of writing in the agrarian world and the advent of the printing press during the
Industrial Age, quite readily helped those with common cultures and causes to band
together, as in an Andersonian imagined community, while mobility delineated very clear
existential-phenomenological lines of belonging to culture and polity.
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Constant occupational changes, reinforced the concern that most jobs with
communication, the manipulation of meaning rather than the manipulation of
things, makes for at least a certain kind of social equality of diminished social
distance, and the need for a standardized, effectively shared medium of
communication. These factors underlie both modern egalitarianism and
nationalism. (Gellner, 1983, p. 112)
Again, we see the power to communicate to the masses affected identity as it relates to
governance and culture—how individuals and groups begin to create meaning and form
narratives around messages affects the ways in which societies choose to organize
themselves and create formal structures that organize communal life.
It was not philosophical influence that formed nationalistic structures; rather, it
was modernity itself – the process of social, economic and technological modernization
and industrialization that beckoned the need for national sentiment. Gellner (1994)
insists that citizens really had no choice in the matter; industrialization imposed a great
deal of influence on the ways citizens viewed the structure and sentiment toward the
organizing body of the state. Kant’s analysis was only a product of what modernization
initiated (Gellner, 1994).
Within industrialization, there is more communicative power across a wide range,
which plays into the Andersonian sense of imagined community. Gellner (1994) does not
see print capitalism as espoused by Anderson (2006), in particular, as part and parcel of
the emergence of nationalism, only the ability to communicate across the masses and
across distances is necessary and sufficient for the formation of nationalism. One might
surmise that Gellner, like McLuhan (1989) that more technologically advanced forms of
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communication such as the Internet, voice and video communication as well as modern
forms of transportation all contribute to our ability to accomplish this.
The guiding question continues to be one of origin, and Kant provides the
philosophical foundations for understanding Gellner’s (1994) explanation. Gellner,
however, challenges Kedourie’s notion that Kant’s philosophy is one that provides
answers. Gellner is strongly opposed to Kedourie’s recognition of Kant as a
philosophical founder of nationalism. He vehemently argues against the idea that Kant’s
ideals of self-determination and individual autonomy have anything to do with the notion
of nationalistic thinking; rather, nations emerged in direct opposition to Kant’s ideals
(Gellner, 1983). “Kant’s main problem was the validation (and circumscription) of both
our scientific and our moral knowledge. The main philosophic device he employs for the
attainment of this end is the contention that our guiding cognitive and moral principles
are self generated, and inescapably so. As there is no final authority or validation to
found outside, it must be inside” (Gellner, 1983, p. 130). Rather, Kant invoked his
concepts of a priori morality and self-determination as an answer to a rather complicated
question. Gellner insists that Kant’s theory of individual autonomy and its effects on
communal life deliberately ignore the power of culture in the national context. Ignoring
the effect of the Industrial Revolution on nation-building and reducing society to mere
recipients of dominating philosophical ideas, as Kedourie suggests, does not tell the true
story of nationalism’s genesis. However, O’Leary (1997) suggests that Gellner’s
interpretation of nationalism’s relationship to industrialization may be overly functional
and attribute much more emphasis to modernization than is really the case. Gellner’s
theory was considered to be “unashamedly functionalist,” focusing more on economic
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origins while organizing human and material culture (O’Leary, 1997, pp. 203, 215). As a
result, Gellner’s theory tends to be quite “apolitical,” discounting the need to
acknowledge the political aspects as opposed to the cultural and materialist aspects
(O’Leary, 1997, p. 215). “So the economy needs both the new type of central culture and
the central state; the culture needs the state; and the state probably needs the homogenous
cultural branding of its flock…In brief, the mutual relationship of a modern culture and
state is something quite new, and springs, inevitably, from the requirements of modern
economy” (Gellner, 1983, p. 140). O’Leary also believes that Gellner’s model for types
of nationalism only addresses societies which are mostly considered homogenous or, at
the most, bi-cultural; his theory doesn’t address multiculturalism, an essential element of
society in contemporary society (O’Leary, 1998). Because of Gellner’s discrete
treatment of culture and the ability to identify nations and nationalism through
individuals, some scholars have suggested that his theory tends to describe “nationalities”
as opposed to “nationalism” (Englander, 1978, p. 37).
Transitions to a Postmodern Hermeneutic of the Nation
As we have seen, scholars such as Gellner and Anderson who have delved deep
into the subject of nationalism cannot avoid acknowledging the presence and power of
human communication and the role it plays in the rise and transition of nationalist ideals.
Smith (1995) also offers a detailed analysis of the formation of the nation and the
direction in which social, political, economic and communicative forces are driving it.
Smith’s cogent analysis of the development of nationalism is helpful in determining some
of its significant moments, but it is clear that his definition of nationalism falls within the
realm of “false nationalism” (Buber, 2005) perspectives. This bias presupposes the need
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to shift from contemporary structures of nationalism into the inevitable transition to
postmodernism. Smith declares,” [O]ur world has become a single place” (1995, p. 1),
and the need for a postmodern theory of nationalism is essential for responding to the
current historical moment. More importantly, Smith, unlike most contemporary scholars
of nationalism, recognizes the influence of premodern thought on the development of
nationalism through social history and its direct relationship to postmodern renderings of
the nation. Yet again, we see the deep connection of premodern ideals to postmodern
characteristics (Smith, 2008, p. 32).
The story we tell about the dating and shaping of nations must begin in
antiquity…The first glimmerings of such national communities could be found in
ancient Egypt, and more obviously in Christian Armenia and post-Exilic Judea;
while in the ancient Greek world, Athens, the largest polis – and in Aristotle’s
eyes and ethnos (nation) – displayed at least some of the processes of national
community. (Smith, 2008, p. 34)
Smith harkens back to our analysis of Isocrates and Cicero and their contributions,
particularly those of culture (paideia) and natural law, to the conceptions of nationalism
throughout history.
Smith (1995) explains that nationalism scholarship tends to refer to three distinct
schools of thought: the first recognizes the nation and nationalism as organic responses to
the historical moment; the second tends to be more Kedourian or Gellnerian, where
nations and nationalism are direct results of modernization and industrialization; and the
third sees nationalism as a constant centerpiece of human society that persists while all
other aspects “pass away” (pp. 3-4). Until recently, the first school of thought has been
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discussed much less frequently than the other two schools of thought, but contemporary
thought seems to be hovering within what Smith coins “the First School.” The first
school of thought also seems to address nation and nationalism within a communicative
structure that recognizes historicity and the needs of the human community within a
particular historical moment. Smith (1995) argues that, if interpreted under the rubric of
the first school of thought, our contemporary understanding of nationalism does not
indeed respond to the needs of the current moment; rather, we are embedded in the realm
of the other schools of thought.
In fact, we are already witnessing the breakdown of the 'homogenous nation' in
many societies, whose cultures and narratives of national identity are becoming
increasingly hybridized and ambivalent, and the emergence, some would say rereemergence, of looser polyethnic societies. A 'post-modern' era, like its ‘premodern' counterpart, has little place for politicized ethnicity or for nationalism as
an autonomous political force. (pp. 3-4)
Smith provides an important transition in our discussion about the character of the nation
and nationalism in postmodernity. Not only does Smith recognize the importance of the
ancients in shaping our historical and metaphorical renderings of nation, he sees the
nation as an ontological phenomenon that must respond to the needs of the human
community at any particular point in time. As scholars such as Lyotard (1984)
acknowledge the breakdown of metanarratives and a departure from the epistemology of
modernity, so too must the nation reconceptualize its structure and role to respond most
effectively to the needs of the contemporary world. We can only accomplish such a task
under the guidance of all of those who have come before such as the ancients and the
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Enlightenment philosophers to arrive at a constructive hermeneutic approach on
contemporary nationalism.
Implications
This chapter has explored the various renderings of the nation and nationalism in
modernity through existential-phenomenological, philosophical, sociological and
economic perspectives, which reflect the diversity as well as the internal discord within
the concept itself. In short, there seems to be very little agreement among scholars about
the origins and emergence of modern nationalism. Scholars do not seem be able to agree
on the historical point at which and the philosophical concepts through which nationalism
emerged. This project takes the stance that the nation is essentially a product of ancient
philosophy, politics and rhetoric like that of Smith (1983, 1998, 2010). Kedourie and
Gellner see nationalism as a product of the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution,
major interruptions which identify movements of modernity.
The diversity of the origins of nationalism seems to be limitless. Whether it is
considering its ancient antecedents, attributing it to philosophical or economic roots, or
understanding its existential-phenomenological power, it is clear that nationalism has
entered the world stage from a variety of ideological perspectives. In this chapter, we
began to move into modernity’s version of nationalism through hermeneutic devices such
as sacred space, collective memory (or, better stated, collective amnesia), duty to one’s
own citizenship and citizenry, and the influence of a social contract and civil society on
the macrostructures of society and its contribution to the creation of the nation and
nationalism.
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This project has focused on the influence and power of Kant’s contribution to the
idea of the nation through concepts such as the categorical imperative and selfdetermination, as well as the historical events such as the vast Industrial Revolution that
spread across the Western world and influenced the Western trope on countless levels. I
chose to focus on these two particular events as they allow us to frame the argument
about nationalism through a communicative lens, offering a focus on the ways in which
society chose a rhetorical stance to help them negotiate a complicated social world.
Although many scholars, such as Gellner, may not agree about Kant’s influence and
others may not agree with Gellner’s overly mechanistic, economic perspective of the
Industrial Revolution, they are two significant worldviews that frame our understanding
of nationalism as an existential-phenomenological, communicative construct.
Kedourie and Gellner provide significant theories of nationalism within the
framework of modernity, but postmodern life seems to texture the metanarrative of
nationalism differently, incorporating the philosophical, political, social, economic, and
for all intents and purposes, communicative ground to fuel human action. Englander
(1978) states:
It is the history of individuals reflecting on, and judging, the situations that
confront them; a history of individuals molding traditional terms to fit their own
frame of reference, rather than passively receiving them; it is a history, not of
supraindividual forces, as in Gellner, nor of abstract ideas, as in Kedourie, but of
human action. (p. 45)
The function of this particular study is to uncover some of the philosophical and
rhetorical antecedents helpful for understanding nationalism; the constraints and focus of
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this project to do not allow for an exhaustive anthology of the multitude of theories and
approaches about the nation that have been expounded by timeless scholars such as Marx
and Engels (2004), Rousseau (1973), and Fichte (2013), to name just a few. However,
the scholars that I have chosen offer a compelling tale of nationalism’s philosophical
origins and how these hermeneutic approaches help us evaluate the presence of
nationalism in our communicative lives.
Our next task will be to engage previous scholarship on nationalism, which
includes the ancients, and move the discussion about the current nature of nationalism in
postmodernity to contemporary issues, recognizing how human communication again is
placed at the center of this discussion. Most importantly, postmodernity recalls the need
for what the ancients called phronesis, or practical reason, and the need for rhetorical
approaches in contingent circumstances textured by multiple voices and perspectives in
an ever-growing diverse paideia. However, it is important to realize that we may not be
able to move into such a discussion without acknowledging the foundational role of
modernity, which I have addressed in this chapter.
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Chapter 5
The Postmodern Nation:
Applying Martin Buber’s Dialogic Theory
“In a new day of mankind, the early dawn of which we believe we have already
perceived, nationalism will become more loving and more attached to the life of
individuals, will fashion it more richly and freely, will be the most private and hidden
essence of mankind” (Kohn, 1980, p. 30).
Postmodernity provides a fitting, yet complex, framework for the concept of
nationalism in the contemporary world, textured as it is with diversity and with the everincreasing connections and ability to communicate more directly across this diversity. Of
course, from a global perspective, it is not that diversity never existed or that diversity is
more evident in postmodernity, but rather how opportunities for cross-fertilization and
interconnectivity seem to be acknowledged more than ever before. Given our analysis of
nationalism theory thus far, it is clear that the way in which human communication is
structured, disseminated and utilized transforms the concept of nationalism. My next task
is to move from our historical and metaphorical discussion of nationalism with its
contributions to communicative, social, political, and economic thought and move toward
an understanding of nationalism within the postmodern realm by understanding the
historical-structural shift of postmodernity, the shift in the structural and existentialphenomenological nature of communication, and how all of this responds to our current
communicative moment.
In a letter to Martin Buber, his friend and colleague, Hans Kohn (1980), a wellknown scholar of nationalism, outlines a brief history of nationalism and expresses his
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vision of a transitional moment in the idea of nationalism in the early 20 th century (p. 27).
Immediately after the First World War, Kohn saw a shift in the way individuals viewed
nationalism’s role in their personal, political and economic lives. For Kohn, The Great
War was the pivotal moment in which nationalism would meet its inevitable demise. In
hindsight, we can see that this transition was in fact delayed and more drawn out than he
had surmised, but there still seemed to be an unavoidable next phase for nationalism’s
fate. The focus on the individual in 19th century thought and social behavior seemed to
be collapsing on itself, creating a social and political tension that called for a new era of
the nation, perhaps no longer structured and validated by the state as it had been as a
result of Enlightenment thought (Kohn, 1980).
At the beginning of the twenties in our century, one can see this reformation of
nationalism almost everywhere. It is the sense of a new, powerful, connected life,
the certainty of standing in tradition and yet being touched by totally new winds,
the yearning for a new strong faith, that holds all these movements together. At
the same time there is a conscious seeking for an ethical anchoring of nationalism.
…Nationalism is becoming a question of personal ethics, personal shaping life; it
is becoming questionable. It is faced with new problems. Things close to it are
now remote. Certitudes are questionable, and people are trying to interpret
uncertainties from the breadth and depth of solitude… Among the Jews, Martin
Buber gave form and expression to this movement. (Kohn, 1980, pp. 27-28,
emphasis added)
Kohn’s comments seem to be situated within the realm of communication ethics; the
monolithic modern nation seems to be transforming under postmodern dialogic,
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interpersonal pressures that no longer can contain individuals within clearly defined
political, cultural, economic and communicative boundaries. The nature of human
connection can no longer sustain a rigid structure of the nation in modernity.
As we will see, Kohn’s predictions echo Buber’s philosophical approach for the
existence of man, and whose concerns eventually are ideated in his hopes for the Jewish
state in the early 20th century. We will see how Buber’s philosophy of dialogue reflects
the concerns of nationalism at the time, as expressed by Kohn, and how they can provide
a lens through which we understand nationalism not so much in the 20th century, but as
we transition into the 21st century and beyond. Concerns for the individual’s
embeddedness in community as well as the relationship that emerges “between”
individuals have a lasting effect on the shifting idea of the nation and the individual’s role
within the nation. In other words, “dialogue,” particularly in the Buberian sense,
becomes an essential concept for framing the nation and nationalism in a new form.
At the moment we see the characteristics of a postmodern nation emerging
through various media, particularly through the ease of communication technologies, but
also through the movement of people and the ability to interact on a more interpersonal
level, or “second person” level (Verlinden, 2010), shifting the ways in which humans
think about the world around them and their particular place in the world. A theory of
postmodern nationalism can help us answer these two worldviews by applying our
understanding of communication theory and the influence of communication on a number
of levels, whether they are interpersonal, inter-group, intercultural, or international. Most
importantly, we will see that, with the power to communicate across vast spaces and
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cultural divides, the nation and nationalism can take on dialogic characteristics. Dialogic
theory can provide substantive ground for texturing the concept of the postmodern nation.
By invoking dialogic scholar Martin Buber, I will attempt to construct a theory of
what I call “dialogic nationalism” that takes into consideration not only communication at
a more macro level and across borders, but also the importance of interpersonal,
intercultural interactions between peoples who communicate across their national borders
and national identities every day. Our “imagined communities” have become even more
imagined and are no longer relegated only to print capitalism as indicated in Anderson’s
(2006) seminal work, as technology and dialogue together form a bond that allows us the
imagine communities that are less rigid and seemingly more natural to the human
communicative process — all while creating more complexity and contingency than ever
before. Cosmopolitanism provides a glimpse into understanding a more interconnected
world, but it does not provide the practical answers that a theory of dialogic nationalism,
an intermediary solution, might. Dialogic nationalism does not discount the power of
institutions within the state and nation, but rather acknowledges their existence as a
vehicle toward increasing communication across cultures and borders. There is a
continued sense of public participation as advanced by the Greeks and Romans.
Habermas’ Critique of Postmodernity: The Postnational Constellation
As illuminated at the very beginning of this project, Lyotard’s analysis of the
dawn of postmodernity and the destruction of the metanarrative provides a framework for
exploring the rhetorical/metaphorical history of nationalism. It also provides an opening
where “dialogic nationalism” becomes a possibility. Given this discussion on the many
characteristics of the nation, it may seem more appropriate to consider nationalism as a
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major feature and phenomenon of modernity, always providing an existentialphenomenological center, a necessary point of reference, for its members to live within a
Western notion of reason and security. Human discourse forces the nation to engage in
constant transmutation over space and time. Therefore, a conversation about the
contemporary nation is pointless without exploring its particular characteristics and how
it is influenced within postmodernity.
In his famous essay on the “Postnational Constellation,” Habermas (2001) offers a
detailed analysis of the effects of communication on an ever increasingly globalized
world at a systematic political and economic level. Since modernity, the self-determining
nature of the nation-state has served as the social mechanism where democracy and
individual freedom could flourish. “…[T]he very success of the social democratic
process, as one could call it, has nourished the vision of a society capable of conscious
change through the will of its democratically united citizens” (Habermas, 2001, p. 60).
Habermas, however, offers a rather grim outlook regarding the erosion of the nationstate. The deconstruction of the nation, under the pressure of various postmodern
narratives of globalization, results in the volatility of institutionalized systems of
government and economic markets and a disjuncture between human life and
institutionalized systems. However, Habermas realizes that these external forces of
postmodernity and their effect on the nation as we understand it are inevitable; he
attempts to construct an argument that addresses the concerns of the disintegrating
modern nation and the inevitability of postmodern forces that challenge the existence of
what he calls the postnational constellation.
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Habermas understands that the debate about the changing world is a complex
dialectic of a swinging pendulum between the nation-state within modernity and the
postnational constellation in postmodernity. This dialectic is also expressed in the fact
that humans are constantly opening and closing their lifeworlds to external pressures. We
inevitably open and close our minds, expanding our horizons of understanding and
opening ourselves to alternative ontological paths, only to engage in this process over and
over again. A dialectic of the private citizen’s identity tied to the nation gives way to
what we generally consider static forces in the public sphere (Habermas, 2001).
We need to distinguish between two different aspects here: on the one hand, the
cognitive dissonances that lead to a hardening of national identities as different
cultural forms of life come into collision; on the other hand, the hybrid
differentiations that soften native cultures and comparatively homogenous forms
of life in the wake of assimilation in a single material world culture. (Habermas,
2001, pp. 72-73)
The loss of a “democratic form of self-control” that is made possible within the modern
nation is not only a result of larger political and economic pressures, but also the product
of the communicative life of individuals within their lifeworlds. Although Habermas
chooses to focus on the larger political and economic effects on postmodernity, it is clear
that he sees the interpersonal, intercultural experience as a foundational factor in the
movement to a postnational formulation of the world. “Reacting to the homogenizing
pressure of a material world culture, new constellations often emerge which do not so
much level out existing cultural differences as create a new multiplicity of hybridized
forms… a process kept in motion through intercultural contacts and multiethnic
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connections” (Habermas, 2001, p. 75). The dismantling of various forms of political and
economic systems forces us to reconsider modern forms of the nation and to function
with a newly organized, multidimensional sphere where alternative political voices are
heard (p. 87).
Habermas begins to investigate the formation of the European Union as well as
the United Nations as the first postnational entities to systemize these multidimensional
global political challenges. However, it is still clear that the world is still attempting to
grasp what it means to develop political, economic and communication systems that
address the dismantling of the nation as we know it. He suggests that the “rhetorical
strategies” that address concerns of these multiple narratives are often supplanted by
larger institutionalized structures of the state, but recognizes that the “discursive structure
of opinion” has an effect on the “loosening of the conceptual ties between democratic
legitimacy and the familiar forms of state organization” (Habermas, 2001, p. 111).
Habermas’s analysis explores the relationship of the public sphere, systematized through
government and public opinion, in addition to the pressure that individuals’ private
voices have on the restricting of the existential lifeworlds of the nation. Dialogic theory
may serve as one window into understanding how individuals can affect the
transformation of larger, seemingly monolithic political, economic and communicative
structures while this transformation takes place. The dismantling of the modern of nationstate presents a number of complex political and economic challenges that seem almost
unforeseeable in an increasingly deterritorialized world; in the spirit of Habermasian
philosophy, he emphasizes a need to focus on coordinated institutionalized public
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structures as paramount to the successful functioning of society in this postnational
constellation (Habermas, 2001, p. 88).
Postnational entities are like the individual stars of a constellation that create
dynamic meaning and telos with other stars; their meaning and purpose is less
sophisticated when they live on their own, but teem with meaning when intricately
coordinated with the other stars in the larger constellation. The postnational constellation
cannot be a dysfunctional cacophony of multiple narratives, but rather a systematized
network of coordinated action that responds to the needs of a multiplicity of voices. Like
Giddens (2001), for Habermas, the modern nation may not be completely on its ways out;
rather, the postnational constellation, like the possibility of dialogic nationalism, serves as
a transitional moment that recognizes the benefits of self-determined nations grounded in
modernity succumbing to the pressures of postmodern narrative confusion.
Dialectical Voices of the Postmodern Nation
Michael Ignatieff (1993) recognizes this tension and the need to transmute
nationalism in the postmodern moment; we need nationalism, and alongside it
provinciality, to interact dialectically within cosmopolitan norms in order to exist in an
enlarged global context. For Ignatieff, nationalism takes on new meaning in a postdynastic realm, for it must transform to accommodate real world problems today; but, in
a Mazzinian sense, cosmopolitan, post-nationalist thinking can only occur in the crucible
of national protection. Such was the case in Bosnia, a region which he coins a “true
cosmopolitan society;” Bosnians fell victim to extranational pressures because they did
not have a state to protect them as a recognized ethnic group. “[C]osmopolitans are not
beyond the nation; and a cosmopolitan… post-nationalist spirit will always depend, in the
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end, on the capacity of nation-states to provide security and civility for their citizens (p.
13).
As mentioned earlier, Calhoun (1997), by way of Michel Foucault, explains
nationalism as a “discursive phenomenon.” Acts of human communication construct the
“realized imaginative” boundaries that manifest in our private and public consciousness,
and therefore our actions, beliefs, and ultimately our institutions. Although ideas of
nationalism are real political and economic forces by many accounts, Calhoun frames
them largely through existential-phenomenological means because they exist in the hearts
and minds of those who are an integral part of the larger discourse, and therefore define
the rhetorical nature of national identity. We will lose sight of the power and complexity
of nationalism if we treat any one element of nationalism as its “master variable” (p. 21).
For Calhoun, treating nationalism as a coherent, well-articulated narrative reduces its
textured complexity and therefore its rhetorical qualities. It is for this reason that
nationalism’s power resides in acts of communication and rhetoric and responds to the
narrative confusion of the postmodern communication context. We often see nationalism
as a practical approach to the problems that the world presents to us—we form
governments, institutions, economies and communication systems in the context of
defined physical characteristics of what we view as a nation. However, we see the reality
of nationalism with greater clarity when we evaluate it as a social phenomenon that
resides in the hearts and minds of its members; exploring its “discursive” qualities leads
us to a postmodern understanding of national power as adequate to this historical
moment. “Nationalism is not just a doctrine, however, but a more basic way of talking,
thinking and acting. To limit nationalism simply to a political doctrine … is to narrow
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our understanding of it too much. It doesn’t do justice to the extent to which nationalism
and national identities shape our lives outside of explicitly political concerns – and
especially outside competition over the structuring of state boundaries” (Calhoun, 1997,
p. 11).
Smith, unlike Gellner (1994) and Kedourie (1993) discussed in Chapter Four,
recognizes the premodern roots of nationalism and rejects the notion that nationalism is
simply a manifestation of modern thought; ultimately, he considers globalism a result of
democratic ideals and the emergence of mass communication (Smith, 2008, p. 34).
Smith also supports exploring the influences of postmodern thought on the nation and
nationalism. Scholars such Nussbaum (1996, 1997) and Appiah (2005, 2006) have
contextualized the contemporary state of nationalism through theories of
cosmopolitanism, while Smith recognizes this trend in cultural, political and economic
globalization. However, Smith attributes the emergence of global cosmopolitanism to
what we might call an Ellulian “techne” (1965), by granting power and access
specifically to the technological aspects of communication that empower those with such
expertise (Smith, 1995, p. 21). Globalization, therefore, is largely in the hands of the
computer scientists and networking specialists as well as the creative minds of
cyberspace and social media. He argues that such a focus on the technical form of
cosmopolitanism does not only support the economic forms of globalization, but also
contests the very nature of politics and culture (Smith, 1995). Current modes of
technology provide the form and channels through which a new world communication
order occurs both economically and culturally. Our attitudes and behaviors are influenced
by the form and frequency of communication, which enables us to interact with others,

163

either directly or indirectly. This focus on culture can also be seen through Smith’s call to
understand this cultural shift in the study of nations and nationalism through the lens of
ethnicity and ethnic groups (Smith, 1992). Technology that has brought us together has
provided a foundation to justify extreme nationalistic tendencies or more cosmopolitan
worldviews. In other words, increased ability to engage in interpersonal and intergroup
dialogue across cultures and national borders more than ever has influenced the
conceptual shift of the nation and nationalism in either direction. One could only
acknowledge our ability to interact with others through the Internet, modern
transportation, and the opening of certain borders to business and education to understand
the acute shift in nationalism inquiry. Global business practices, interethnic marriages
and international student mobility are just a few examples of how modern technology has
influenced the frequency and ability to communicate and transform our understanding of
culture, nation and world. Our mental and communicative constructs are subject to
inevitable forces of interaction in both impersonal (business, corporate, internet) and
interpersonal (travel, education, cultural exchange) realms.
Smith (1992) points out that there is an imminent decline in nationalism studies
and the concept of the nation within the construct of classical modernism (p. 3). The
concepts of nation and nationalism have been subject to postmodern deconstruction
through new approaches such as Anderson’s “Imagined Communities” as well as
Hobsbawm’s (1983) concept of “invented traditions” (p. 3). Traditional historical
analyses such as those of Kedourie and Gellner that I discussed in the previous chapter,
although key to our discussion, have been supplanted and transformed to address the
current state of nationalism studies – an academic response to that which is transpiring in
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real life across the globe. Gellner’s idea that the concept that nationalism may have
actually invented those nations to which it was loyal may actually hold true, as the
postmodern form of nationalism studies in communicative terms reflects the nature of
national and cultural communication today. A world with access to more dialogic
settings of communication is a world influenced by multiple voices and disparate
perspectives. The rather modern concept of the nation, emerging from a controlled,
structured center, is challenged by a world that must inevitably face the multiple,
contingent messages of the day. Metanarratives are burst asunder to reveal a world
where traditional understandings of nation no longer provide guidance to those who must
function in a world with a constant, even overwhelming, flow of information and voices.
Traditions, Culture, Civilization and Diaspora
Studies since the emergence of postmodern thought have highlighted the
transforming nature of nationalism and how it seems to be constituted in everyday life.
Ideas such as Hobsbawm’s “invented traditions” (1983) and Huntington’s “clash of
civilizations” (1996) have attempted to recast the structuration of national and cultural
thought by offering new ideas to the classical understanding of the nation and
nationalism. For Hobsbawm,
“[I]nvented tradition” is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by
overtly and tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to
inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically
implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to
establish continuity with a suitable historic past. (p. 1)
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He suggests that where “genuine” traditions are strong and unwavering, there is no need
to “revive or invent” new traditions to honor what already exists (p. 8). Hobsbawm
contends that nations are, in fact, new “exercises in social engineering” that actually
require the invention of tradition and innovation to legitimize their existence and social
function; this new idea of nation has, ostensibly, served as a catalyst for significant social
phenomena that emerged in the 20th century, such as the struggle for territory and
“national” recognition in Palestine (pp. 13-14). Hobsbawm’s idea of nations as “invented
traditions” debunks the claim that nations are rooted in “genuine” tradition and tied to
deep historical continuity. Rather, nations are relatively new products that masquerade as
the timeless social constructs embracing all that become part of them (p. 14).
As a contemporary of Lyotard (1984), Hobsbawm sees the diversity and
multiplicity in the ideas of the time. Through a postmodern lens, “invented traditions” are
perhaps manifestations of the historical moment, lacking a metanarrative and relying on
“inventions” for cultures and nations to create their own new stories. Traditions,
although often thought to be immutable and static, are frequently contested as constantly
transforming and responsive to the moment. The tradition that we often regard as an
artifact passed down from time immemorial is our own new version of that which came
before us, one that responds to the current historical moment in all its contingency and
diversity. In a sense, the nation is an invented tradition, responding to the historical
moment.
Culture and tradition (like Greek paideia discussed earlier), as the central force
behind the development of “nations,” continues to gain traction in discussions of
nationalism (Huntington, 1996), but as seemingly unnatural entities artificially
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constructed and legitimized through the social contract. In the contemporary world,
people administer their lives within nations, but it seems that the way people conduct
their daily lives rests on the idea of culture, or what Huntington (1996) refers to as
“civilizations.” The post-Cold War, New World Order brought forth the reorganization of
how we think about nation. For Huntington, civilizations rather than nations constitute
the major spheres of influence within the post-Cold War period, and at the core of these
civilizations lies the power of culture. “In the post-Cold War world, the most important
distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political or economic. They are cultural”
(p. 21). Over the last 15 to 20 years, we can see clearly how the notion of nations,
particularly the core characteristics of the national phenomenon, has transformed. What is
important, however, is how we define this core element of culture. Culture must be
understood in postmodern terms in order to locate its rhetorical, practical strength; we
even hear the echoes of postmodernity through Huntington’s rather modern voice—that
global politics are “multipolar and multicivilizational” (p. 21). Huntington deploys
modern universal structures of “civilization” for a system that he attempts to frame as
non-universal and contingent. Again, we find ourselves at a crossroads being asked to
choose one of two paths of national identity, but in reality there may be a third path of
compromise that will lead to a better understanding of its growing complexity.
Huntington’s pivotal work in the field of international relations quickly becomes
supplanted by the unfortunate events of September 11, 2001, where scholars like
Huntington seem to respond to a call for national unity in opposition to those forces that
threaten core “national” beliefs (Huntington, 2004). In Who We Are, Huntington (2004)
characterizes national identity as a fixed concept, deriving its energy from internal unity
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and continuity focused on a central core, evidently returning to his modern roots. Cultural
diversity, immigration, cosmopolitanism and “subnationalism” all pose a threat to the
power of nationalism and the individual’s place in it. Until September 11, 2001,
Huntington characterized American national identity as disjointed and therefore lacking
the necessary substance to bring its people together effectively. For Huntington,
September 11 was a pivotal moment for American national identity; most Americans
readily identified their place in the world as solely American, and most other identities
with which they positioned themselves in society quickly faded into the background.
Essentially, for Huntington, postmodern approaches to diversity and multiplicity are
inauthentic claims about the nature of nationalism and its goals. Elitist cosmopolitan
views of nationalism threatened the very core of national identity and did not speak to
what the American public believed (Huntington, 2004, p.7).
Even when giving strength to what he believes to be the damaging effects of
multiculturalism and diversity to the American national identity, Huntington (2004)
acknowledges that American national identity is a product of competing narratives and
differing opinions. His overall theoretical framework for preserving national identity
works against this acknowledgement:
While the salience of national identity may vary sharply with the intensity of
external threats [therefore questioning the value and substance of the national
identity], the substance of national identity is shaped slowly and more
fundamentally by a wide variety of long-term, often conflicting social, economic,
and political trends. The crucial issues concerning the substance of American
identity on September 10 did not disappear the following day. (p. 9)
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Diversity framed by democracy lives at the very core of the American national being, but
continues to pose challenges of uncertainty and fluidity that are not characteristic of a
solid national identity structured through modernity. Postmodern claims offer a context
for the American national identity question, but for modernist thinkers such as
Huntington, postmodernity still does not provide a necessary centripetal force that must
guide competing narratives to create a cohesive and powerful nationalism. Huntington’s
arguments contribute greatly to the conversation on postmodern nationalism in the sense
that these two competing narratives—one based on the diversity of culture, and the other
based purely on an immutable, immobile central core—help us form a more sophisticated
understanding through the lack of an overarching, unified metanarrative on nation and
nationalism.
Appadurai (1996) is advancing a postmodern approach to understand the
transformational phenomenon on a grassroots level through rhetorical and narrative
structures; he conceptualizes the current state of nationalism as what he calls the
“postnational imaginary” (pp. 21-23). As is the central theme of this project, these types
of postnational imaginaries are directly linked to the mobility of people and advancement
of communication technology that allow for faster and more efficient exchange of ideas,
opinions, and politics quite readily across national physical and ideological borders.
These “diasporic public spheres” push the limits of the modern concept of nationalism
and challenge what we already know and think about the nation (Appadurai, 1996, p.22).
What has emerged historically is now under close scrutiny, recasting the nation into
multiple, amorphous, complex narratives.
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My general argument is there is a similar link to be found between the work of the
imagination [Anderson] and the emergence of a postnational political world.
Without the benefit of hindsight (which we do have with respect to the global
journey of the idea of the nation), it is hard to make a clear case for the role of the
imagination in a postnational order. But as mass mediation becomes increasingly
dominated by electronic media (and thus delinked by the capacity to read and
write), and as such media increasingly link producers and audiences across
national boundaries, and as these audiences themselves start new conversations
between those who move and those who stay, we find a growing number of
diasporic public spheres. (Appadurai, 1996, p.22)
Appadurai’s anthropological perspective analyzes the case of postnationalism through an
intercultural communicative lens in that he acknowledges the importance of the mediated
message in the ways we structure our national and cultural selves. What is notable is not
so much the importance of the mass media itself, but the voices that create these
narratives of possibility that are not confined to one’s own national, political, economic
and cultural life. Rather, the exposure that various messages and, therefore, people
expand our horizons and encourage us to play with concepts that we may not normally
engage. Interculturalism is inherently a natural part of our lives sometimes mediated
through mass media, but more importantly originated and conceptualized by people
affected by intercultural versions of life, or what Appadurai calls a “global and
deterritorialized” human existence (p.55).
The idea that the nation and culture are primordial by nature, as espoused in the
Enlightenment, is readily debated in this postnational order, as it limits the
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epistemological and communicative forms of contemporary life (Appadurai, 1996).
Concepts such as imagination and invention, which have been discussed thus far, and
dialogic communication, which will be invoked soon, are not inherently primordial and
do not speak to the compartmentalized nature of primordialism; rather, they address
issues of “being” and “interbeing” to transform our understandings of the world around
us. Appadurai points out that the work on imagination (Anderson), along with others on
ideology (Lefort, 1986) and hegemony (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985), “began to show us a
new way of seeing subaltern consciousness” (p. 145). The official word of the state,
although still powerful, begins to be subverted in the language of postmodernity, offering
access to alternative voices and intersubjectivity, much like the “invented traditions” that
Hobsbawm (1983) advanced, or what Appadurai views as the “dialectics of implosion
and explosion” (p. 157). However, Appadurai does not suggest that any of this has the
ability to subvert what we currently understand as the nation in many respects; rather, a
postnational context could mean that the existential-phenomenological essence of the
nation may continue to exist in the hearts and minds of its citizens, but the territorial
aspects the deeply associate with the nation may actually be on the decline (p. 169).
The Global Village: An Early Understanding of the Postmodern Nation
In their timeless work, The Global Village, McLuhan and Powers (1989)
(henceforth McLuhan) offer an analysis of the nation and globalization through the
development of various technologies and the ways in which these technologies affect our
thinking and approaches to quotidian issues. They recognize a conceptual shift in the
ways people understand the world around them and explore how this shift will ultimately
connect us to each other differently than before. McLuhan believes that our
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epistemological approach to the world around us is shifting from what is thought to be
more what he views as linear, mechanistic, left-brain, visual thinking to more holistic,
technological, right-brain, acoustic thinking due to the simultaneous, multiple messages
we receive in an age of postmodern technology and multiple media. In the famous
statement, ”the medium is the message,” McLuhan comments on the importance of
“ground” (the non-linear, multifaceted, acoustic form of the message) and how such
ground forms the context, content, and channel for the message one wishes to convey (p.
6).
In the order of things, ground comes first. The figures [the tangible, visual
elements] arrive later. Coming events cast their shadows before them. The
ground of any technology is both the situation that gives rise to it as well as the
whole environment (medium) of services and disservices that the technology
brings with it. These are the side effects, and they impose themselves
haphazardly as a new form of culture. The medium is the message. As an old
ground is displaced by the content of the new situation, it becomes available to
ordinary attention as figure. (p. 6)
This technology that forms the context and content is an extension of our biologic selves
in postmodernity (p. 87).
McLuhan (1989) recognizes this shift in the manner in which we approach the
world, and therefore view our place in the world among this great web of associations,
constantly connecting us and embedding us in physical and social existences. The way in
which we utilize and engage technology has important implications on the ways we view
ourselves in the world, particularly as we have been made to think of ourselves in the
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context of the nation and the world. This epistemological shift to the holistic causes us to
the recast our identities within the context of the nation and view the world more as a
“global village” more than ever before (p. 95).
McLuhan (1989) suggests that this access to electronic media and the possibility
for limitless communication across individual, cultural and national boundaries causes a
loss of individualism, that in turn causes us to cling to more “tribal loyalties” for a sense
of belonging and comfort. These tribal loyalties that are enacted may be misconstrued as
national devotion and fervor, but McLuhan makes it clear that, as a result of the
electronic age, these loyalties are more accurately tied to culture and multiple “centers”
of thought and action. Tribal loyalties are not discrete, boundary-driven connections, but
rather fluid, acoustic forms of affiliation that foster belonging, but in a way that is quite
different from that of Enlightenment influenced epistemologies (p.92; p. 118). These
ideas provoke pre-modern thinking discussed earlier, where culture (much like the Greek
paideia), forms “centers” of identity and social context; they create the ground on which
figures such as nations exists (or do not exist), and allow humans to communicate in
ways which seem natural than the more linear, visual or mechanistic epistemological
structures introduced in modernity.
The nature of the satellite surround is that it has no center and no margin.
‘Centers’ exist everywhere. This is the way the Europeans understood the
character of reality and culture in pre-Renaissance times; no national borders,
simply centers of thought and influence; cities which were haunts of being, of
ideas — the universe of Duns Scotus and Erasmus where nationalism did not yet
exist. In the age of the super satellite, large numbers of people will be unable to
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think merely of regional monopolies of information. Satellites will be able to
‘talk’ to each other and total coverage will lead to total, low cost communication.
Slow information movement will be possible only under the greatest restrictions;
espionage will, therefore, begin to disappear. (McLuhan, 1989, p. 118)
One can see McLuhan’s foresight currently in development: the Internet is becoming
more complex and faster, email, videoconferencing, social media like Facebook and
Twitter allow us to transform the ways in which we communicate; information
technology companies like Apple, Google and Yahoo, have become powerful centers for
political, social and cultural communication; and, mobile handheld technologies that
bring the world to our fingertips and allow us to communicate seamlessly, all resemble
this “satellite” that McLuhan invokes. Even his understanding of a dissolving privacy in
the face of these complex technologies has become accurate as recent news emerges
regarding the government’s ability to monitor and intercept individual Internet
communications for the purpose of “national security.” (Baker & Sanger, New York
Times, June 7, 2013; Nagourney, New York Times, June 8, 2013). McLuhan’s discussion
seems to be inherently postmodern, recognizing how new communication technologies
that connect individuals shift the ground on which we stand, ultimately participating in a
variety of narratives that establish and transform our identities.
It is difficult to discuss the nature of postmodern communication and
epistemologies without mentioning the necessity and power of such technologies. As a
harbinger of communication, and therefore culture, in a postmodern age, McLuhan
understood the future of the technologies that were available to him in the 1970s and
1980s. The limits of this project do not allow me to engage a detailed analysis of some of
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the abovementioned technologies, but like McLuhan, I recognize their existence and
power in order to arrive at a conceptual and practical understanding of how this global,
postnational world is emerging, and what philosophical, ontological phenomena
contribute to this new understanding of the communicative world.
Grounding Buberian Dialogic Theory
In more recent scholarship, the transformative nature of the modern nation-state
as we know it is discussed through these concepts of imagination, invention, postnational
order and the like, but the transition is relatively abrupt with few offering a transitional
phase between the nation in modernity to the nation in postmodernity. Both Appadurai
(1996) and McLuhan (1989) offer an interpretive analysis for such a link between the
traditional nation as we understand it in modernity and the nation as it may emerge in
postmodernity. Since the act of communication is at the core of the nation’s essence and
existence, communication scholarship can offer a substantive approach to thinking about
this transitional, rhetorical moment in the nation, particularly as it pertains to dialogic
communication theory.
Traditionally, dialogic communication is a form of communication theory that
explains how meaning and relationships emerge interpersonally through existentialphenomenological and ontological means. Scholars such as Bahktin (1981), Levinas
(2004), and Buber (1988,1996, 2002, 2005), among others, have all grappled with
existential questions of ethics and being through the act of human dialogue and how it
affects the ways in which we communicate, create meaning, structure thought and exist
as human beings. Although dialogic theory from this perspective has been readily
appropriated to studies of interpersonal and intergroup communication, for the purposes

175

of this project I hope to ground the idea of postmodern nationalism, or postnationalism, in
the idea of dialogic communication and what it can offer for this transitional moment in
the nation—the transition grounded in Lyotard’s (1984) and Anderson’s (2006)
scholarship and characterized more recently by Appadurai (1996) and McLuhan (1989).
I turn to Martin Buber’s understanding of dialogue and its applications for two reasons:
His detailed treatment of dialogic theory, as well as his commentary on nationalism in the
20th century. Buber’s ideas may open up particular lines of inquiry that emerge from our
previous investigation of a communicative-rhetorical history of nationalism as well as
this apparent transformation of the nation and nationalism.
The application of dialogic theory to issues of global justice and how justice
emerges in the nation, as well as in its political, social, economic institutions, is
beginning to emerge as a mode of inquiry (Verlinden, 2010). Scant scholarship has taken
ideas of dialogics, particularly as they have emerged in Martin Buber’s work, and applied
it to larger social issues as opposed to interpersonal, relational communication studies. A
literature search on the connections to dialogic theory and nationalism studies reveals
very little; the scholarship is virtually non-existent.
I hope to explore and provide an interpretive analysis of Buber’s works on
dialogic theory (Between Man and Man, 2002; I and Thou, 1996; The Knowledge of
Man, 1988, among others) as well as his various writings on nationalism specifically in
response to the problem of the Jewish state in the early 20th century (Buber, 2005).
Buber’s scholarship becomes an important element of this study, as it links the idea of
dialogic communication to that of the nation. Scholarship on Buber seems to divide his
work into dialogic theory and his nationalism writings, but few seem to connect the two
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directly. It is clear that Buber’s dialogic approach lives deeply in his views and actions
regarding nationalism and the Zionist movement, but a more deliberate investigation of
his work in both areas might allow us to develop a better understanding of what I mean
by “dialogic nationalism.”
Applying dialogic communication theory to the problem of postmodern
nationalism might help us understand the nature of an increasingly technological world
that seems to lend itself to more interpersonal forms of communication rather than more
commonly applied political communication methods where individuals often seem to be
removed as more distant, disengaged, passive agents in the communication and creation
process. Of course, political communication still plays a central role in understanding the
problem of the nation, as is evident through our inquiry into Isocrates and Cicero.
Nevertheless, the idea of interpersonal communication may play an even more prominent
role as communication technology blurs the communicative, institutional, and political
boundaries and ties people together through more direct forms of communication.
Although we regard the ancients as foundational in helping to create an understanding of
political communication and the human role in the nation, ancient political
communication involved more direct, individual participation, more than those that
immediately followed it. In a sense, the infinite web of “centers,” similarly professed by
Isocrates and McLuhan, are now demanded by postmodernity since this immense
network transcends traditional structures like the nation (albeit constructed on a large
scale) and challenges the idea of international communication by perhaps replacing it
with new forms of interpersonal communication.

177

Dialogic theory by way of both Buber and Levinas has also been applied to
understanding our engagement of global justice issues (Verlinden, 2010). Dialogic theory
provides a transition for two traditional approaches to social issues—the particular,
partial, individually-centered approaches and the universal, impartial, collectivelygenerated approaches (p. 83). Verlinden (2010) argues that these two rather discrete
worldviews no longer provide a helpful answer to issues of global justice and how we as
people-living-in-the-world respond to everyday problems, particularly those that affect us
more indirectly and impersonally (p. 90). By invoking the works of Buber and Levinas,
Verlinden is able to arrive at a transitional point similar to that which I hope to explore
for the discussion of transforming nationalism. Buber’s concept of the “interhuman”
points us in a moral, ethical direction that privileges the actual emergent relationship, the
“between” that is essential to our existential being (Verlinden, p. 96; Buber’s works).
Although not directly addressing issues of nationalism, Verlinden’s focus on global
justice directs us to a conversation about the transitional moment in global
communication for individuals who otherwise might feel that they are, or actually are,
removed from issues that may not have a direct effect on their daily lives. Previously
thought to be quite discrete and separated from global communication, dialogic theory
can help bridge the gap between particularistic and universalistic approaches to social
problems. Buber’s dialogic is not confined to the interpersonal; rather, it is a modality of
turning toward existence, an embodied communicative approach that influences all other
modes of communication whether they are interpersonal, intergroup, intercultural, or
international, essentially because it is “interhuman.” Verlinden helps us mend this gap by
explaining that Buber’s I-Thou not only applies to “concrete individuals” but also to the
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“we of community,” the dialogic structures of society; however, the structural nature of
modern society complicates the essence of community as “an abstract organic structure”
that eludes any sort of genuine and practical engagement (Verlinden, 2010, p. 97). In
Buber’s world, the “voice of the particular” must be heard above the various political
institutions and conversations that take place in a national context. In short, Buber’s
dialogue is not only an ontological explanation of the interpersonal relationship, but it is a
vehicle for allowing voices to connect to each other substantively on a much larger
scale—socially and internationally.
Buber’s use of dialogics is clear throughout his rhetoric of the nation as early as
the 1920s. His focus on dialogics offers us a foundation for understanding the
transformative character of the nation, how it affects international communication and
why the individual interlocutor plays such an elevated role in this transformation.
However, we must understand Buber’s philosophical anthropology—a philosophy
focused on the whole human being—and how it offered credence to the interpersonal
relationship, the necessity of “turning towards” the Other, to offer his philosophy as an
overlay to our discussion about postmodern nationalism.
Anderson and Cissna (1997) situate Buber as an important, although perhaps less
evident, contributor to the postmodern conversation on dialogue. They investigate how
his philosophy helps us explore alternative philosophical standpoints for human
communication at every level of interaction—‘the interpersonal, intergroup, inter-social,
or intercultural, and international—what Buber coins “interhuman.” Buber’s
anthropological philosophy is significant in the conversation about dialogic theory
because it encourages us to explore “how to turn toward, address, and respect otherness”
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(Cissna and Anderson, 1997, p. 109-110). Arnett and Arneson (1999) point out that
Buber sets himself apart from other dialogic theorists (like Rogers) in the way he views
the self as deeply situated in the narratives of the historical moment. Buber recognized
the embeddedness of these individuals in narratives and their existence as
communicative, dialogic beings that emerge out of intersubjective consciousness —the
“interhuman”—and the meaning that emerges “between” those persons engaged in
dialogic communication. The self does not exist in a self-reliant vacuum for Buber, but
rather a relational, ontological realm where meaning and responsibility emerge (Arnett &
Arneson, 1999). The concept of the “between” becomes a consistent metaphor in
Buber’s work (Buber, 1996; 2002). In a need to address “the between,” Buber addresses
our disillusionment with institutions that are constructed to support human activity, and
most importantly, human relations:
When the automatized state yokes together totally uncongenial citizens without
creating or promoting any fellowship, it is supposed to be replaced by a loving
community. And this loving community is supposed to come into being when
people come together, prompted by free, exuberant feeling, and want to live
together. But that is not how things are. True community does not come into
being because people have feelings for each other (though that is required, too),
but rather on two accounts: all of them have to stand in a living, reciprocal
relationship to a single living center, and they have to stand in a living, reciprocal
relationship to one another. The second event has its source in the first but is not
immediately given with it. A living reciprocal relationship includes feelings but is
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not derived from them. A community is built upon a living, reciprocal
relationship, but the builder is the living, active center. (Buber, 1996, p. 94)
Buber, then, distinguishes between emotions and the self, and that the human
communicative relationship builds community through reciprocity. Strong, functional
communities are the results of a dialogic relationship that emerges in the “between,” not
an egotistical focus on developing one’s self without the guidance of the narrative, or
what he refers to as the “center.” This distrust in institutions is a direct comment on the
characterization of the nation in modernity and the dilemma of postmodern contingency,
the lack of the metanarrative to which Lyotard refers. However, Buber recognizes that the
reality of shifting meaning and multiple narratives which lack a guiding metanarrative
does not have to mean that we are lost in a world of individualism and personal emotions;
rather, community is still possible when finding a “center.”
Buber attempts to describe the nature of the dialogic relationship through
Christian, Hindu and Buddhist metaphors to demonstrate the how modernity has
corrupted the concept of the self by detaching it from the dynamics of human
relationship. From a Christian perspective, the Holy Trinity is a prime example of pure
dialogue. These seemingly separate entities become one in the purest forms of
communication, but also take on different roles to create the dialectic of communication:
The relationship of the Father to the Son is hierarchical, but complementary and
necessary; the manifestation of the Spirit through the two is also different, but dynamic
and necessary. Like dialogue, the concept of the Trinity is an elusive concept, difficult to
grasp in human terms but real and possible. Any refocusing on the “I”—the self situated
at the center of it all—loses the essence of what is meant to be as holistic and complete.
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“All modern attempts to reinterpret this primal actuality of dialogue and to make of it a
relationship of the I to the self of something of that sort, as if it were a process confined
to man’s self-sufficient inwardness, are vain and belong to the abysmal history of
deactualization” (Buber, 1996, p. 133). Dialogic communication recalls the notion of
religious tropes such as the Trinity and invokes a re-centering of the self and other as a
complementary relationship, inextricably linked, as one turned toward the other
completely and fully.
Buber’s dialogic theory speaks about the “quality” of contact through
instrumental and objective means (Stewart, Zediker, and Black, 2004, p. 33). Arnett
(2004) explains that this “quality” in dialogic communication, particularly in the
constructs developed by Buber and Levinas, is inherently ethical and elicits what he calls
a “responsive ethical I” (2004, p. 87). A “responsive ethical I” is one that understands
that responsibility rests in our true dialogic relationships with the Other – relationships
that acknowledge a “decentered self” who is committed to the Other and also responsive
to the historical moment (p. 88). The “I” cannot exist without the “Other,” as the “I”
finds itself emerging out of responsiveness to the “Other” while recognizing the
narratives that live around them and within which they dwell. However, life does not
always present what is expected or desired, but is it is subject to contingency, uncertainty
and the reality of everyday life—what Arnett and Arneson (1999) refer to as Buber’s
“communicative poetics” (pp. 140-142). “For Buber, poetry is more concrete than a
logical description of issues such a friendship, love, hope or loyalty. Buber’s
communicative poetry guides without dictating a linear series of expectations. Following
the horizon of Buber’s perspective, … a dialogic ethic ‘interprets otherwise,’ unable to
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provide a graspable answer, pointing to ‘concrete’ life in which real meeting lives in
fuzzy clarity, in a guided temporal response” (Arnett, 2004, p. 89).
This “responsive ethical I” also leads us to engage dialogics in terms of
community. Arnett’s work on Buber and what dialogic theory means for community
(Arnett, 1986) actually preceded his work on the “responsive ethical I” (Arnett, 2004),
but it seems that this “I” is a requirement of dialogic communication and applies to the
formation of healthy, productive communities. Communities are a result of this “fuzzy
clarity” or communicative poetic because they emerge from what Arnett refers to as
“dialogic tension.” “In essence, the usage of the word community…is not rooted in a
precise definition, but in an attitude sensitive to the dialogical tension between self, other,
and the principles of a group or organization” (Arnett, 1986, p. 17). However, we must be
careful not to conceptualize community as collectivism. Buber warns, “Modern
collectivism is the last barrier raised by man against a meeting with himself” (Buber,
2002, p. 239). In other words, man is not dialogically joined with man in a collective;
otherwise, he is embedding himself in a collective that masks his true relationship with
the other and himself. In community, there is a dialogic tie that recognizes and
acknowledges the other as an embedded other and all that comes with her—uncertainty,
tension, agreement, disagreement, and cooperation – a full menu of life’s experiences.
However, living in community requires a thoughtful response to everyday
communication, or what Buber called the “narrow ridge”—an alternative to the dualistic
form of oppositional communication that we are often accustomed to, particularly in
contemporary Western culture. The “narrow ridge” depolarizes our communication
recognized through multiple viewpoints, “as an alternative to absolute positions that
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characterize communication in a polarized community” (Arnett, 1986, p.31). The
“narrow ridge” is also an ontological communicative space where contingency thrives as
a positive element of human communication, where answers are reached and solutions
are discovered. A linear, rational methodology for problem-solving may not always be
the solution; instead, through a constructive conversation of opposing viewpoints,
answers emerge in the “between,” textured even more by the diacritic of what has been
described as Buber’s “unity of contraries” (Arnett, 1986, p. 65; Arnett & Arneson, 1999,
p. 142). It is important to note, however, that Buber referred to the “unity of contraries”
when discussing mankind’s tendency to escape individual responsibility under the
protection of the collective. Not until the individual was able to achieve a sense of unity
would she be able to emerge from the collective to engage in dialogic communication
and, therefore, the productive, meaningful construct of community.
But unity itself, unity of the person, unity of the lived life, has to be emphasized
again and again. The confusing contradictions cannot be remedied by the
collectives, not one of which knows the taste of genuine unity and which if left to
themselves would end up, like the scorpions imprisoned in a box, in a witty fable,
by devouring one another. This mass of contradictions can be met and conquered
only by the rebirth of personal unity, unity of being, unity of life, unity of action –
unity of being, life and action together. This does not mean a static unity of the
uniform, but the great dynamic of unity of the multiform in which multiformity is
formed into unity of character. (Buber, 2002, p. 137-138)
Buber sets himself apart from other philosophers of communication, and scholars of
dialogue in particular, because he does not focus only on the existential-
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phenomenological qualities of the dialogic act. Rather, for Buber, the ontological
qualities are deeply rooted in and between people and not Being alone. His theory is a
practical approach to intersubjectively lived experiences that address quotidian problems.
“Buber opted for real people, real problems, the calling of conscience in the existential
moment…he doesn’t discuss being-in-the-world, but persons-in-the world” (Arnett,
2004, p. 78).
Applying Dialogic Theory to Nationalism
Arnett (1986) explains that Buber’s dialogic theory has been often misinterpreted
as “soft” and “expressionistic,” (p. 40), but he also points out, other scholars have
understood Buber’s philosophy as one that stands its ground while being able to engage
in productive dialogue (p. 40-41). As a result, these concepts of Buber’s dialogic theory
are relevant to our discussion of postmodern nationalism for a number of reasons.
Traditionally evaluated as a relatively modern concept, nationalism has proven to be a
somewhat contradictory, controversial subject structured within modern notions of
boundary and organization, but appearing to have more rhetorical characteristics of
uncertainty, contingency and fluidity. The postmodern moment, which has been outlined
as one that lacks a central metanarrative but embraces multiple petite narratives, seems to
lend itself to a rhetorical understanding of nationalism. As we have seen, dialogic theory
fits well within this approach by offering not so much a structural approach, but rather a
post-structural approach, or a dialectical guideline, for how nationalism emerges and why
communication is at the center of it. Most relevant, however, is how dialogic theory
becomes a useful and practical approach to nationalism because Buber, as a dialogic
theorist, was also directly involved in activities of nationalism both academically and
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politically. We will see how dialogic theory appropriately textures the difficult
conversation of Israel in the early 20th century, particularly how Buber stands his ground,
but also employs dialogic theory to engage his colleagues and the opposition alike.
Because this project has attempted to view the rhetoric as an essential tool in
developing the concept of the nation and nationalism as early as the Ancients, it is
important to valorize the dialogical approach in exploring postmodern nationalism to
rhetoric as well. Czubaroff (2000) states, “Significant work remains to be done for those
who wish to explore the relevance of dialogical tradition to rhetoric” (p. 183). Czubaroff
believes that Buber’s theory makes a case for dialogic rhetoric because it shifts the
influence of communication from “impositional, transactional, persuasive centers in the
rhetor to an influence that is truly centered on the ‘between’” (p.181). This new rhetoric
framed in dialogics is ontologically, historically and contextually bound and can have
deep implications for community building, as posited by Arnett (1987). Czubaroff (2000)
admits, however, that it is difficult to design dialogic research because dialogic theory is
steeped in everyday lived experience and not subject to straightforward research
methodologies that extrapolate particular experiences and permit clear structuration (p.
182).
The previous analysis suggests that communication studies becomes a necessary
and appropriate field through which we can explore the development and nature of the
nation and nationalism. We can see that rhetoric and dialogic theory are certainly worthy
of connection and development. Martin Buber’s works on dialogue and nationalism can
provide an opening for exploring nationalism in terms of dialogic communication.
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Although heavily involved in the Zionist movement of the early 20 th century,
Buber often offered dissenting views of Zionist policymaking and diplomatic relations
regarding a new state for the Jewish people. He firmly stood his ground on his visions for
nationalism in general, and the Jewish nation more specifically, while attempting to
engage in dialogue with his colleagues on the subject of Zion and a binational agreement
with Palestine. His dialogic orientation (even before his published philosophical works on
dialogue) was fully and completely a part of his approach to the Jewish state and to the
idea of nationalism in general.
Additionally, Buber’s dialogic theory is relevant to issues of nationalism in the
sense that he employs the metaphor of “borders” to describe his concept of monologic
versus dialogic communication. Where monologic (I-It) communication is a “reflexion”
on the self (Buber, 2002), it invokes a “border” —a discrete separation and
objectification—between the Self and the Other. Dialogic communication, on the other
hand, is a mindful “turning toward the Other” (Buber, 2002, p. 25) that recognizes both
distinction in the self that works from a particular standpoint while also turning toward
the Other (Arnett, Fritz, and Bell, 2009)—there is an transformed connexion between I
and Thou (You), that seems to be more holistic and dialectically united. “[E]very It
borders on other Its; It is only by virtue of bordering on others. But where You is said
there is no something. You has no borders. Whoever says You does not have something;
he has nothing. But he stands in relation” (Buber, 1996, p. 55).
This metaphor of “border” plays directly into Buber’s views on the nation and
nationalism over the years. Nations and the concept of nationalism itself depend greatly
on the existence of “borders” as well as the literal and figurative understandings of views
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on nationalism. Dialogic concepts such as Buber’s concept of I and Thou provide ground
for approaching practical solutions regarding the structure of a nation which, in turn,
structures political, social and economic institutions that affect human relationships and
potential.
Buber might say the concepts of the nation and nationalism are formed during
crucial moments of human solitude (what he calls “the ice of solitude”) or “existential
homelessness,” where humans lack the security of abode and are forced into selfreflection and desperately search for a home (Buber, 2002 p.151). For a moment we
return to Kant’s contribution to the structure of the self, how it relates to the modern
understanding of nationalism, and Buber’s reaction to Kantian ideals in view of the
“interhuman” and its implications for communication and community. Buber explains
that the Aristotelian world viewed Man as a part of a larger whole in the cosmos, a
necessary, integrated cog in the complex, fluid wholeness of life. “Man is comprehended
in the world, the world in not comprehended in him” (Buber, 2002, p. 151). Man is not a
discrete object that conducts the world, but is an essential, integrated element that keeps
the cosmos flowing and whole.
The Aristotelian man wonders at man among the rest, but only as a part of a quite
astonishing world. The Augustinian man wonders at that in man which cannot be
understood as part of the world, as a thing among things; and where that former
wondering has already passed into methodological philosophizing, the
Augustinian wondering manifests itself in true depth and uncanniness. It is not
philosophy, but it affects all future philosophy. (Buber, 2002, p. 153)
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“The wholeness of Man,” then, actually becomes an important question to resolve
following Augustine’s concept of Man, which affected much subsequent philosophical
thought, and is expressed in Kant’s works (Buber, 2002).
Buber’s (2002) philosophical analysis of man’s place in the universe and his
connectedness to the universe begins with Kant’s question of “What is Man?,” but
harkens back to Aristotle and ends with Nietzsche and Feuerbach, while visiting with
Aquinas, Cusa, Hegel and Marx along the way. The point here is that, like Kedourie
(1993), who saw Kant as a pivotal figure in the understanding of the concept of
nationalism, Buber believes that Kant’s work is foundational and essential for
understanding the pure nature of Man. However, for Buber, Kant’s important questions,
although attempting to find a philosophical home for Man, separates and alienates him
from the wholeness of man. We see this same idea emerge in Kedourie’s work as it
pertains to the conceptual evolution of nationalism through Kant’s principles of the
categorical imperative and self-determination. Although such principles originate in a
priori guidance with Man connected to a greater whole, his reason and actions toward the
world are focused completely within an independent, autonomous self. There is a turning
inward that neglects Man’s need to connect to the larger whole. If we understand the
nation and nationalism as a practical concept that emerged out of Kantian thought, as
espoused by Kedourie, then we might be perplexed by Buber’s comments. How can
concepts such as the nation and nationalism, which seem to be a necessary product of
communication and community, be a product of Kantian individualistic, self-reflective
thought? Buber believes that the questions focused on “What is Man?” never really quite
reach an acceptable answer because they lack a necessary and sufficient element that all
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of these philosophers have seemed to neglect along the way — community. Our
interconnectedness and intersubjective existence cannot be ignored if we are to answer
this question. Without community, I and Thou cannot emerge in areas beyond the
communicative dyad; neither Man, nor any other philosophical field for that matter, can
be realized and explored to its fullest (Buber, 2002, p.185).
Perhaps by utilizing Buber’s intellectual lineage and Kedourie’s understanding of
the nation and nationalism, both centered on Kant, we can begin to understand why the
concept of the post-Enlightenment nation does not seem to respond to the needs of
humankind. Although seemingly based in community, its Enlightenment roots are
grounded in ideas of self-determination and self-sufficiency and do not respond to the
basic needs that are answered in terms of community and connectedness. Kant’s
understanding of cosmopolitanism and a perpetual peace were well intended, but
alienating, isolationist structures. Although communities were brought together to form
nations, nations were then structured under ideas of autonomy, individualism and, in turn,
justified to act as individuals entities themselves, with no regard to concepts such as
dialogic I-Thou relationships. The network of nations that can create a perpetual peace
existed, but the boundaries and borders that define these nations blatantly ignore the
dialogic connections that must exist for peace to exist in a cosmopolitan world. By man’s
shifting his place in the world from the Aristotelian embeddedness to Kantian
individuality, the purpose of community also shifted. The idea of nation may have existed
in the Ancient world, but its focus, as we can see in Isocrates and Cicero, was formed
around community. According to this line of reasoning, the modern understanding of the
nation was formed around individual identity.
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European man became more and more isolated in the centuries between the
Reformation and the [French] Revolution. United Christendom did not merely
break in two; it was rent by numberless cracks, and human beings no longer stood
on the solid ground of connectedness. The individual was deprived of the security
of a closed cosmic system. He grew more and more specialized and at the same
time isolated, and found himself faced with the dizzy infinity of the new worldimage. In his desire for shelter he reached out for a community—structure which
was just putting in an appearance, for nationality. The individual felt himself
warmly and firmly received into a unit he thought indestructible because it was
“natural,” sprung from and bound to the soil. (Buber, 2005, p. 47)
Buber’s dialogic existence does not necessarily calls us back to the ancient understanding
of Man’s embeddedness in community. Rather, it negotiates ancient and modern
understandings of Man and how they have formed functional communities to create
solutions that recognize Man’s connected individual existence that cannot thrive without
I-Thou relationships lived out in community. Buber’s anthropological philosophy
grounds postmodern nationalism because it recognizes the natural connections that
people have to each other regardless of the nation and culture in which they live. The
narrative multiplicity of postmodernity seems to reflect a more fluid, a priori structure in
which Man dwells, where dialogic communication as a tool is at the core of this structure.
The idea of the nation in postmodernity is reflective of how Buber views
individual agents in a communicative act. Nations are like the individuals in
communicative acts, but in order to develop dialogic relationships that enhance life, they
must engage in meaningful I-Thou relationships. As we are all now able to communicate
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across national borders in an instant, the ways in which we engage others throughout the
world interpersonally seems to transcend national borders on a daily basis. The ability to
engage in such communication requires us to reconsider our place in our local
community, our nation and the world. The concentric circles of identity not only offer us
a “home,” but they force us to reconsider our situatedness within our historical context.
Just as the I-Thou relationship has no borders, our postmodern international and
intercultural relationships—whether they are a product of international travel, face to face
interpersonal communication or virtual, high-tech communication—push the boundary
limits of nation and culture and encourage us to question our discrete place in the greater
whole.
Buber’s Nationalism
Buber’s philosophy can be seen quite clearly through his writings on nationalism
and the Jewish state in the early 20th century. As an original member of the Zionist
movement, he was often an iconoclastic voice in the struggle for a Jewish “home,”
considering the various elements that surrounded the Jewish question and the necessity
for productive relationships with those in close proximity. One can see the origins of his
thinking on dialogue through his struggles with Jewish nationalism and nationalism in
general.
Although brief, his address to the Twelfth Zionist Congress in 1921 on
nationalism is essentially a plea to the Jewish people to consider the ethical implications
of engaging in “false nationalism,” and regarding the nation as an end in itself (2005, p.
54). He regards the nation as a concept that has been broken since the Reformation when
communities where increasingly isolated from each other and sought safety and solace in
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the nation (Buber, 2005). For Buber, nations are formed when communities become
aware about how they differ from other communities and attempt define an identity based
on this difference. He defines a nation as such:
So the term nation signifies the unit ‘people,’ from the point of view of conscious
and active difference. Historically speaking the consciousness is usually the
result of some inner—social or political—transformation, through which the
people comes to realize its own peculiar structure and actions, and set them offer
from those of others…A nation is produced when it acquired status undergoes a
decisive inner change which is accepted as such in the people’s selfconsciousness. To give an example: the great shift which made ancient Rome a
republic made it a nation, too. Not until Rome became a republic did it become a
nation aware of its own peculiar strength, organization, and function,
differentiating itself in these from the surrounding world. (Buber, 2005, p. 51)
The spiritual connection to the nation, what we define as nationalism, is a symptom of an
unhealthy nation, one of overemphasized awareness, unaware of its own disease (Buber,
2005). This tendency of the nation to focus only on itself, and as an end in itself,
disregards the existence of other communities and peoples, and very clearly crosses over
into what Buber believes is a “false” form of nation and nationalism (2005, p. 53). A
nation’s refusal to acknowledge the existence of a “greater structure” that reigns over any
sort of national supremacy, and believes itself to be the be-all-end-all in international and
human relationships, will result in despotism and danger (2005, p. 54). Such a national
ideology is isolationist and egotistical and will cause great strife and eventually its own
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demise. For Buber, the occurrence of false nationalism was leading to a major shift in
nationalism:
In this day and age, when false nationalism is on the rise, we are witness to the
beginning of a decline of the national ideology which flowered in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. It goes without saying that it is perfectly possible
for this decline to go hand in hand with increasing success of nationalistic politics.
But we live in the hour when nationalism is about to annul itself spiritually.
(Buber, 2005, p. 54)
The breakdown of the nation, in Buber’s eyes, is a reaction to the strong nationalistic
forces that were actually attempting to fortify and validate its very existence. Such a
“false nationalism” is not a true reflection of human existence and our attempts to
connect with each other; false nationalistic tendencies, therefore, will eventually work
against any unnatural forces that do not allow us to form communities, wherever they
may be.
The existence of a “common center” is a recurring theme in our discussion about
the formation of nations. Buber’s acknowledges the existence of a “greater structure”
that is more important than the nation itself; when a nation disregards the existence of
this greater structure and refuses to heed its guidance, it will cause its own demise. We
are led to believe that this “greater structure” is God, who perhaps has created a greater
functional structure, and is the greater structure itself, which forms a community of
nations without domination and power. For Buber, a nation and the spiritual connection
to that nation can only exist morally and ethically with constant reliance on this greater
structure, which in turn, forms a community of nations.
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As a proponent of the Jewish nation, Buber warns against these pitfalls of false
nationalism and reminds the Jewish people that their nation is created not only
historically, but also through the eyes of a higher power, as a “community of faith”
(Buber, 2005, p. 55). The Jewish people must transcend this idea of, what Buber calls,
the “formal nation” and understand that this community of faith will not allow it only to
exist as a viable nation, but also as a nation that does not engage in false nationalism. He
implores that Judaism must rise above what we have known as a nation in modernity, and
quite possibly imagine a community of faith if it is going to create a home for those who
have been searching since the Diaspora. Because the type of nation that Buber is
suggesting is not a community as an end in itself, it will then be able to engage in
“supranational responsibility” (Buber, 2005, p. 57).
Buber (2005) begs the Zionists to move beyond what we have understood as a
formal nation and begin to understand its overarching purpose and goal—to live in a
interconnected world where nations are not final, but rather necessary tools that organize
peoples, offering them existential-phenomenological homes that house their collective
history, memory and cultures while helping them understand that they are products of a
larger interconnected context. Buber is not suggesting that nations are unnecessary, but
that a nation’s focus and purpose must be transformed to accommodate the needs of the
world. The new Jewish State can act as an example of one as long as it does not
prescribe to the ideas of nation from the past: “In our case, more than any other, the
decision between life and death has assumed the form of deciding between legitimate and
arbitrary nationalism” (2005, p. 57).
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Such ideas can be understood in Buber’s discussions about the new Jewish state’s
relationship with the Palestinian people. Although often a dissenting voice of the Zionist
movement in his approach to collaborating with the Arabs in Palestine (Mendes-Flohr,
2005), Buber continued to advocate for a peaceful accord with the Jewish people in light
of the Balfour Declaration which began the process of granting the Jewish people land
under British rule in Palestine. He adhered to his strict approach to nationalism that
transcends common understandings and attempted to help the Zionists engage in
legitimate nationalism that regarded all members of the region. Again, we can see clearly
his philosophical, dialogic stance in the face of national conflict. He insists that the
Jewish plan is not a plan “aimed against any other people,” but an effort to regain a longawaited home for the Jewish people (Buber, 2005, p. 61); however, this can only happen
when genuine Buberian dialogue that creates an existential-phenomenological space of
“common interests” and “mutual respect and goodwill” between the stakeholders that
demand recognition in terms of a nation (Buber, 2005, p. 61). “Only then will both
peoples meet in a new and glorious historical encounter” (Buber, 2005, p. 61).
Buber’s dialogic rhetoric is focused on the Other, and the new Jewish state’s
responsibility to the Other. That is, the need for the Zionist movement to not participate
in any form of colonial hegemony toward the Arabs and to react to the Arab uprisings
unlike any other national movement before. Buber’s nationalism, fueled by religious
supranational intentions and focused on a higher power that forces humans to engage in
justice toward others framed by a dialogic viewpoint, leads him to this point: “But the
human aspect of life begins the moment we say to ourselves: we will do not more
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injustice to other, than we are forced to do in order to exist. Only by saying that do we
begin to responsible for life” (2005, p. 86).
Most striking, of course, is Buber’s focus on the interpersonal and how it plays
such an essential role in the development of this new type of nation in the face of distress
and conflict. Buber understands that the creation of Israel can be formed, in large part,
through interpersonal/ intercultural encounters between men and women from each side
unlike any other nation on earth at the time (2005, p. 85). Justice will live in the
relationships that individuals forge across religious, cultural, political and communal
boundaries and create new “centers” that at as binding agents for multiple narratives. As
an alternative to false nationalism, Buber’s legitimate form of nationalism seems to
manifest as a “dialogic nationalism” formed between Man and Man who live in their
guiding narratives yet are willing to negotiate and transform those narratives to live in a
supranational context. “More than anywhere else in the world there is here a topos—a
place where there is a concrete social transformation, not of institutions and
organizations, but of interpersonal relations” (2005, p. 85, emphasis added).
Buber’s Zion was rife with conflict in a pre-Israel world when he was writing his
philosophy of the nation in the early 1920s. One might even say that Buber missed the
mark after witnessing the atrocities that affected not only the world, but the Jewish
people in particular, not even 20 years later. However, one might also regard Buber as
ahead of his time when understanding his thoughts on the nation and nationalism as a
progressive, even radical, voice in the face of recurring conflict that resembled national
conflicts of the past. He is a voice of hope, but also one of solid philosophical ground,
forming a view of dialogue that was not applied to the problems of nationalism before.
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Even after years of domination of the Jewish people in Europe and constant conflict with
Arabs in Palestine, Buber wrote his most important works on dialogic communication
and the need to turn toward the Other. We can see clearly that Buber’s dialogic theory
grew directly from his hopes and dreams of a new nation within the context of the
Jewish-Arab relationship. It is no coincidence that during the same period (in 1923)
Buber would create I and Thou, his original work on dialogic theory.
The above analysis is just a glimpse into Buber’s long and tumultuous
relationship with Zionism. However, the above discussion may point us toward a theory
of dialogic nationalism framed by Buber’s conception of dialogic theory and his writings
about the nation in general. Grounded on a theological/religious/philosophical stance,
Buber breathes life into debates about real world problems particularly as they pertain to
the nation and nationalism. Buber’s disdain for politics and the role it plays in the
formation of the nation, asks us to focus on a morality that is centered on a higher guiding
principle (much like Kant) in order to reach justice through peaceful coexistence with the
Other. Nationalism can, in fact, be grounded in interpersonal relationships when focused
on a common cause and regard for justice. Just as Buber’s theological question of “If not
Me, then Who?,” Buber’s question about the formation of Israel and the Palestinian state
also takes on a existential-phenomenological character by asking “If not Now, When?”
(2005, pp.102;106).
As we return to Kohn, Buber’s trusted colleague, quoted at the beginning of this
chapter, we can not help but think the he got it all wrong: Did he not foresee the
tragedies of World War II and the diabolical Hitler regime that annihilated millions in the
name of nationalism? Or, the continuing challenges in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that
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has claimed countless lives as well? Buber’s concept of “false nationalism,” on the other
hand, may have in fact reluctantly admitted to their inevitable occurrence, but for Buber
these events are products of old conceptions of nationalism and domination.
The Closed-minded attitudes inform the dominant type of nationalism, which has
gained so many adherents among us—the most worthless assimilation—it teaches
that everyone must consider his own nation as absolute and all other nations as
something relative; that one must evaluate one’s own nation on the basis of its
greatest era, and all other nations on the basis of their lowest points. If this idea
continues to gain acceptance it will lead to worldwide disaster. (Buber, 2005, p.
89)
On the other hand, we might think that Kohn and Buber were philosophical visionaries
who saw an inevitable metamorphosis of the nation. Yes, this transition has taken much
longer than perhaps hoped for, but the age is upon us, beckoning new relationships in the
context of the nation, through every form of communication available to us. Dialogic
theory, particularly as Buber has contextualized it, is one window through which we can
explore the communicative nature of the nation in the postmodern moment. The
contingency of our lives and the narratives that guide them leave us to search for possible
answers in a world that seems to be restructuring or reconstructing, rather than
deconstructing, before our eyes. The real and phenomenological boundaries and
delineations are no longer static, but moveable and fluid.
Buber begged his constituencies to regard the process of national formation as a
delicate balance between forming a community of faith and culture and accepting those
who do not share this faith and culture. Although he considered it necessary for a nation
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to be based on theological and ethical principles, he also recognized the need to
acknowledge those who structured these principles differently. Buber’s philosophical
propensity toward dialogic thinking allowed him to see the possibilities for peace and coexistence even in the face of distress. Humans can authentically and genuinely
communicate with each other when they are turned toward one another across the divide
of difference. Such interactions begin interpersonally but emanate into structures of the
nation that, in turn, form our nationalism. In a sense, Buber reminds us of the Ancients
who were constantly attempting to form structures and an understanding of the function
of the polis, never forgetting that the polis is a product of the people and communities of
these people, and not vice-versa. For all of these thinkers, a nation is possible through
the existence of an existential common center as a guiding principle, even if there are
many.
Implications
This preceding discussion seems to point to the fact that nature and character of
nationalism is changing. Nations still exist – their function and the way they define our
lives continue to persist. Is the nation, as it existed in modernity, on its way out? Does a
postmodern nation encourage us to engage in relationships that are founded on multiple
narratives of postmodernity? It seems that the extent to which nations are bounded and
static in modernity is transforming our approach to nation and culture in general.
Appadurai (1996) and Huntington’s (1996) conceptions of culture and civilization that
are permeable and impermanent seem to be apparent.
The progressive nature of technology, particularly communication technology,
that allows us to communicate easily and regularly across national borders affects the
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way in which we involve our identities, and the ways in which these institutions affect
our lives on a regular basis. Contrary to some intellectual thought, the nation may not be
gone, but the ways in which embedded, communicative individuals transform the nation
may change its face forever. Dialogic theory provides a transition point from which we
might frame postmodern nationalism in a way that recognizes the Other embedded in
national structures, across multiple narratives and layers of existence. Nations provide a
existential-phenomenological home, but the preceding discussion suggests that the
manner in which we begin to imagine our existence in the nation is rapidly transforming.
By definition, the multiple centers of postmodernity allow nations themselves to
persist. Postmodernity does not necessarily require a movement toward global politics
(Habermas, 2001). Their very existence valorizes multiple voices and narratives;
globalization does not dissolve borders, it reinforces them but shifts the ways in which
we view those borders as accessible and permeable. As individuals living in a
postmodern moment, we are no longer deeply embedded in one imagined community of a
nation, but rather we are embedded within multiple identities that force us to comprehend
a more globalized world. Dialogic nationalism does not necessarily see the dissolution of
the nation, rather it sees a need for phenomenological “centers” of identity, culture,
economics, and politics but with more contingent, permeable borders. It sees a need to
view our embeddedness in the nation as more transformative and communicative across
these borders as well as within those borders. Within these borders we hear multiple
voices that have literally transcended physical borders and have introduced new,
multidimensional voices to the conversation on the nation, nationality, and nationalism.
Dialogic theory provides a philosophical framework for interpreting such phenomena.
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Chapter 6
Epilogue - Toward a Theory of Dialogic Nationalism: Practical Applications
At the beginning of this study I situated the question of how communication and
rhetorical studies could inform a constructive hermeneutic for understanding of the
nation, nationality and nationalism. I explored the contribution of the ancients—
specifically, Isocrates in Greece and Cicero in Rome—to locate conceptions of the nation
even in the ancient world as an attempt to combat any tendencies of what Roberts (2008)
describes as “chronocentrism” or the “belief in the uniqueness of special difficulties in
our own time as somehow more important than the past” (p. 93). As we discovered,
many scholars have considered the genesis of the nation to rest mainly in modernity, but
further investigation into ancient rhetoric suggests otherwise. Isocrates and Cicero (along
with the more obvious contributions of Aristotle and Plato) both seriously contributed to
the conversation about the nation, even if the qualities and structures of nation were
somewhat varied and focused on political as well as communal understandings of the
nation.
As we can see, the ancients provided important ground for our conversation that
included the nation within modernity and postmodernity. We can see the principles and
rhetorical power of the ancients in both philosophical standpoints quite clearly—there is
structure, discreteness and boundedness while there is public participation as well as the
centrality of interpersonal, dialogic communication when discussing the formation of the
nation. Consequently, I moved (rather abruptly) into the Enlightenment and the influence
of modernity on what we know understand as the nation. The modern nation seems more
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familiar to us in the contemporary world, but also a bit outdated in what some consider as
postmodernity.
The Enlightenment philosophers like Kant in particular seem to have had a
significant impact of how the nation would be structured and respond to political, social,
economic and communicative aspects of everything from interpersonal to intercultural
communication and international politics. The autonomous individual played a
significant role in how nations were formed and imagined by its members, but not
without a general guiding principle, which organized and shepherded those individuals
into a communities of memory and culture.
My task was intended to explore these phenomena throughout history not only as
historical phenomena, but also as metaphors that can inform current phenomena
pertaining to the nation. As studies of the nation within postmodernity have emerged in
the last 20 years, many have chosen to focus on globalization and cosmopolitanism in
particular. Without a doubt, these approaches are necessary when understanding the
nation, but my focus to frame the nation itself presupposes the existence of these
phenomena while attempting to explore the more specific phenomena of nation,
nationality and nationalism. My bias rests in the fact that a dialogic ethic can provide
answers for current existential-phenomenological forces. Dialogic communication theory,
in particular at it has been explicated by Martin Buber, seems to provide a philosophical
home for the way I understand the emerging “post-national imaginary” (Appadurai, 1996,
p. 177). Dialogic nationalism does not necessarily call for the end of the nation as we
know it, rather it acknowledges a discrete Other while allowing meaning to emerge
between the two to create a third alternative. In this sense, dialogic communication as
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framed by Buber—not just dialogue —allows us to view the nation as a communicative
phenomenon that engages the Other differently. Monologue will persist even in these
discussions of dialogic nationalism. Dialogic nationalism is not suggesting that by
turning toward the Other we will resolve all the political, economic and social problem of
the world, completely avoiding diplomatic breakdowns and war. However, dialogic
nationalism highlights the centrality and importance of the embedded individual and the
dialogic act as influential and transformative for people whose identity is closely tied to
the nation. Dialogic nationalism is an integrative approach to seeing the nation and
nationalism as an ever-changing phenomenon in terms of how people imagine their place
in the world simply through an encounter with the Other, but framed by national identity.
In the midst of an apparent breakdown of a grand guiding narrative, dialogic theory may
be able to provide some starting points from which we can explore the multiple
narratives, and the communication of those narratives and how they affect the idea of the
nation. I have attempted to bracket the nation and nationalism through the lens of
communication; however, other issues such as language and religion introduce even more
complexity to the nature of the changing globe and the role of the nation itself. The
scope of this project does not allow for a more detailed elaboration on such issues, as
whole chapters could be dedicated to them; however, I hope that this study can serve as a
foundation for those discussions, and place the nation into dialogue with barriers (and
bridges) of language and religion.
There are several areas in our daily lives that affect the way in which we
communicate with Other and, in turn, encourage us to reconsider our place in the world.
One may argue that those international and intercultural interactions may in fact affect
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the way one reacts to difference and multiplicity, forcing them into the cocoon of
isolation. However, all indicators seem to at least shift our thinking about the world into
new realms. Just as Appadurai (1996) suggests that transportation, immigration and
technology are transforming modern man into a post-national imaginary, I would suggest
that our lives are affected by those phenomena everyday either directly or indirectly. We
no longer passively absorb information about the world around us through unidirectional,
monologic media such as television and radio, but as McLuhan (1989) suggested, we are
engaged in more frequent interpersonal/social relations, mediated through technology,
that enlarge our local village to a global one.
The forces of postmodernity seem as if they will forever change and challenge the
nation as we know it, deterritorializing the nation more than before. One might only
mention the social and communicative phenomena emerging in the Arab world at the
moment, the global debate on immigration, or the global financial and economic crisis, to
see how these events are shaping – or rather reshaping—our world. This is not to say that
these events will not be wrought with conflict and seemingly monologic behaviors, but
the pressures of multiple voices and new forms of instantaneous communication may
restructure the nation, as formed in modernity. Autonomous individuals still play a role
in how this will happen, but individuals tied together in even more powerful forms of
communication may change the way in which we view the nation into the future.
Like Bhabha (1996), Roberts (2008) points out that globalization, which should
be investigated well beyond the frame of three decades, has fostered the phenomenon of
identity hybridization, or a “dialectic between two or more identities” (p. 98). Roberts
contests the notion that mass media, as espoused by Appadurai (1998) and McLuhan
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(1989), are the only forces that influence our notions of increased globalization, but
rather how in the postmodern moment interpersonal communication, cultural
performances, and public participation have an even more prominent and influential
presence (Roberts, 2008). Dialogic theory not only provides a framework for such an
approach to globalization and the state of the nation, but also points us in the direction of
how the idea of the nation is relying on more personal, participatory forms of
communication rather than the traditional, institutional, almost monolithic forms, of
communication as characterized in modernity.
Indicators of the Changing Nation?
My experience in this form of dialogic nationalism lies directly in my work with
international students in the United States. Working with this population has encouraged
me to think about this very subject and to academically engage the origins of the nation
and nationalism as well as their transformative character. With the largest number of
international students studying in the United States ever (Farrugia, et al., 2012, p. 2), the
mere number of international students may be a clear indication of the changing character
of the nation and nationalism. International students live “between” (Bhabha, 1996;
Hegde, 1998) national and cultural contexts on many levels and offer insight into how we
might characterize the pragmatic shift of our thinking about this idea of the nation.
Students have long played an influential role in national change whether through
surreptitious activity or overt protestations; Tiananmen Square, the Wall in East Berlin,
Otpor in Serbia (York, 2001), all exemplify the power of student voices in civil society,
particularly when it comes to the changing character of a nation. International students
can provide insight for thinking about the changing character of the nation within
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globalization and postmodernity as their experience occupies a liminal space that
transcends the traditional understanding of the nation and nationalism. Many of these
students, not all, are part of the socially influential sectors of society, which can often
encourage change at home and abroad. The narratives of international student
experiences can provide a hermeneutic entrance through which the postmodern nation
may reveal itself through human communication.
Very little research has contributed to the conversation about international student
flows and its effect on the perception of the nation and nationalism. A few, but
significant, studies that have been done (Szelenyi, 2006; Szelenyi & Rhoads, 2007;
Kramer, 2009) seem to indicate that international students—genuine “postnational
imaginaries” who are part of the “diasporic public sphere” (Appadurai, 1996, p. 177; p. 4)
— in fact, place a considerable amount of pressure on the concept of nation, and
therefore on practices in international relations.
I hope that my exploration about the rhetorical/communicative nature of the
nation and its changing character can lead to even more research about how the changing
nature of human contact is forcing us to live more interculturally and internationally,
particularly from the standpoint of philosophy of communication. To build upon
Waltzawick, Beavin and Jackson’s (1967) edict “we cannot not communicate,” (p. 49) I
would suggest that, in our current interconnected, globalized world, “we cannot not
communicate interculturally.” It is my stance that the presence of an international student
in the classroom and on a university campus, and our interactions with that student,
whether directly or indirectly, not only presents new cultural perspectives on a subject,
but also encourages us to question our own convictions and worldviews.
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My question about the nation and nationalism originated from such heated
debates over immigration and how migrants can influence perceptions about the overall
economic, social and political health of a nation. Immigration, or what Appadurai (1996)
coins the “diasporic public sphere,” (p. 4) is a useful pragmatic public problem that
illustrates the power of nationalistic rhetoric and communicative action framed within the
context of the Other, and the conceptual matrix of postnational theory. Much research
has focused on the impact of immigration on individuals, identity, social justice,
cosmopolitanism and public policy (Abbott, 1969; Busey, 1969; Carens, 1999; Demo,
2005; Gerstle, 2001; Ingram, 2002; Jones, 1992; Kraut, 1982; Payrow, 2007; Portes &
Sensenbrenner, 1993; Portes & Rumbaut, 2006; Scott, 1984; Seglow, 2005; Vertovec,
2001), but little research has attempted to frame the problem of immigration within a
framework of postmodern nationalism addressing issues of identity hybridization, which
may result in the deterritorialization of the nation itself.
More specifically, the subject of immigration is often a polarizing, politically
charged debate that engages societies to either emphasize or reconsider their current
political and social standpoints (Carens, 1999; Demo, 2005; Ingram, 2002; Seglow, 2005;
Vertovec, 2001). It invokes emotional reactions as well as rational inquiries into the state
of private and public postmodern life. Current debate in the U.S. about immigration
speaks volumes about the power of migration and inter-border, cross-cultural
interactions. Immigration has been a robust debate throughout history, as it seems to
directly affect the ways in which individuals and groups identify with their national
heritage and create or reinforce particular social standpoints when citizens feel
threatened—that is, immigrants present unknown social risks that devalue the perceived
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comfort and feeling of protection of a particular community (Demo, 2005). For these
reasons, immigration can also reveal an interesting hermeneutic entrance when
considering the nation and nationalism. By understanding migratory phenomena through
communicative constructs, we may begin to understand how individuals, groups and the
larger public form identities around the experience of migration and, in turn, affect the
entire notion of the nation, nationality and nationalism. Immigration in the context of the
nation can also offer ground for justifying the promotion of a model of dialogic
nationalism.
My hope is that this study can provide even more questions about the validity and
possible transformation of the nation in the contemporary world through a philosophy of
communication lens. I believe that such an approach to the nation is heuristic in that it
leads us to more specific phenomena that put direct pressure on the nation as we
understand it. Additionally, other conceptions of dialogic theory, like that of Emmanual
Levinas and his views on dialogic reciprocity, may provide another framework in which
we can refine this idea of dialogic nationalism; in other words, is Buber’s suggestion of
turning toward the Other and acknowledging the Other enough to explicate the shifting
nature of the nation through a philosophy of communication lens. Within the limits of
this project, many questions have gone unanswered because of the sheer complexity of
the idea of nation and the plethora of scholarly conversations that have engaged studies
about the nation and nationalism. However, this has provided a starting point from which
we can ground additional questions of dialogic nationalism and its applicability in
conversations about the nation in postmodernity.
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Dialogic nationalism may provide a transitional hermeneutic for the postmodern
nation. As we are engaged in more intellectual relationships, we are confronted with
difference, hanging onto our own identities while allowing them—either intentionally or
unintentionally—to be transformed from within. My hope is that this study of nation and
nationalism from antiquity to the postmodern provides a unique
rhetorical/communicative view of the nation and nationalism. I also hope that this
discussion of the postmodern nation from a communicative/dialogic standpoint is
heuristic as it has many applications for various national and cultural phenomena and,
ultimately, how we imagine the world around us.
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